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Executive Summary 
1.  This study has been commissioned by Northumberland County Council to consider the 
iŵpliĐatioŶs of Bƌeǆit oŶ the ƌuƌal Ŷoƌth of EŶglaŶd. Bƌeǆit is a ͚oŶĐe iŶ a geŶeƌatioŶ͛ eǀeŶt ǁhiĐh ǁill haǀe 
a significant and long-lasting impact on all parts of the UK.  The area covered by this report is primarily 
the rural parts of the county of Northumberland, but inevitably, what happens in the neighbouring areas 
will have a significant impact on rural Northumberland so a wider focus on the rural north is employed 
where necessary.  In addition, rural areas are interconnected with urban regions across the North, hence 
the impact of BREXIT on the rural north must include consideration of the potential impacts of BREXIT on 
regions of the North, including the metropolitan areas.   
2.  The policy review captures how the rural north of England has been lagging behind both the 
regional and national economy for some time.  The data shows that Northumberland has lagged behind 
the urban areas of the region in both GVA and levels of employment for a number of years.  Rural 
economies also face problems relating to low wage levels, affordable housing, connectivity and 
dependence on EU funding.  However, problems also arise from mistaken or outdated assumptions about 
rurality, and the application of policies designed primarily for urban areas. 
3. The Policy review has also revealed two important issues: 
 that while land-based activities are vital, particularly for more remote communities, the economy 
of the rural areas of the north is highly diverse and the BREXIT effects cannot simply be reduced 
to a Ŷaƌƌoǁ ƌaŶge of seĐtoƌs that aƌe deeŵed to ďe ͞ƌuƌal͟.    rural areas are interconnected with urban regions across the North, hence the impact of BREXIT 
on the rural north must include consideration of the potential impacts of BREXIT on regions of the 
North, including the metropolitan areas.   
4.  The review also highlights hoǁ BƌitaiŶ͛s ƌuƌal aƌeas ƌepƌeseŶt a foƌgotteŶ oppoƌtuŶitǇ.  Their 
economic contribution – 16.6 per cent of GVA – deƌiǀes fƌoŵ diǀeƌse aĐtiǀities; ͚tƌaditioŶal͛ ƌuƌal seĐtoƌs 
such as agriculture and tourism operate alongside a growing presence of agri-tech, energy generation, 
and manufacturing.  The latter accounts for the same proportion of the rural and the urban economy.  
Different elements of the rural economy are closely intertwined, relationships to urban neighbours are 
important, and rural places themselves are highly diverse. 
5.  The sector reviews highlight how specific drivers will have impacts for certain sectors. For 
example,  
  
 For agriculture the main concern is around the future of policy following the exit from the 
Common Agricultural Policy.  There are also pressures resulting from access to EU labour and 
commodity markets with uncertainty about the nature of future relationships compounding the 
pressures.  Similar concerns were raised in relation to manufacturing with access to export markets and EU 
labour markets being the top drivers for change.  There were potential positives highlighted.  The 
possibility of gaining better access to fast growing markets in Africa and South East Asia could 
benefit the region͛s manufacturing companies.  Linked to the labour market issues, a big driver 
for change is the region͛s ability to deliver the relevant skills and training for the region͛s 
businesses.  This has been a problem for a number of years and has formed the basis of a number 
of the ƌegioŶ͛s pƌeǀious eĐoŶoŵiĐ stƌategies.   In contrast to the manufacturing and agricultural sectors, the Forestry sector sees a number of 
opportunities in Brexit. For example, as the sector grows there is a problem of sourcing raw 
materials locally. With any decline in agriculture and land values, opportunities arise to convert 
land to forestry.   The tourism sector presented more of a mixed picture with changes to travel and visa processes 
possibly adding to demand for staycations.  This is balanced by concerns about finding and 
retaining a workforce willing to work in a rural area.  There was also a strong statement made by 
a number of experts on the need for a more coordinated approach to destination marketing for 
the region.   The Digital and creative sector is often hidden within the wider rural economy but plays a 
significant and growing role.  For this sector, connectivity is the biggest driver for change.  Both 
physical, through issues such as broadband, but also intangible connectivity through distance 
from knowledge and innovation networks.  
5. The round table events also highlighted the need for the region to play to its strengths.  This is in 
terms of its economic strengths in manufacturing, particularly sectors such as off-shore and automotive 
and in the new fast-growing sectors such as digital and creative industry.  It also relates to the natural 
assets of the region. The relationship between the rural and urban areas was also highlighted as being 
critical to the region͛s future prosperity.   
6. The most important driver of change identified by the expert panel for this report was the shape 
of regional and rural policy support following Brexit.  The impact of a new agricultural policy regime in 
  
tandem with a new regional policy structure will have a significant impact on the rural north of England. 
This is partially mitigated by the potential of new devolved structures that are about to come into effect. 
The North of Tyne Combined Authority and the Borderlands Growth Deal do give the region the 
opportunity to control its fate to a certain extent and to implement policies which address the specific 
weaknesses of the economy.  However, knowledge of, and commitment to, both endeavours remains 
patchy.  Other drivers which are important in determining the future of the rural north of England are 
digital infrastructure and the impact of the 4th industrial revolution.  There is a danger that events may 
further marginalise the region, both physically and in policy terms leading to the rural north of England 
missing out on the opportunities that these developments offer.  
7.  The two scenarios presented in this report deliberately reflect the best and worst outcomes of 
Brexit.  Even the best outcome for the rural north of England presents significant challenges for policy 
makers due to the pre-eǆistiŶg defiĐieŶĐies iŶ the ƌegioŶ͛s eĐoŶoŵǇ.  IŶ the worst-case scenario, policy 
makers will need to make significant decisions to mitigate the effects of Brexit.  In both scenarios, tackling 
the pre-existing weaknesses of the northern rural economy will also provide a policy framework to tackle 
Brexit.  These weaknesses, as identified by the expert panel include, a better regional jobs and skills 
market, better connectivity - both in transportation and ICT - and a more joined-up approach to regional 
decision making.  
8. The final workshop held by the project team has created a third scenario and roadmap for the 
future. It highlights both the risks and the opportunities presented by Brexit and what the region can do 
to face the challenge head on.  There are fundamental structural issues that need to be addressed: 
connectivity; skills and training; supply chain infrastructure and coordinated governance for example.  
Some of these issues can be tackled by the region and its stakeholders without help.  Other issues require 
support and assistance from beyond the region.  The clear message was that the region needs to speak 
with one voice and be clear about what it is asking for.  
 
  
  
1. Introduction 
This study has been commissioned by Northumberland County Council to consider the implications of 
Brexit on the rural north of England. Brexit is a ͚oŶĐe iŶ a generation͛ event which will have a significant 
and long-lasting impact on all parts of the UK.  The area covered by this report is primarily the rural parts 
of the county of Northumberland, but inevitably, what happens in the neighbouring areas will have a 
significant impact on rural Northumberland so a wider focus on the rural north is employed where 
necessary.  The ƌepoƌt͛s stƌuĐtuƌe is as folloǁs. 
Following the Introduction, Chapter One sets out the wider context of the rural north, its economic and 
social profile and wider challenges and opportunities and locates the Northumberland economy within 
this. Chapter 2 looks specifically at policy literature on the potential implications of Brexit across a series 
of pan-regional, regional and local scales, while Chapter 3 provides a more in-depth analysis of the key 
sectors ƌeleǀaŶt to NoƌthuŵďeƌlaŶd͛s ƌuƌal stƌategǇ and the potential opportunities and constraints 
created by Brexit.   
The policy review considered both academic and policy documents.  It looked at policy responses to Brexit 
on both a national and regional level coupled with a comprehensive sectoral analysis taking account of 
the most important sectors for the rural north east of England.  This was then triangulated using the 
material gleaned from the primary data described in the next three chapters.   
Building on the material covered in the first 3 sections, Chapter 4 explains how a foresight methodology 
was used to engage a panel of experts from across the region in imagining what rural Northumberland 
will be like in 2030.  This panel of experts was set the seemingly simple question of: ͞ ǁhat will Brexit mean 
foƌ the ƌuƌal Ŷoƌth of EŶglaŶd?͟  Within this question, the complexity of Brexit soon reveals itself as the 
impact will be felt across all sectors of the economy and within every community in the region.  To 
structure this seemingly impossible task, the Delphi Method was adopted.  The Delphi Method provides 
a systematic way of thinking about the future.  Chapter 5 captures how it first identifies the key drivers 
for change and then starts to build an understanding of the systems and processes that are driving change 
in the region.  
The final stage of the foresight process – contained in Chapter 6 - is to build a set of scenarios imagining 
what the rural north of England will be like in 2030.  These are not intended to be predictions but are 
provocations to stimulate a debate about the kind of future to aim for and conversely the kind of future 
to avoid.   
  
2. The Project Methodology 
This study has used a foresight methodology to develop an understanding of the impact that Brexit may 
have on the rural north of England.  The foresight method does not aim to predict the future.  It sets out 
to imagine a number of scenarios that reflect possible outcomes for the future.  These future scenarios 
are developed with the help of an expert panel and using a range of primary and secondary sources.  
Figure 1 shows the structure of the foresight method used in this study: 
Figure 1: Foresight Methodology 
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Phase 1: Baseline evidence; Policy Review and Delphi Panel. 
The foresight method starts with three parallel work packages: a policy review; a Delphi Panel Survey 
and the collation of baseline evidence.  
Work Package 1: The Policy Review 
An extensive review of a range of policy and academic documents was undertaken.  The current socio-
economic and policy contexts in which Northumberland and the rural North finds itself have been outlined 
as have the possible implications of Brexit.  This stage also included a detailed review of the present state 
of the ƌegioŶ͛s ŵaiŶ seĐtoƌs – agriculture, digital, environmental & renewable energy, fishing, forestry, 
manufacturing and tourism - and the potential short term, medium and long-term impacts.  Challenges 
and opportunities for these sectors are also presented.  
Work Package 2: The Delphi Panel. 
The Delphi Method was developed in the 1950s by the RAND Corporation to avoid the problems 
associated with seeking consensus within a group of experts, such as any pressure to conform to the 
majority views of the group or dominance by a strong voice.  The main benefit of the Delphi Technique is 
its ability to obtain a consensus of opinion among the experts involved in a project.  Since its original 
development, it has been adapted to suit a wide range of research problems.  
There are a number of characteristics of the Delphi Method that are common to all projects: 
 There is anonymity on the part of the participants;  The participants are chosen because of their specialist knowledge of the subject matter; and  There are at least two rounds of communication between the researcher and the participants. 
In the case of this study, two rounds of the survey were conducted in February and March 2018.  In the 
first round of the survey, an expert panel of stakeholders was asked to highlight what they thought were 
the key drivers for change in the rural north of England after Brexit.  In the second round of the survey, 
the expert panel was asked to rank the drivers in order of importance and to connect the key drivers to 
each other.  From these two survey rounds, it was possible to build up a detailed process map of which 
elements of the rural north of England will be most important in driving change.  
Phase 2: Developing the future scenarios for a post-Brexit rural north of England 
The final Phase of the project was to create a series of scenarios of the rural north of England in 2030.  To 
do this, the information collected through the Delphi Survey and policy review were combined with a 
  
STEEPV matrix. STEEPV stands for: Social; Technological, Economic; Environmental; Political and Values. 
This allows the key drivers identified in the Delphi Survey to be explored across all dimensions of society.  
The result is a detailed narrative setting out what the future rural society will be like along with a detailed 
analysis of how each driver will influence what is happening at that time.  For this analysis, two scenarios 
were created to represent the best possible outcome and worst possible outcome from the Brexit process 
and consequences flowing from those outcomes.  These scenarios are not intended to be predictions 
about the future but are indications of potential futures that can stimulate debate about what kind of 
future is desirable and what future should be avoided.  
  
  
3. The Rural Economy  
The Rural context 
The purpose of the next two chapters is to review the policy literature that addresses issues for rural areas 
in the north of England with particular emphasis (in chapter 4) on the challenges that these communities 
may face arising from BREXIT.  These challenges are applied in particular to rural Northumberland but 
illustration is also presented where appropriate from neighbouring territories in the wider rural North of 
England, in particular from Cumbria, and also from the South of Scotland.  Several key documents contain 
overviews of the rural North in general and these are reviewed in these sections.  A key point made 
throughout these documents, however, is that rural areas are particularly vulnerable to policy changes 
partly due to sectoral dependencies that typify many rural economies, but also due to recent trends in 
socio-economic characteristics that are associated with areas that display relatively low population 
density and poorer levels of accessibility.   
It is important to - initially - highlight that rural areas of the north of England share many characteristics 
in common with rural England in general.  The Rural Coalition (2017) notes that rural areas of England 
account for almost 9.3m people living in small towns, villages, hamlets and farms across the Country 
(settlements with a population of less than 10,000, plus some slightly larger hub towns serving rural 
hinterlands).  This rural population comprises 17% of the total England population (ONS 2014 Mid-Year 
Population Estimates).  
The Rural Coalition (2017) also estimates that in 2015, economic output from predominantly rural areas 
ǁas ǁoƌth aŶ estiŵated £Ϯϯϳ ďillioŶ oƌ slightlǇ uŶdeƌ a ϭϳ% shaƌe of EŶglaŶd͛s GVA.  It is iŵpoƌtaŶt to 
recognise that a wide range of economic sectors are present in rural areas.  The difference between 
economic structures in urban and rural areas is, perhaps, sometimes exaggerated.  There is, for instance, 
a considerable amount of manufacturing activity dispersed across smaller settlements in rural areas.  
Though self-evident, it is important to note that while businesses in rural areas may be distinctive in some 
regards, most have characteristics that are similar to those in urban areas and face many of the same 
opportunities and challenges (House of Commons Library, 2017a), b)).  However, it is undoubtedly the 
case that rural economies have greater dependency on agriculture, forestry and fishing: In 2015, these 
accounted for 16% of rural businesses in England and 28% in Scotland.  On the other hand, two sectors 
which are notably under-represented in rural areas are financial services and information and 
communications services.  
  
The significance of agriculture for rural economies extends well beyond its direct impact in terms of 
primary food production.  While Agriculture aĐĐouŶts foƌ ϭϮ peƌ ĐeŶt of joďs iŶ the UK͛s food sǇsteŵ, iŶ 
ĐoǀeƌiŶg ϳϭ peƌ ĐeŶt of the UK͛s laŶd, it is the ŵaiŶ iŶflueŶĐe oŶ ƌuƌal laŶdsĐapes, soils, ǁildlife aŶd fƌesh 
water. Farmers have also diversified into leisure and accommodation, environmental management and 
renewable energy production.  It is estimated that diversified activity accounts for over a fifth of farm 
business income, and more than a third on small farms.  
UK agriculture also underpins the food manufacturing sector by providing over 60 percent of the produce 
and raw materials involved.  This is a vitally important sector, sustaining 3.8 million jobs and adding over 
£21 billion (GVA) to the UK economy every year.  Food manufacturing is nationally important and benefits 
communities across the country, although it has particular importance in many rural areas (RSA, 2017).  
Tourism is also important to rural economies providing markets for existing and new businesses as well as 
opportunities for farm diversification.  Overseas visitors whose visits included a trip to the countryside or 
villages spent an estimated £4.2 billion in the UK in 2011.  A higher proportion of employment in this 
sector is in small businesses in rural areas than in urban areas (Tourism Alliance, 2017).  
There are some encouraging signs in terms of business formation in recent years.  The number of business 
units located in rural areas grew by more than 10% in the four years up to 2015/16 (DEFRA, 2018c).  The 
great majority of rural business units are classified as being either small or micro businesses.  When 
compared with urban areas, there is a particularly high proportion of single person businesses (sole 
traders and partnerships) and a particularly low proportion of larger businesses in rural areas.  Home 
working is common in rural areas and particularly so in the smallest settlements.  In 2013, there were 
994,000 home workers in rural areas, who comprised 22% of all those working in rural areas.  This figure 
compares with 12% for those working in urban areas.  Whilst home working has increased across all types 
of area, the fastest rate of growth has been that recorded in rural areas. 
In terms of connectivity, a recent survey of business support organisations (BCC, 2017) found that access 
to broadband and mobile networks was their top rural concern.  Other concerns identified were rural 
ďusiŶesses͛ aĐĐess to fiŶaŶĐe, skilled laďouƌ, staƌt-up/growth advice, marketing advice and transport 
networks – not rural-specific issues, but ones which may well have a particular rural dimension.  According 
to Ofcom (Connected Nations 2016 report), 95% of all premises (nationally) now have access to a 
broadband connection of 10 Mbps – a speed defined as fast, but not as superfast.  However, the remaining 
5% are concentrated in rural areas.  Ofcom concludes that around a quarter of all rural premises do not 
yet have access to a 10 Mbps broadband connection.  A recent (2017) business survey by the British 
  
Chambers of Commerce similarly found that 30% of responding businesses from rural areas did not have 
a reliable broadband connection.  Gaps in mobile phone signal are, again, concentrated in rural areas 
(Rural Coalition, 2017).  
The Policy Challenges  
The challenges to the economies of rural areas nationally has been summarised as follows (after CRE, 
2017; RSA, 2017):  
 Policymaking all too often hits rural communities inappropriately or leaves them behind.  Resourcing 
may seem unfair in its allocation between urban and rural, and services can fall short once the focus 
moves outside towns and cities.  Assumptions are made about rural economies that focus too 
narrowly on agriculture and tourism and the ageing profile of the population is seen as a burden.  
 Lack of affordable housing and high prices in relation to rural wages are persistent causes of concern 
among rural residents.  Average house prices in rural areas are 26% higher than in urban areas, while 
local earnings are 27% lower, and there is much less housing association and council housing – 12% 
of rural housing stock is social housing compared with 19% in urban areas.  Younger people are often 
priced out of the market completely and hence may be forced to move away or to commute long 
distances, disrupting family networks and preventing the local economy from realising its potential.  
Lack of access to appropriate housing reduces the available workforce and stifles the contribution that 
rural areas could be making to national growth. 
 There are relatively low wage levels in rural areas.  The average for those who work in predominantly 
rural areas is £19,900, which is £4,600 less than the average for those who work in urban areas.  The 
average for those who live in rural areas is £21,600, which is £1,500 less than the average for those 
who live in urban areas.  This indicates that rural residents who commute to urban jobs are able to 
increase their earnings above those who work locally in rural areas.   A marked feature of the population of rural England is its age profile.  Older people are over-
represented, with the 65 plus age group comprising 23.5% of the rural population compared with 
16.3% of the urban population.  Conversely, young adult age groups are under-represented in rural 
areas.  Whilst the ŶatioŶ͛s populatioŶ pƌofile is set to age – with older people forming a growing share 
of the total population – that trend is projected to happen fastest in rural areas.  The fastest 
(percentage) growth of all will be that for the 85 plus age group in rural areas (Rural Coalition, 2017). 
  
 The quality of the rural environment is under huge pressure.  The past 40 years have seen farmland 
bird numbers halve and butterflies fall by 40 per cent.  To conserve important habitats, more than a 
quarter of UK land is protected by national and international legislation.  Nevertheless, 1,057 species 
in the UK are estimated to be threatened with extinction (RSA, 2017).  The case for protecting and 
restoring ecosystems acknowledges the benefits that these provide to us all.   
 On climate change, reductions in UK agricultural emissions lag behind those of other industries while 
deŵaŶd foƌ food aŶd eŶeƌgǇ has led to ͚offshoƌiŶg͛ of iŵpaĐts thƌough high leǀels of iŵpoƌtiŶg.  It is 
estimated that for every 100 hectares of UK farmland, another 70 hectares globally is devoted to 
meeting UK consumption.  
At national level, therefore, in one sense many of the issues facing rural economies are the same as those 
ǁhiĐh affeĐt the ǁhole of the UK ďut the ĐhalleŶges of ͞ƌuƌalitǇ͟ ŵeaŶ that their impacts are different, 
more acute, or harder to address.  A continual tension also exists in national rural policy-making between 
pƌoŵotiŶg gƌoǁth aŶd ŵaiŶtaiŶiŶg the ĐhaƌaĐteƌ aŶd ƋualitǇ of the ĐouŶtƌǇside aŶd ͚Đheƌished 
laŶdsĐapes͛ ;C‘E, 2014, p. 4).  It is pertinent to note, however, that even prior to the BREXIT vote, the 
ϮϬϭ5 ͚ϭϬ-poiŶt plaŶ͛ foƌ ďoostiŶg ƌuƌal pƌoduĐtivity (DEFRA, 2015) addressed connectivity, skills, 
enterprise, housing and governance, all of which would appear in a list of growth enablers for any type of 
area.  The rurality factor, however, tends to affect the priority order and urgency of policy interventions.  
Policy statements at a national level aimed specifically at rural economies have therefore tended to 
emphasise connectivity (broadband services, mobile communication, transport connections), issues 
related to population and skills (rural apprenticeships, childcare, housing supply) and business 
environment (planning legislation).  The perceived difference between rural and urban areas is also 
affecting the role that rural areas can play as future technologies start to have a meaningful impact on the 
economy and society.  Many new technologies, Autonomous Vehicles, the Internet of Things and big data, 
have often been developed to address the problems faced by cities.  There is a risk that rural areas, which 
can also benefit significantly from these new technologies, will miss out.   
However, it is commonly argued that BƌitaiŶ͛s ƌuƌal aƌeas ƌepƌeseŶt forgotten opportunities (CRE).  Their 
economic contribution – 16.6 per cent of GVA – deƌiǀes fƌoŵ diǀeƌse aĐtiǀities; ͚tƌaditioŶal͛ ƌuƌal seĐtoƌs 
such as agriculture and tourism operate alongside a growing presence of agri-tech, energy generation, 
and manufacturing.  The latter accounts for the same proportion of the rural and the urban economy.  
However, challenges arise from remoteness, lack of investment, mistaken or outdated assumptions about 
rurality, and the application of policies designed primarily for urban areas.  Different elements of the rural 
  
economy are closely intertwined, relationships to urban neighbours are important, and rural places 
themselves are highly diverse.  Policy for the rural economy in the 21st century needs to recognise this 
integration of issues and the importance of place.  
The ͞‘ural North͟: Rural Northumberland as an Exemplar 
Theƌe is Ŷo siŶgle agƌeed defiŶitioŶ of the ͞ƌuƌal Noƌth of EŶglaŶd͟.  IŶ the ďƌoadest seŶse, it ĐaŶ ďe takeŶ 
to mean areas of the North (North-West, North-East and Yorkshire and Humberside) that lie outside the 
City-Regions as currently defined.  This defiŶitioŶ eŵďƌaĐes ŵaŶǇ diffeƌeŶt tǇpes of ͞ƌuƌalitǇ͟ iŶĐludiŶg 
urban fringe areas and commuter belts alongside disadvantaged uplands and remoter rural areas.  The 
boundary of the area to the north is also somewhat arbitrary (the Anglo-Scottish Border) as rural areas of 
Northumberland and Cumbria share many characteristics in common with the south of Scotland.  
The boundaries of the ͞‘uƌal Noƌth͟ have been defined spatially by Davoudi et al (2017).  Data from the 
2011 Census shows that more than 2.1 million people in the North lived in communities officially classified 
as ͚ƌuƌal͛, aĐĐouŶtiŶg foƌ ϭϰ% of the total populatioŶ.  The rural North, however, is diverse in character 
and contains settleŵeŶts ďetteƌ desĐƌiďed as fƌeestaŶdiŶg ͞sŵall toǁŶs͟ ǁith populatioŶs up to ϯϬ,ϬϬϬ, 
many of which act as market towns and service centres for surrounding smaller settlements.  The rural 
Noƌth ĐoŶtaiŶs soŵe of EŶglaŶd͛s ŵost ƌeŵote aŶd spaƌselǇ populated areas (North Pennines, NW 
Northumberland) as well as small towns with locally significant industrial employers as well as former 
mining villages across County Durham.  The rural North, however, also encompasses small settlements 
located closer to the major northern conurbations where local economies are strongly influenced by 
patterns of commuting. 
While the pƌeĐise ďouŶdaƌies of the ͞ƌuƌal Noƌth͟ aƌe ƌatheƌ aƌďitƌaƌǇ, examples of territories associated 
with the greatest disadǀaŶtages assoĐiated ǁith ͞ƌuƌalitǇ͟ are much more readily agreed.  ͞RuƌalitǇ͟ on a 
national scale can be regarded as a source of disadvantage for businesses and policymakers, but many 
rural areas in the North of England present additional challenges for local economies arising, in part, from 
the nature of the physical environment, relative geographical isolation and distance from political 
decision-making.  Of course, some of these circumstances can be overcome through proactive 
engagement.  There are also characteristics of rural areas of the North that can be used to offset evident 
disadvantage, in particular, the quality of life that can be experienced as a rural resident.  The manner in 
which these advantages and disadvantages interplay can be illustrated using rural areas of 
Northumberland as an exemplar.   
  
Northumberland County sits to the north of the Tyne & Wear conurbation and stretches up to the border 
with Scotland.  As has been identified in the Northumberland Economic Strategy  (NCC, 2015b), the area 
can be split into three distinct areas: the south east, central and remoter rural areas to the north and the 
west of the county.  As has been shown for rural areas nationally, therefore, rural Northumberland 
displays varied types of rurality conditioned by proximity to the Noƌth͛s ŵajoƌ Đities aŶd patteƌŶs of 
commuting, trading and leisure. Each of these areas within Northumberland has its own particular 
characteristics and challenges.  The economy of the south east and central areas of the county are closely 
connected to the Tyne & Wear Conurbation to the south.  The north and west of the county is more self-
contained with some links to the cross-border economy.  
As can be seen from Table 1, Northumberland has a slighly higher economically active population than 
the rest of the north east but is below the national average.  The breakdown of employment by sector 
shows that Northumberland has a higher proportion of jobs in the Health and Social Work, Tourism, 
Manufacturing and Agriculture Sectors than either the north east or the UK.  Some of these sectors are 
commonly associated with relatively low wage activities.  However, the 2015 Northumberland Economic 
Strategy (NCC, 2015b) also highlighted that the county is a significant location for higher skilled workers 
to live but that they often commute to jobs in the urban core.  This is mainly to the Tyne & Wear area but 
there is also a significant minority of people who undertake a longer distance commute to for example, 
London or Greater Manchester urban centres.   
Table 1: Employment and unemployment (Jan 2017-Dec 2017) 
  Northumberland 
(Numbers) 
Northumberland 
(%) 
North East 
(%) 
Great Britain 
(%) 
All People 
Economically Active 148,700 76.6 75.4 78.4 
In Employment 142,000 73.0 70.6 74.9 
Employees 116,500 61.0 62.7 64.0 
Self Employed 25,100 11.8 7.8 10.6 
Unemployed (Model-Based) 7,500 5.0 6.2 4.4 
Source: ONS 
 
  
Figure 2 shows the sectoral composition of the labour force in the County.  Northumberland has significant 
levels of employment in healthcare, wholesale and retail distribution, accommodation & food, 
manufacturing as well as agriculture and forestry.  In contrast, Northumberland is below the regional and 
national figures for Information and Communication jobs and on a par with the region for Professional, 
Scientific and technical jobs.  These structural characteristics are long-standing and typify many local 
economies in the rural north.   
 
Figure 2: Employment by Sector 
  
Source NOMIS, 2018 
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Another key characteristic of the economy of Northumberland is that it is dominated by micro-businesses. 
This has a significant impact on growth and productivity.  There is also evidence that in the remoter north 
and east of the county, many of these businesses are home-based businesses.  These characteristics of 
the ĐouŶtǇ͛s ďusiŶesses pƌeseŶt a 
challenge for those seeking to provide 
support and assistance to businesses 
in Northumberland.  These 
businesses do not always have the 
inclination nor ability to engage with 
knowledge networks.  They often lack 
the capacity to engage in business 
development programmes that target 
growth and productivity.   
 
However, there is evidence from recent surveys that many of these rural businesses are interested in 
innovation to develop their own resilience.  This often relates to better business practices such as 
investment in new ICT technology or developing better business management techniques (Philipson et 
al., 2018). 
This is reflected in the continuing underperformance of the county in terms of Gross Value Added (GVA). 
Figure 4 shows the GVA per head of population for the three local authorities making up the new North 
of Tyne Combined Authority.  
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The data on skill levels for Northumberland paints a mixed picture.  For higher levels of qualification, 
Northumberland is above the regional but below the national average.  For lower level qualifications, the 
area is above both the regional and national average.  Lastly, Northumberland has the lowest percentage 
of people with no qualifications.  This suggests that there are workers with skills in the county but evidence 
suggests that many of the higher skilled jobs are located in the urban core with workers commuting to 
them.   
Table 2: Qualifications (Jan 2017-Dec 2017) 
  Northumberland 
(Level) 
Northumberland 
(%) 
North East 
(%) 
Great Britain 
(%) 
Individual Levels 
NVQ4 And Above 65,200 35.0 31.7 38.6 
NVQ3 And Above 100,200 53.8 52.1 57.2 
NVQ2 And Above 143,100 76.9 72.6 74.7 
NVQ1 And Above 166,300 89.3 84.1 85.4 
Other Qualifications 7,200 3.8 6.3 6.9 
No Qualifications 12,700 6.8 9.6 7.7 
Source NOMIS 2018 
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At the moment, there are two strategic plans which are having an impact on the economy of 
Northumberland.  The first has been referred to already, the Northumberland Strategic Plan produced in 
2015.  
The second is the North East Strategic Economic Plan (SEP) produced in 2014 and reviewed in 2017.  These 
plans are hierarchical in nature with the targets for jobs growth being cascaded down from the North East 
SEP to the Northumberland SEP.  The visions for the two plans are also closely aligned: 
͚A pƌospeƌous NoƌthuŵďeƌlaŶd fouŶded oŶ Ƌuality loĐal joďs aŶd ĐoŶŶeĐted ĐoŵŵuŶities͛ - 
Northumberland SEP 
͚Moƌe aŶd ďetteƌ joďs͛ – NE SEP 
The NE SEP identifies four key sectors with the potential to deliver the needed high skilled jobs:  Digital  Advanced manufacturing  Health and life sciences  Subsea, offshore and energy technologies 
All four sectors, though not traditional rural industries have a significant or have the potential to have a 
significant presence in rural areas.  For example, a report for the North East Rural Growth Network found 
a cluster of sub-sea and off-shore service companies in a rural enterprise hub (Cowie et al., 2013).  There 
is then a question of how best Northumberland can attract, develop and retain industries such as these 
alongside the existing businesses that are well established in the County.  
Finally, it is important to highlight that Northumberland contains a varied and diverse set of landscapes. 
In the south and east, it contains areas of former industrial land much of which has now been reclaimed 
as both productive agricultural land but also cultural and environmental land.  In Northumberland, 
Northumberlandia and Duridge Bay are good examples of areas which were previously open-cast mining 
which have now been remediated to sites which are not only rich in biodiversity but also add to the 
cultural heritage of the area.  Further north, the eastern coastal area holds some of the region͛s best 
arable land. Moving westwards, the land starts to rise until reaching the North Pennines and Cheviot hills 
at the Border with Scotland.  This part of the region has some of the most remote communities and most 
tranquil areas in the whole of England.  Its unspoilt nature has been recognised with the first Dark Sky 
Park in the UK.  A large part of this area is taken up by Kielder Forest and the Ministry of Defence Otterburn 
Training Area.  The area contains just about every terrestrial and marine special designation it is possible 
to have.  It is home to many important historical places and buildings from the earliest Bronze Age hill 
  
forts, HadƌiaŶ͛s Wall aŶd AlŶǁiĐk Castle to the ŵoƌe ŵodeƌŶ industrial archaeology such as Woodhorn 
Museum.   
Rural economies within the Northern Powerhouse area 
The analysis above describes the strengths and vulnerabilities of rural economies in Northumberland.  
However, many of these characteristics are shared with other areas of the rural North of England.  An 
attempt to summarise these issues has been made by Davoudi et al (2017) and the key points in this 
document are very significant to an understanding of the threats and opportunities that might be posed 
by BREXIT for the wider rural North.  Davoudi et al (2017) identify three characteristics that are important 
in understanding the rural North:   
 Sparsely populated areas: Northern England contains some of the most remote and sparsely 
populated aƌeas iŶ EŶglaŶd iŶĐludiŶg EŶglaŶd͛s loǁest ƌesideŶtial deŶsities iŶ the NoƌthuŵďeƌlaŶd 
National Park.  IŶ ϮϬϬϴ, oǀeƌ ϯϬϱ,ϬϬϬ people liǀed iŶ aƌeas offiĐiallǇ Đategoƌised as ͚“paƌselǇ 
Populated͛ aĐƌoss the thƌee ŶoƌtheƌŶ ƌegioŶs.  Residents of these areas and their small towns include 
a high proportion of households with incomes below the governŵeŶt͛s poǀeƌtǇ leǀel aŶd aƌe ŵoƌe 
likely to live in fuel poverty, earn lower wages, and travel further to essential services.  
 The movement of people between urban and rural areas: analysis of flows across England in 2016 
shows that rates of net migration to local authorities classified as predominantly rural areas have 
increased since 2008/09.  In 2014-15 such areas, which define much of the rural North, received a 
net internal inwards migration of 64,900 people.  Most of this (54,200) came from predominantly 
urban areas, from adults aged between 30 and 45 years, and children below 15 years of age. 
Important changes to service demand and provision can result from inward (or outward) migration 
of younger families, especially in areas of sparse or declining population.  
 High levels of economic activity: more working-age ƌuƌal ƌesideŶts aƌe ĐoŶtƌiďutiŶg to the Noƌth͛s 
economic and social health through paid work or self-employment than those living in cities and 
towns.  It is also important to stress the economic and social significance and value of volunteering 
in rural areas.  
It is important to recognise the diversity of the rural North before considering policy interventions and 
potential BREXIT impacts.  There are several significant characteristics of the business base found in rural 
areas in the North. Davoudi et al (2017) note that in 2011-12 there were more than 121,000 businesses 
opeƌatiŶg ǁithiŶ the ƌuƌal Noƌth ƌepƌeseŶtiŶg alŵost oŶe iŶ fouƌ of the Noƌth͛s eŶteƌpƌises ;Ϯϯ%Ϳ.  The 
  
overall profile of rural businesses also has several distinct characteristics that are important to recognise 
for policy purposes.  While there are some larger firms located in towns within rural areas, as a 
generalization, large employers are fewer in number and less significant for the local economy.  In relative 
terms, however, self-employment, sole traders and home-based businesses (HBBs) are a more important 
component of the business base in rural economies compared to the urban North.  
Home-based businesses obviously includes many farms and tourism enterprises.  Alongside sole traders 
and micro-businesses, these form the core of the economy in many small settlements within the rural 
North.  In 2011-12, for example, 22% of businesses in rural areas had no employees, a level that is more 
than double the rate in the urban north (9.8%).  Some, like electricians, plumbers, and engineers for 
agricultural machinery are highly mobile, while others such as village shops, GPs, home helps and care 
workers serve very local markets.  These businesses rarely feature in economic development plans or 
ďusiŶess suppoƌt pƌogƌaŵŵes, ofteŶ ďeiŶg tƌeated ŵoƌe as ͚seƌǀiĐes͛ ƌatheƌ thaŶ as ďusiŶesses that ĐaŶ 
be nurtured and grown.  Nevertheless, in many rural communities they may provide more jobs than any 
single medium-sized employer.  These enterprises engage in a wide variety of business activities and 
sectors, and face multiple challenges including reliance on part time or seasonal workers and often 
hampered by poor transport links and lack of dedicated business premises.  This raises issues of isolation 
and peripherality that hampers their growth.   
  
  
4. The Impact of Brexit: Policy Review 
The BREXIT debate and the rural North 
A comprehensive search for relevant policy literature on the possible effects of BREXIT on rural areas of 
the UK has identified a number of useful contributions to this debate.  These include reports published by 
the Countryside Alliance (2017), IPPR North (2017a, 2017b), Centre for Rural Economy, Newcastle 
University (Garrod et al, 2017), Rural Coalition (2017) and various short reports from the House of 
Commons Library (2017a, 2017c).  However, there is no single source that deals specifically with the 
possible impacts on rural areas in the north of England.  There is comment on the Brexit implications for 
different regions and the north of England in general (for instance, North-East Combined Authority (2017) 
& ESRC (2018) but not specific to the rural area.   
Our response to this situation is twofold.  First, we seek to distil from these available policy documents 
implications that might be relevant to Northumberland and the rural North.  Alongside this, we have 
carried out a search for reports and analyses specific to those sectors that are of relevance to the rural 
North with a view to identifying the key drivers of these activities and the threats and opportunities 
associated with Brexit.  This information has been used to inform the scenarios emerging from the Delphi 
survey that specifically targets participants in the rural North.   
There are at least two clear messages that can be derived from the discussion above regarding the 
characteristics of the rural North;   
 First, that while land-based activities are vital, particularly for more remote communities, the 
economy of the rural areas of the north are highly diverse and the BREXIT effects cannot simply be 
ƌeduĐed to a Ŷaƌƌoǁ ƌaŶge of seĐtoƌs that aƌe deeŵed to ďe ͞ƌuƌal͟.   
 Secondly, rural areas are interconnected with urban regions across the North, hence the impact of 
BREXIT on the rural North must include consideration of the potential impacts of BREXIT on regions 
of the North, including the metropolitan areas.   
In light of these observations, we consider first the potential impacts of BREXIT on northern regions in 
general and specifically on the North-East of England.  
Brexit and the rural North – regional context 
An overview of the possible impacts of BREXIT on the north-east region in general has been produced by 
the North East Combined Authority (NECA - the legal body that serves seven Councils – County Durham, 
Gateshead, Newcastle, North Tyneside, Northumberland, South Tyneside and Sunderland).  The NECA 
  
(2017) report estimates that the local impacts of Brexit in the North East could create between 1.3% and 
2.5% reduction in GVA, depending on the nature of Brexit agreed.  The report notes that the North East 
in general has a symbiotic relationship with European neighbours and unpicking these long-standing and 
often complex relationships will require a precise and careful understanding of our economy, the 
businesses which drive it and provide jobs for our residents, and the interconnected nature of this 
ecosystem.  The arguments presented to support this conclusion are as follows:  
 Many of the sectors and industries critical to economic growth are dependent on both European 
markets and access to skilled workers, often from overseas.  This applies critically to motor vehicles, 
but there is more than this.  The NE exports more services to Europe than any other region in the 
country and the manufacturing base is integrated into relationships with the EU single market through 
long-standing supply chains and export sales of manufactured goods. 
 The ƌepoƌt dƌaǁs atteŶtioŶ to the faĐt that the ƌegioŶ͛s gƌoǁiŶg speĐialisŵ iŶ Ŷeǁ aŶd ƌeŶeǁaďle 
energies relies on innovations and development that is directed in part by EU regulations and 
characterised by European-wide business networks. 
 Even prior to the EU referendum, there has been a growing demand in the region for skilled workers 
in a number of sectors, including engineering, digital technology and health.  Ensuring that the region 
has the right mechanisms in place to develop the skills of our residents is key.  As a region in which 
population is growing more slowly than in other regions and ageing, there is a reliance on an inflow 
of skilled workers to drive our growth sectors as well as to deliver our vital public services.  Changes 
to immigration controls, including the potential end of free movement of workers, between the UK 
and other EU states, will impact on the number of EU nationals coming into the North East, disrupting 
previous flows of skilled workers into important sectors by creating real and perceived barriers to 
migration. 
 As a significant beneficiary of European Structural Funds, the North East has maximised the impact of 
these important funds, aligning them to its economic priorities and ensuring that they have been a 
vital resource in supporting our strong economic growth over the past decades.  Between 2007 and 
2020, over £800m of EU Structural Funds will have been invested in the North East. Within the current 
fuŶdiŶg pƌogƌaŵŵe €Ϯϴϵŵ of EuƌopeaŶ ‘egioŶal DeǀelopŵeŶt Fund (ERDF) will be invested in 
supporting businesses, providing finance for business, supporting innovation and putting in place 
measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  €Ϯϱϲ.ϵŵ has ďeeŶ alloĐated fƌoŵ the EuƌopeaŶ “oĐial 
Fund (ESF) to support up-skilling in areas needed by business and to support those who are 
  
unemployed back into the labour market.  A loss of these funds to the region will significantly dent 
efforts to continue to restructure the economy and support residents in accessing opportunities. 
 As a strong exporting area, not least in growth sectors, the future arrangements for trade and customs 
are of critical importance to local businesses.  Due to the Noƌth East͛s depeŶdeŶĐǇ oŶ the ƌelatioŶship 
with the EU, the economy is at risk of a greater impact as a result of changes to the trading 
relationship.  The EU is the UK͛s ďiggest tƌadiŶg paƌtŶeƌ, aĐĐouŶtiŶg foƌ ϰϴ% of goods eǆpoƌts fƌoŵ 
the UK and 39% of service exports last year.  This relationship is even more important for the North 
East. ϱϴ% of the Noƌth East͛s goods eǆpoƌts aƌe to the EUϱ, higheƌ thaŶ that of aŶǇ otheƌ ƌegioŶ apaƌt 
from the South West.  The EU market is especially significant for the North East, with 50% of North 
East service exports going to the EU, the highest proportion of any UK region.  
The NECA report makes a strong case for concluding that the Region is more vulnerable to BREXIT than 
many other UK regions due to the structure of its economic activities and its population and labour market 
characteristics.  The need to replace EU Structural Funds is self-evident and the UK Shared Prosperity Fund 
is regarded as a vital instrument to enable the region to respond to BREXIT.   
NECA argues that one key factor for coping with BREXIT concerns the replacement for the EU Structural 
Funds.  It is recognised that the proposed UK Shared Prosperity Fund provides the opportunity to improve 
regional economic growth funding and this is welcome.  However, concern is expressed about the 
management and scale of this funding. NECA argues that management of the fund should be fully 
devolved to the region to allow strategic management and long-term investment decisions; it should also 
be at least the scale of the current EU structural fund and start in 2020-21 to ensure continuity in project 
funding.  It is further suggested that there is an opportunity in this process to simplify the funding 
administration and set up a system based on economic need rather than through competition.   
These observations on the UK Shared Prosperity Fund are points well made in the sense that they reflect 
lessons learned from European Policy experience that regional knowledge and partner commitment are 
key inputs to regional policy effectiveness.  This is a vital principle, for instance, that underpins the concept 
of ͞“ŵaƌt “peĐialisatioŶ͟ ǁhiĐh adopts a ͞plaĐe-ďased͟ appƌoaĐh to poliĐǇ.  In practice, this means 
maximising the inputs from regional partnerships, making a realistic assessment of regional assets and 
avoidance of inappropriate transfer of models fƌoŵ otheƌ ͞ŵoƌe suĐĐessful͟ ƌegioŶs.  This logic, of course 
can be extended to apply to sub-regional territories – that policy intervention specifically in rural areas 
ǁithiŶ the ƌegioŶ also ƌeƋuiƌe a ͞plaĐe-ďased͟ appƌoaĐh aŶd that loĐal aĐtoƌs ǁith knowledge of rural 
areas of the North are best placed to assess rural assets and evaluate policy options.   
  
Brexit and the rural North – the wider impact 
There are, justifiably, concerns over the vulnerability of the land-based economy in rural areas.  However, 
as the UK negotiates leaving the European Union, it is also crucial that the needs of rural communities as 
a whole are taken properly into account.  The Rural Coalition argues that rural considerations should 
inform both the terms on which we seek to leave the EU and UK (or England) laws, regulations and funding 
programmes that are subsequently put in place.  This should be based on a broad understanding of rural 
and should not focus solely on agriculture and the natural environment – crucial though both of these are.  
Rural communities and businesses have wide interests, including housing, healthcare, education, skills, 
jobs, transport and broadband as well as a wider range of sectors located in many rural areas.   
Thus, there are four principles that the Rural Coalition wants to see adopted in Government thinking.   
They are that: 
 Bƌeǆit ŵust ƌeĐogŶise ͚ƌuƌal͛ is ŵoƌe thaŶ agƌiĐultuƌe aŶd the Ŷatuƌal eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt; 
 All Brexit negotiations and post-Brexit policy development must be rural proofed; 
 Policies and funding must deliver a fair deal for rural communities; and 
 Decision-making, funding and delivery must be devolved and involve rural communities. 
The Statement also identifies four policy priorities that, if acted upon, it considers would make a great 
difference to the quality of life of those who live or work in rural areas.  They are: 
 A meaningful increase in the delivery of affordable housing in villages and small towns; 
 Proper recognition of rural service delivery challenges and services designed to meet rural needs; 
 Long-term support for social action, to help communities become more resilient; and 
 Business support and infrastructure which reaches rural areas, so that the rural economy can grow 
and create quality jobs. 
There is considerably more policy comment on the threats and challenges of Brexit for rural areas.  This is 
peƌhaps uŶdeƌstaŶdaďle giǀeŶ the ƌaŵifiĐatioŶs of ǁithdƌaǁal fƌoŵ the EU͛s ͞CoŵŵoŶ AgƌiĐultuƌal 
PoliĐǇ͟ ;CAPͿ aŶd the need to create a new agricultural policy for the UK.  However, the possibility that 
these circumstances may act as triggers for opportunities and new policy approaches has also been 
acknowledged.  Some of these opportunities are specific to the farm sector:  
  
 CAP͛s oďjeĐtiǀes ǁeƌe ĐƌitiĐised as ďeiŶg too ďƌoad aŶd uŶfoĐused.  Brexit provides an opportunity to 
direct support towards boosting agricultural production, investing in research, exploring the potential 
for GM crops, etc, and to conduct more ƌeseaƌĐh aŶd iŶŶoǀatioŶ oŶ “ĐotlaŶd͛s stagŶatiŶg agƌiĐultuƌal 
productivity, generally.  
 The transition period could lead to lower area payments, exacerbating existing pressure for industry 
restructuring and (re)emphasising the need to support productivity improvements through, for 
example, advice, training and capital investment grants plus continued R&D activities.  
 Agri-environmental schemes could become more important, but major challenges remain.  The 
effectiveness of such schemes used in the past 25 years to improve the environment is questionable, 
and the high cost of administrating them is also a major weakness.  Critically, they must be financially 
attractive to farmers, but the use of environmental schemes to support income is currently 
constrained by WTO rules.  Designing outcome-focused rather than prescription-based schemes may 
help.  
 Trade flow changes risk disrupting supply chains, threatening the viability of many businesses and also 
affecting food prices.  While prices may fall or rise, higher and more volatile prices are most harmful 
to more deprived groups in society who spend a much greater share of their income on food.  Trade: 
Whilst often discussed in the abstract, the UK must continue observing EU regulations to maintain 
trade with the EU even from outside the single market.  At the UK-level, there is a risk that concessions 
on economically smaller sectors such as agriculture are exchanged for benefits to larger sectors such 
as financial services.   
Northern Devolution and Brexit 
The formal institutional framework and landscape of the North have changed considerably in recent years.  
Changes in the Noƌth iŶĐlude: the ƌeplaĐeŵeŶt of ‘DAs ďǇ LEPs that aƌe ďased oŶ ͚fuŶĐtioŶal eĐoŶoŵiĐ 
aƌeas͛ aŶd ƌespoŶsiďle foƌ the alloĐatioŶ of EuƌopeaŶ “tƌuctural and Investment Funds; devolved budgets 
and powers offered to city councils through City Deals and Growth Deals (subject to local institutional 
restructuring such as the creation of combined authorities); elected mayors; participatory budgeting and 
locality budgets to be distributed by councillors to their wards; and opportunities for local councils to 
retain business rates from new or expanded firms.  However, many of the devolutionary changes (Sub-
regional LEPs, City and Dev-Deals) fail to offer equity for rural communities and places (Davoudi et al, 
2017).    
  
While Rural support has been provided through the Rural Growth Networks, support from the Council for 
Small Industries in Rural Areas and its successor the Rural Development Commission, and from LEADER 
programmes, rural areas and small towns have, for the most part, been absent from debates on regional, 
local and national economic development.  In the GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s 2016 Northern Powerhouse Strategy 
(HMG, 2016), the teƌŵ ͚ƌuƌal͛ is ŵeŶtioŶed oŶly once and that is in relation to natural qualities.  Yet rural 
areas make up the vast majority of the land area of the north of England.  In the recent Industrial Strategy 
(HMG, 2017) there were only 10 references to rural in the 129 page document.  These were mainly generic 
statements on the urban and rural in relation to connectivity, digital and smart energy with one short 
statement on the importance of partnership in promoting rural growth. 
Given the centrality of the rural dimension in Cumbria, Northumberland and the South of Scotland, there 
were concerns that the rural implications of Brexit had not received the attention they should have had – 
compared to cities and city-regions.  This is particularly the case in terms of the land-based economy 
including agriculture and agri-business.  The recent UK Government backing for the North of Tyne 
Combined Authority and Borderlands Growth Deal is important, but a more integrated and coherent 
strategic approach to rural economic governance and rural productivity post-Brexit is still needed.  
In terms of new governance arrangements, recent research suggests that the emphasis should be less on 
a ͚oŶe size fits all͛ (or centralised approach) and more on a flexible and multi-scalar approach.  When 
considering repatriating powers from Brussels in conjunction with ongoing devolution initiatives, different 
levels of governance will now have to come into play.  This will Include more powers to; the Scottish 
Parliament; English Combined Authorities; City Deals; Borderland Growth Deals; and even to a pan-
Northern approach via the Northern Powerhouse, Transport for the North or even a new Council for the 
North.  In creating new forms of economic governance, it is vital that the government also includes rural 
areas in these deliberations (Northumbria University et al, 2017, p. 11).  
In addition, new forms of devolution should resist the comfort of devolving power and resources only to 
established, higher tiers of administration and governance.  New powers for Parish and Town Councils to 
undertake neighbourhood planning, and have their processes and proposals acknowledged by statutory 
planning authorities, are a key form of devolution.  
  
More specifically, IPPR North, (2017), advocates 
rural devolution ͚deals͛ iŶ ǁhiĐh ĐeŶtƌal 
goǀeƌŶŵeŶt sets ͚ŵiŶiŵuŵ oďligatioŶs͛ ǁhiĐh 
local areas with a substantial rural component 
must meet.  These should relate to food 
production and sustainability; environmental 
protection including flood prevention and 
decarbonisation; participation in the industrial 
strategy; and capital spending to support 
infrastructure and economic development.  Local 
and combined authorities, working with local 
enterprise partnerships, should demonstrate 
how they will use devolved budgets to meet their 
obligations and add value.  
IPPR therefore recommends an integrative and 
devolved sǇsteŵ of ͚ƌuƌal deǀolutioŶ deals͛ iŶ 
which stakeholders negotiate with central 
government, setting out how they can best use 
their natural assets to contribute to national 
priorities and add value locally.  
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has 
effeĐtiǀelǇ opeƌated as aŶ ͚iŶdustƌial stƌategǇ͛ foƌ 
agriculture, including environmental 
management.  Withdrawal from the EU 
represents an important opportunity for reforms 
integrating the diverse elements of the rural 
economy and fitting it for the modern global 
context. 
UK regional policy post-Brexit  
In a recent review of the potential future of 
regional policy in the UK, Bell (2017) notes that 
IPPR North: Ten Key Steps 
1. Central government should convene an advisory 
group to develop and regularly review a framework 
of short-, medium-and long-term goals for the rural 
economy.  This framework will also guide 
negotiations for rural devolution deals with 
devolved areas.  Funding under these deals will 
effectively replace the CAP but also relate to broader 
and integrated aspects of the rural economy.  
2. Local and combined authorities, working with LEPs, 
should Ŷegotiate ͚ƌuƌal deǀolutioŶ deals͛ ǁith 
central government, demonstrating how they will 
meet minimum obligations and add value with the 
funding and other support which they seek.  Deals 
should include payments to producers which 
support farm sustainability, incentivise good 
environmental practices, innovation and skills 
development, and support the wider rural economy.  
3. Environmental protection should be considered at 
local and national levels; the framework for 
devolution deals should include requirements for 
neighbouring areas to work together on key issues 
such as flood protection.  
4. The 2013 agri-tech strategy should be revisited and 
strengthened in the context of EU withdrawal and 
the industrial strategy.  
5. Universities in rural areas and neighbouring cities 
should ďe iŶĐeŶtiǀised to estaďlish ͚spiŶ out͛ offiĐes 
to boost agri-tech opportunities. 
6. Improvements to rural connectivity should reflect 
the needs of both rural trading and workforces; 
superfast broadband provision is a priority.  
7. The potential of rural areas as centres of excellence 
in advanced manufacturing and high-tech fields (e.g. 
energy) should be included in the industrial strategy. 
8. Workforce and skills issues should be addressed at 
sector level to meet the needs of particular places.  
9. Business support in rural areas should reflect 
distinctive business populations, e.g. numerous 
isolated small and micro-businesses and reliance on 
digital skills.  
10. Rural devolution deals should include an element of 
͚plaĐeŵakiŶg͛, ǁhiĐh ĐoŶsideƌs hoǁ ĐoŵŵuŶities 
and quality of life support economic growth and 
demand in local economies; this would include 
access to services and housing.  
 
  
the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s commitment to maintain funding until 2020 will provide some short-term relief for 
agencies counting on continuation of these monies.  However, beyond 2020 - and assuming that Brexit 
involves leaving the single market and the customs union - regional policy options for the UK include the 
following: 
(i) Discontinue the Structural Funds and rely on existing regional initiatives to deliver regional 
priorities.  This appƌoaĐh ǁould help Đlose the UK͛s stƌuĐtuƌal ďudget defiĐit, alďeit iŶ a ƌelatiǀelǇ sŵall 
way. 
(ii) Continue with the Structural Funds, following EU practice in determining area eligibility and levels 
of funding.  Bell notes that that this is not a very plausible strategy given that those who voted in 
favour of Brexit would be unlikely to accept the continuation of EU-determined policies.  
(iii) Maintain existing levels of funding to support spatial economic policies but realign them with 
existing UK regional policies.  This would mean accepting a more locally responsive approach which is 
less geared to a centrally-based funding regime based on transparency.  However, the success of such 
a devolution deal approach is yet to be seriously evaluated.  
(iv) Return to 1970s policies designed to increase demand in areas experiencing high levels of 
unemployment or inactivity.  However, this approach is unlikely to find supporters in the present 
government, while differences in unemployment and inactivity rates are now small compared to what 
they were in that era and while differences in market income and wealth have tended to increase in 
recent decades.  
Looking ahead, Bell concludes that if the UK continues to follow a lax monetary policy combined with a 
tight fiscal policy, opportunities for increased funding for regional policy will be limited and that the 
potential losers from redirecting the Structural Funds to other public-spending priorities include a variety 
of stakeholders—not only local authorities, but also the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh and Northern 
Irish assemblies.  Such bodies are then likely to contest such reductions in their funding and argue that 
they should be able to control the distribution of any replacement funding.  It may also be difficult for a 
government which negotiates Brexit to cut regional policy support in areas which voted heavily in favour 
of Bƌeǆit͛ ;Bell, ϮϬϭ7, p. 102). 
In the next chapter, the report provides a more detailed examination of each of the key sectors in the 
rural economy in turn, focussing on: the current situation; policy drivers; and opportunities and challenges 
in the medium and long-term.   
  
5. Brexit and the rural North: Assessment of Key Sectors 
Since the EU referendum in June 2016, a considerable policy literature has evolved based on attempts to 
assess the likely impacts of BREXIT on different sectors of the economy.  These reviews are wide ranging 
and consist of reports and pamphlets produced by policy analysts, sector lobby groups, sector specialists, 
government departments as well as research papers by academics.  An attempt has been made to review 
this body of literature that includes variously assessments of Brexit effects based on data analysis as well 
as reports on opinion of specialists and key informants with knowledge of competitiveness in different 
industries.  The review covers those sectors that are thought to be particularly relevant to the current and 
future economy of the rural North, namely:  
 Agriculture  Forestry  Tourism   Fishing  Environmental and renewable energy  Digital  Manufacturing 
A full list of the reports consulted in this review is contained in the References.   
The contents of these sources have been analysed to distil key aspects of the Brexit debate applied to 
sectors.  The current situation in each sector is assessed and key policy drivers identified.  An attempt is 
then made to extract the opportunities and challenges faced by each sector arising from Brexit.  This 
analysis is used to inform or verify the scenarios that have emerged from the Delphi survey.   
5.1  Agriculture 
Sector reviews tend to emphasise that agriculture is an important sector both nationally and regionally: 
 Nationally because faƌŵeƌs ŵaŶage the ŶatioŶ͛s ĐouŶtƌǇside ĐoǀeƌiŶg ϳϬ% of UK laŶd aƌea and the 
British food and drink industry is worth £109bn and employs 3.8 million people.1  However, the real 
value of both total crop output and total livestock output fell considerably in the period 1984-2016 
aŶd agƌiĐultuƌe͛s shaƌe of total eŵploǇŵeŶt has also falleŶ iŶ eaĐh of the UK͛s countries.2  Regionally because of the 39 English LEP areas, Cumbria has the second highest proportion of adults 
working in agriculture (nearly 12,000)3  iiͿ ϭϬ% of the UK͛s daiƌǇ heƌd, ϴ% of ďeef Đattle aŶd ϭϯ% of all 
                                                          
1  NFU (2017), p. 12. 
2  House of Lords Library (2017), pp. 2, 4 and 6. 
3  Cumbria LEP (2016), p. 7. 
  
sheep and lamb stock are in Cumbria4  iii) the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing (AFF) sector accounts 
for 25% of economic activity in Southern Scotland, almost three times the Scotland average and iv) in 
Northumberland, in 2013, AFF accounted for 5% of total jobs in the county and had the highest 
location quotient of any sector in the county (2.25).5 
In 2016, the UK had a trade deficit of £23bn in food, feed and drink (FFD) products – a deficit both with 
the EU and non-EU countries.6  Since the Brexit referendum, UK farm incomes have been boosted due to 
the fall in the value of sterling leading to increased UK agricultural competitiveness and increased value 
of CAP payments (as these are in euros). 
Sector reviews also stress that the UK agricultural sector is currently heavily dependent on the EU in 
relation to international trade.  In 2016, the EU accounted for 60% of our FFD products and 70% of our 
imports; seven of the UK͛s top 10 export markets were EU member states; 9 of the top 10 countries from 
which the UK imported its FFD products were EU members.7 
However, non-EU countries are also important foƌ agƌiĐultuƌal seĐtoƌs as the UK͛s exports to the USA (the 
UK͛s ϯrd ďiggest eǆpoƌt ŵaƌketͿ ǁeƌe ǁoƌth £Ϯ.ϯ ďŶ iŶ ϮϬϭϳ aŶd £ϱϲϬ ŵ to ChiŶa ;the UK͛s ϴth largest 
export market). 
Product-markets ǁhiĐh aƌe ŵost iŵpoƌtaŶt fƌoŵ the poiŶt of ǀieǁ of the UK͛s tƌade ǁith the EU iŶĐlude: 
 Wheat.  The EU accounted for nearly 75% of UK exports in 2016.  Barley.  The EU accounted for over 70% of UK exports in 2016.  Sheep.  The UK exported 88,000 tonnes of sheep meat to the EU in 2016.8 
Assessments of the Brexit effect note that the present system of the CAP is far from beneficial for farming 
in the North and there are disadvantages with the current system:  
 Payments are no longer tied to food production but instead to acreage and therefore can reward 
already wealthy landowners.  It pushes up the price of land.  This creates a barrier to entry for 
new farmers and entrenches lower productivity.9 
                                                          
4 Cumbria LEP (2016), p. 8. 
5  Northumberland County Council (2015), p. 14. 
6  House of Commons Library (2017a), p. 3. 
7  House of Commons Library (2017a), p. 3. 
8  House of Commons Library (2017a), p. 9. 
9  Gove (2018a), p. 4. 
  
 UK 2020 argues that UK self-sufficiency in food production is 13% lower than it was 20 years ago.10  UK ϮϬϮϬ aƌgues that it pƌeǀeŶts the UK͛s aďilitǇ to Ŷegotiate poteŶtiallǇ ďeŶefiĐial tƌade 
agreements with non-EU countries.11  UK 2020 argues that the EU has failed to keep pace with advances in agricultural technology due 
to takiŶg the ͞PƌeĐautioŶaƌǇ PƌiŶĐiple͟ ƌatheƌ thaŶ the ͞IŶŶoǀatioŶ PƌiŶĐiple͟.12  Pillar 1 payments under the CAP have yielded hardly any environmental benefits.13 
However, the NFU argues that without the current direct payments to farmers under CAP, many farmers 
would have gone out of business due to price volatility of food products giving rise to extreme income 
volatility of farmers.14  
Policy Drivers 
An attempt has been made to assess the general impact of different outcomes of the Brexit negotiations 
with the EU for the farm sector.  These scenarios have been depicted by the Centre for Rural Economy at 
Newcastle University (2017)15: 
 Brexit Lite - UK negotiates a free trade agreement with the EU.  This would mean marginal changes in 
production and value of output. 
 Brexit Comp - The UK has free trade with the EU and also the rest of the world.  Trade liberalisation 
option desired by the Institute of Economic Affairs.  This would mean reduced prices and UK output 
values across all commodities.  Marked downward effect on beef and sheep sectors. 
 Brexit-WTO - where no trade agreement was reached with the EU and WTO rules would apply.  This 
would lead to significant adjustments in trade between the UK and EU.  EU tariffs and non tariff 
barriers would affect UK exports. 
Much discussion also surrounds a range of factors that are thought to be of significance in determining 
future trends in the farm sector.  These include:  
 The iŵpaĐt of teĐhŶologǇ oŶ ͞“ŵaƌt FaƌŵiŶg͟ – precision farming, genetic biotech. 
 National and global population growth increasing the demand for food. 
                                                          
10 UK 2020 (2017), p. 1. 
11 UK 2020 (2017), p. 4. 
12 UK 2020 (2017), p. 4. 
13 Gove (2018a), p. 4. 
14 NFU (2017), p. 4. 
15 CRE (2017). 
  
 Labour shortages in therural North due to migration; ageing economy and succession issues; labour 
availability in farming and competition with other sectors in the rural economy; affordability of rural 
housing. 
 “hift iŶ fuŶdiŶg to atteŶtioŶ oŶ ͞Ŷatuƌal Đapital͟ iŶ goǀeƌŶŵeŶt poliĐǇ. 
 Impact of climate change – warmer climate and greater probability of flooding events. 
Opportunities 
It is recognised by all bodies – DEFRA, the NFU, the CLA that leaving the CAP will create the opportunity 
foƌ a Ŷeǁ aŶd ͞ďetteƌ͟ DoŵestiĐ AgƌiĐultuƌal PoliĐǇ to ďe put iŶ plaĐe.  The GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt ǁaŶts ͞the Ŷeǁ 
system to deliver benefits such as improved air, water and soil quality; increased biodiversity; climate 
change mitigation and adaptation; and cultural benefits that improve our mental and physical wellbeing 
ǁhile pƌoteĐtiŶg ouƌ histoƌiĐ eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt.͟16 
DEFRA and the NFU foresee the period post-Brexit as consisting of 3 phases. 
Phase 1:  March 2019-Feb. 2021 
Period of relative stability and continuity for the sector as Government is committed to 
maintaining cash funding to the sector to the end of the current Parliament iŶĐludiŶg ͞all 
fuŶdiŶg pƌoǀided foƌ faƌŵ suppoƌt uŶdeƌ ďoth Pillaƌ ϭ aŶd Pillaƌ Ϯ of the ĐuƌƌeŶt CAP͟.17  
Launch of pilot schemes of new funding initiatives and emphasis on the environment.  
Government will simplify applications for farmers wishing to enter existing schemes 
providing environmental benefits such as Countryside Stewardship.  Direct payments will 
be phased out. 
Phase 2: March 2021-2023 
Review and assessment of pilot schemes.  Impact assessment of post-Brexit trading 
environment. 
Phase 3: 2023 onwards  
The new Domestic Agricultural Policy is fully implemented.  However, the date for its full 
implementation may be postponed depending on whether the Brexit settlement has had 
a great adverse effect on the sector.18 
                                                          
16  Gove (2018b), p. 8. 
17  NFU (2017), p. 17, DEFRA (2018), p.3. 
18 NFU (2017), p. 17. 
  
At a regional level, policymakers across areas included in the rural North have recognised the threats to 
this sector and also considered how policy might support this transition.  As an example, Cumbria LEP sees 
a number of opportunities for the County: 
1. Cumbria could be offered to the country as a test bed/exemplar for new locally designed and delivered 
rural/agricultural development programmes that ensure economic, environmental, social and cultural 
benefits.  They suggest the partners in this to be the LEP, farmer groups, Natural England, the local 
authorities, the National Park, the National Trust and existing LEADER groups.19 
2. Add ǀalue to the CouŶtǇ͛s ŵilk pƌoduĐts ďǇ iŶĐƌeasiŶg the amount of processing that is done in the 
County. 
3. Develop and expand expertise in environmental land management.  Encourage Cumbria and 
Lancaster Universities to provide research institutes in this field. 
4. Develop the cluster of agricultural supply, technology and advice businesses20.   
5. Re-iŶǀigoƌate the Cuŵďƌia/Lake DistƌiĐt ďƌaŶd iŶ oƌdeƌ to sell the ďest of the CouŶtǇ͛s pƌoduĐe. ie. 
͞Taste the Vieǁ͟ aŶd ͞Feel the Vieǁ͟ ŵaƌketiŶg. 
Challenges 
The House of Lords (2017) and the SRUC (2017) believe that there may be additional challenges for the 
sector if no trade agreement is reached with the EU and WTO rules apply: 
1. The government may have difficulty in providing agri-environment support to farmers in compliance 
with WTO rules. 
2. There is concern for the UK food industry once outside the customs union due to the potential for 
customs delays. 
It is not yet known whether there will be devolved power for Scotland to control and deliver spending on 
agriculture.  The SRUC (2017) argues that Scottish agriculture would be more exposed to trade restrictions 
than England.21 
5.2  Forestry 
More than anywhere else in England, the forestry sector in the North is a vital part of the land-based 
economy.  It comprises the following:  
                                                          
19 Cumbria LEP (2016), p. 27. 
20 LEP (2016), p. 3. 
21  SRUC (2017), pp. 1-2. 
  
 woodland creation;   woodland management;   delivery of woodland based conservation, biodiversity, flood alleviation, carbon sequestration 
and landscape benefits;   timber production, wood processing and production of wood products.   
The Forestry Commission estimates that there are over 4,500 forestry-related businesses in the UK, 
including 550 sawmills (Forestry Commission, 2017).  Forest covers around 13% of the UK land area but 
this varies considerably between national territories.  Coverage is higher in Scotland (18%) and Wales 
(15%) compared to England (10%) and Northern Ireland (8%).   
There are significant variations also within England.  The public sector plays a significant role in managing 
forestry in the rural North.   The Scottish Borders and northern England together represent the most 
important area for wood production and processing in the UK, accounting for one third of total UK 
production.  Key facts include the following:  
 Around half of all woodland in NE England is owned and managed by the Forestry Commission.    Kielder Forest Park is one of the largest man-made forests in Europe covering an area of 60,000 
heĐtaƌes ŵaiŶlǇ aĐƌoss NoƌthuŵďeƌlaŶd ďetǁeeŶ the “Đottish Boƌdeƌ aŶd HadƌiaŶ͛s Wall.    There are major forested areas in Cumbria including Grizedale and Whinlatter as well as around 
30 separate areas of woodland elsewhere in the North-East of England.    Just across the border in Scotland are extensive areas of forest and either side of the border are 
major wood processing plants such as BSW at Carlisle, James Jones at Lockerbie and Eggers at 
Hexham.  
Drivers 
On the demand side, the key driver of commercial aspects of forestry relates to the UK construction 
industry but also demand from pulp and paper processing and distribution (wooden pallets) (UNECE, 
2017).  In general, domestic demand outstrips domestic supply considerably.  Imports accounted for 82 
percent of wood consumption in the UK in 2016 (Forestry Commission, 2017).  The UK is the second largest 
wood importer in the world. 
On the supply side, commercial development and exploitation of UK forests is subject to regulation 
covering environmental impacts, biosecurity and pest control.  Most of these are EU-Wide agreements 
(Glynn, 2016).  UK government also legislates on sustainability principles.  Felling is subject to a licencing 
system (Forestry Act, 1967) managed by the Forestry Commission as regulator.  In most cases, felling 
  
licences require the area felled to be replanted.  In addition to the Government regulation of forestry 
provided by the Forestry Commission and based on the UK Forestry Standard, there are also voluntary 
certification schemes such as the UK Woodland Assurance Scheme (UKWAS) overseen by the Forest 
Stewardship Council.  Overall, across the UK, 44% of UK woodland is certified as complying with this 
standard.  During 2016-17, 7,000 hectares of new woodland was created in the UK with conifers 
accounting for just over half (54%) of this total. 
Supply of timber is also strongly influenced by fairly stable patterns of ownership – 27% is state owned 
and 73% in private ownership including prominently the National Trust.  Since the 1970s, while new 
planting has occurred, the rate of re-planting has declined considerably and during 2016, the number of 
new trees planted fell to its lowest level on record (Priestley and Sutherland, 2016).  However, interest in 
planting large productive woodlands is rapidly increasing once more in England.  The Doddington North 
and Lowther schemes, totalling around 500ha, were planted last year and were the first large scale 
productive planting schemes in England for thirty years. 
Opportunities 
As the UK is a major net importer of wood and wood products, any restrictions on trade with Europe could 
increase the cost and availability of imported wood products supplied to the UK construction industry.  
Equally, exchange rates are a really important factor.  A low pound means home-grown timber is very 
price competitive, increasing demand for it and increasing timber prices.  This has happened in the wake 
of the Brexit referendum and is likely to continue post-Brexit.  There may be opportunity for UK timber 
suppliers to develop innovative wood products to supply this demand from domestic sources.  This also 
puts greater pressure on Government to address some of the barriers that are currently putting a break 
on productive woodland creation in England. 
The changes to agricultural policy post Brexit will have a fundamental impact on forestry, in particular the 
changes to policy on payments to farmers.  The demise of the Basic Payment Scheme is likely to lead to a 
reduction in land values, making afforestation an attractive option for more farmers.  However, much 
depends on what happens with the new Environmental Land Management Scheme (ELMS).  If the 
payments rates are set such that they make up for the absence of BPS there could be little change in land 
values.  That said, it is likely that woodland creation will be a major feature of ELMS.  So even if land prices 
doŶ͛t fall ELM“ ŵaǇ pƌoǀide suffiĐieŶt iŶĐeŶtiǀe foƌ a sigŶifiĐaŶt uptuƌŶ iŶ plaŶtiŶg ƌates. 
  
There are also considerable drivers creating opportunities that are not directly related to Brexit.  The most 
important of these is climate change and the global response to it.  Afforestation is a very effective method 
of ĐaƌďoŶ Đaptuƌe.  The GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s CleaŶ Gƌoǁth “tƌategǇ adǀoĐates a suďstaŶtial iŶĐƌease iŶ the ƌate 
of afforestation to sequester more carbon.  Going forwards, further international treaties, building on 
Paris, are likely to put more pressure on the Government to reduce carbon emissions and increase carbon 
capture.  Forestry has an important part to play here. 
Challenges 
In the short term, The Confederation of Forest Industries (CONFOR) suggests a number of potential 
negative impacts of BREXIT on the forestry sector:   
 Forestry businesses will be affected by possible changes in employment legislation, and restrictions 
on free movement of labour;   Public funding for woodland management is under threat due to withdrawal from the European 
Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD).  This funding is currently a devolved budget in the 
UK.  It is currently not clear how any replacement for EAFRD will be managed.    Barriers to trade with Europe may have long-term negative effects on UK planting and harvesting as 
the UK forestry industry may come under pressure to increase timber supply to meet domestic 
demand (Morgan Tatchell-Evans, 2016).    Brexit may lead to changes in UK environmental policy regarding protection currently provided to 
large-scale forested areas.  Rates of felling and practices are at present covered by EU Directives that 
require detailed Environmental Impact Assessments.   However, given that much of the productive 
woodland resource is independently certified and given the assurances that the Government is giving 
over environmental protection, this is probably only a theoretical threat. 
5.3  Tourism  
Sector reviews emphasise that tourism is an important sector both nationally and especially for this 
region.    At the UK level: 
 It is the UK͛s thiƌd laƌgest employer providing jobs for 3.1m people (9.6% of the UK workforce) and 
contributes £127bn to the economy (7.1% of GDP).22 
                                                          
22  Tourism Industry Council (2016), p. 3. 
  
 “iŶĐe ϮϬϬϵ, the UK touƌisŵ iŶdustƌǇ has ͞gƌoǁŶ at a fasteƌ ƌate thaŶ ŵost otheƌ iŶdustƌies; geŶeƌated 
additional employment at almost twice the rate of other countries and increased export earnings by 
26.5%.23  According to the Tourism Alliance (2017), the UK is currently the 5th most popular country in a ranking 
of ϱϬ ĐouŶtƌies iŶ GFK AƌŶholt͛s aŶŶual suƌǀeǇ of ϮϬ,ϬϬϬ ĐoŶsuŵeƌs fƌoŵ ϮϬ paŶel countries.24  Currently, receipts from inbound tourism are worth £25.4bn to the UK economy, making the UK 
inbound tourism industry the 6th largest in the world.25  Also, it would appear reasonable to expect 
growth in line with or above that predicted by the United Nations World Tourism Organisation 
(UNWTO) who say that international tourism will continue to grow at a compound rate of 4.2% per 
annum which would mean that the UK would be receiving £32bn by 2025.  Domestic tourism is also 
predicted to rise at a similar rate.26    The Tourism Alliance (2017) argues that the growth of outbound tourism from the UK (currently worth 
more than £26bn to the UK economy) should also match that of the rest of the UK tourism industry.  
The former provides more than 400,000 joďs aŶd eŶsuƌes that the UK is oŶe of the ǁoƌld͛s keǇ huďs 
for international travel.27  Business travel provides £4.5bn in revenue to the UK economy (20% of total tourism revenue) and 
supports 100,000 jobs in the UK.  Of this, around half comes from other EU countries.28 
At the Regional level 
The importance of tourism for the rural North of England is widely recognised and also shared with 
policymakers working in the South of Scotland.  Various headlines can be abstracted from documents:  
 In 2013, in Northumberland, tourism accounted for 13,200 jobs or 13% of total employment and had 
experienced growth in the past 5 years of 18%.  Compared to the England average in 2013, the County 
had a location quotient in tourism of 1.33.29  In 2016, Cumbria received just over 45 million visitors.  They brought in £2.72 bn to the economy and 
provided employment for 36,240 FTE posts.  As many tourism jobs are actually part-time or seasonal, 
the total number of people in tourism jobs is estimated at ϲϮ,ϯϭϲ, aƌouŶd ϮϬ% of the CouŶtǇ͛s total 
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employment.30  The Lake District is the most visited national park in the country and generates the 
largest tourism spend of any in England and Wales.  In the Scottish Borders, the 1.9 million tourists and 3.7 million day visits per annum were estimated 
to generate £176M of GVA.  In Dumfries and Galloway, tourism was estimated to contribute £57-68M to GVA and provide 5,400 
jobs.31 
Sector reviews also stress the seĐtoƌ͛s depeŶdeŶĐe oŶ the EU.  For example, of the UK͛s top ten source 
markets for inbound tourism, 8 are other EU countries; 11% of all tourism employees in the UK are EU 
nationals32 and; the current structure and focus on business support for the industry is heavily influenced 
by the availability of EU funding. 
Industry Drivers 
Industry experts suggest that tourism is a sector that is likely to be sensitive to the Brexit negotiations 
relating specifically to rules relating to the movement of workers. The Tourism Industry Council (2016) has 
noted these points:   
 EU nationals currently make up 11%33 of the overall tourism workforce in the UK and there remains 
the question of whether they will be able to stay in this country after Brexit and also whether they 
can be easily sourced in future.  The Tourism Alliance (2017) says that businesses have become 
increasingly reliant on EU nationals to fill vacancies and some businesses have very high numbers of 
such workers.  Without them, some will surely close particularly in Cumbria where there is already a 
shortage of skilled workers to fill vacancies in the hospitality industry.  If ease of travel between countries in the EU and the UK is made more difficult, this may act as a 
deterrent to some tourists coming from abroad.  In addition to any problems with ease of travel, business and corporate tourism may be affected by 
lower investment activity in the UK from the EU.  Currently, around one half of all business travel in 
the UK emanates from the EU.34 
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 Significant EU funding that supports the UK tourism industry is received through the ESIF Programme.  
It is particularly important to areas such as Cornwall and Wales which currently receive more than 
£800 per person from the ESIF – a significant proportion of which supports coastal and rural tourism 
development.  When the ESIF money disappears, public funding for tourism will fall by around 50%.35  There is also the question of whether the employment rights of UK nationals working in the tourism 
industry in the EU will be maintained.  If not, the outbound travel sector may be adversely affected. 
Discussion surrounds a range of other factors that are thought to be of significance in determining future 
trends in the tourism sector. These include: 
 Labour shortages - the Tourism Alliance (2017) points out that there is an imminent shortfall in skilled 
labour that is needed for the tourism industry.  In addition to the need for migrant labour, as stated 
above, the sector finds it difficult to recruit due to a number of reasons: i) skill shortages ii) the 
relatively low rates of pay in the sector iii) the availability of affordable housing in the National Parks 
in particular and iv) the distance required for staff to travel to training institutes.  The Tourism Alliance 
;ϮϬϭϳͿ ƌepoƌts that ͞ϯϴ% of hospitalitǇ aŶd touƌisŵ ďusiŶesses aƌe ƌeporting that they have hard-to-
fill vacancies. In addition, the existing high level of demand for staff means that 21% of businesses 
aƌe ƌepoƌtiŶg that the staff that theǇ aƌe eŵploǇiŶg laĐk esseŶtial skills.͟36  Growth in demand - it is believed that national and global population growth and income growth will 
continue to boost demand for travel and tourism. The opening of the airport at Carlisle to passenger 
traffic in 2019 is also expected to increase tourism in the County.    There is a high rate of entrepreneurial activity in this sector in rural areas.  However, it has also been 
said that sŵall/ŵiĐƌo ďusiŶesses ofteŶ suffeƌ fƌoŵ theiƌ oǁŶ ŵaŶageƌ͛s laĐk of stƌategiĐ skills.  Investment in public transport and development of new technologies in transport and travel -  
according to the Tourism Alliance (2017), there are also initiatives underway to simplify and improve 
the ticketing system for rail travel.  The Alliance calls for the integration of rail and bus networks and 
timetables.  They also believe that there should be more information provided in other languages.  In 
addition, they would like to see greater use of coaches.   With the abolition of CAP payments from the EU, the Government intends to shift the emphasis of 
funding in agriculture toǁaƌds ͞Ŷatuƌal Đapital.͟  IŶ JaŶuaƌǇ ϮϬϭϳ, the theŶ “eĐƌetaƌǇ of “tate foƌ 
DEF‘A stated that the aŵďitioŶ of goǀeƌŶŵeŶt ǁas to ͞ďecome the first generation to leave the 
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eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt iŶ a ďetteƌ state thaŶ ǁheŶ ǁe fouŶd it.͟37  Michael Gove (2018) has also said that he 
would like to see access to the countryside increased.  These initiatives should increase tourism in 
the Border region giǀeŶ the ďeautǇ of the ĐouŶties͛ Ŷatuƌal assets aŶd the possiďle fuƌtheƌ 
diversification of farming into tourism-related activities.   There are strong links between the tourism sector and other rural sectors especially food and drink 
manufacture.  The impacts of global climate change and environmental pressures may impact on tourism. 
Possible solutions to some of the labour shortage problems have been proposed by different bodies.  The 
Tourism Alliance (2017) would like to see the Government expand the TIER 5 Youth Mobility Scheme 
which allows young people from some Commonwealth countries to work in the UK, to include EU 
nationals.  They also propose that Government should relax the rules governing the ability of overseas 
students in the UK to work in the industry whilst they are studying here.  They advocate greater provision 
of careers information, adǀiĐe aŶd guidaŶĐe oŶ the seĐtoƌ͛s Đaƌeeƌ oppoƌtuŶities aŶd fuŶdiŶg to 
incentivise the delivery of sector programmes and apprenticeships rather than these all being towards 
STEM sectors.38  In Cumbria, the LEP suggests that if opportunities for flexible, part-time work across the 
sector were effectively marketed, then it could help solve labour supply issues and provide employment 
for older professionals.39 
 
Opportunities 
The sector reports indicate a number of opportunities for the sector to grow: 
 The depreciation in the value of sterling is seen as an opportunity to attract more international tourists 
to the UK whilst also increasing the level of staycations.  The Tourism Alliance estimated that in 2017 
the UK would see an increase in inbound visitors of 8% and also an increase in domestic tourism of 
more than 4%.40 
 The Tourism Alliance (2017) recognises the importance of coastal destinations in attracting visitors 
who spend in total £13bn in the local economy in the UK.  However, they believe that there are stark 
differences in the performance of seaside destinations across the UK and they would like to see firstly, 
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enhancement of the Coastal Communities Fund and secondly, the introduction of Coastal Enterprise 
Zones. The intention of these would be to encourage businesses to invest in skills, product 
development and enhancing the visitor experience at these coastal locations.  They see investment in 
iŶfƌastƌuĐtuƌe as ďeiŶg ͞ĐƌitiĐal as ŵaŶǇ Đoastal ĐoŵŵuŶities aƌe geogƌaphiĐallǇ peƌipheƌal ǁith 
unreliaďle ƌail, ƌoad, flood aŶd teleĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs iŶfƌastƌuĐtuƌe.͟41  They also argue that the key to 
the success of rural businesses is the creation of a Universal Service Obligation of broadband service 
of at least 10 Mbps. 
 The Tourism Industry Council (2016Ϳ ƌegaƌds the touƌisŵ iŶdustƌǇ as a ͞keǇ ĐoŵpoŶeŶt of ƌuƌal, 
seaside and regional economies.  It says therefore, that funds currently granted through the CAP and 
ESIF programmes need to remain available until the end of 2020 to allow the Government the time 
to put in place national funding replacements.  However, the ending of CAP payments is seen as an 
opportunity to reassess incentive structures so that linkages between farming, tourism and the 
environment are taken into account.  A re-alignment of the balance between agriculture and rural 
heritage will create more job opportunities in tourism, construction and local economies and have 
benefits for well-being and the environment. 
 The GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s Touƌisŵ AĐtioŶ PlaŶ ;ϮϬϭϲͿ states that it ǁishes to see the growth and spread of 
the benefits of tourism to the regions.  The Tourism Industry Council (2016) therefore proposes 
abolition of Air Passenger Duty on domestic flights as this would act as a boost to regional airports 
and tourism outside London.  Rory Stewart, MP for Penrith and the Borders constituency, in his paper 
on the new Borderlands Growth Deal (2018) is calling for the inter-connectedness of urban and rural 
communities to be recognised.  Projects which centre on producing a vibrant and sustainable rural 
and upland economy for example can also benefit the towns through the provision of stronger tourist 
trade, better water management and improved recreational options.  He would like to encourage the 
development of community-led and low-cost innovation projects involving match-funding between 
partners.42  The Tourism Alliance (2017) also sees tourism as an important mechanism for 
redistributing economic activity and wealth from urban to rural and to seaside areas of the UK. 
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In addition, the opportunities for growth of the sector within this region have been echoed in the various 
policy statements, investments and economic monitoring across rural areas of both Northumberland and 
Cumbria, as follows: 
 There is widespread recognition of the tourism assets in rural Northumberland.  The County Council 
iŶ its EĐoŶoŵiĐ “tƌategǇ doĐuŵeŶt ;ϮϬϭϱͿ ƌeĐogŶises the iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of its steǁaƌdship of its ͞ƌiĐh 
ďuilt aŶd Ŷatuƌal heƌitage͟ ŶaŵelǇ, of suĐh plaĐes as HadƌiaŶ͛s Wall, the NatioŶal Park and AONBs.43  
It also speĐifies the deǀelopŵeŶt of ͞a loŶg-term programme of place making, capital projects, 
conservation and investment in the public realm with a focus on town centres and other key locational 
assets such as tourism related infrastructuƌe.͟44  Northumberland Tourism, whose monitoring of the 
sector demonstrates positive signs, show that despite Brexit uncertainties, there have been annual 
increases in visitor numbers (up 5.7% 2016 to 2017).  A significant new investment has also been made 
to the visitor economy in Northumberland during 2017 with the opening of the Sill National Landscape 
Discovery Centre.  This is a high-quality all-weather visitor centre that celebrates the landscape of the 
National Park.  The Sill, which involved investment of £14.8m has been developed through key 
partners including prominently the Northumberland National Park Authority, the Rural Growth 
Network and Youth Hostel Association.    Cumbria LEP also recognises the significance of tourism for the County.  They suggest that Cumbria 
should use the Lake DistƌiĐt͛s ŶeǁlǇ aĐƋuiƌed Woƌld Heƌitage “tatus to ƌaise the pƌofile as a 
destination.  Two of the LEP͛s pƌioƌities are to increase Cumďƌia͛s iŶteƌŶatioŶal ǀisitoƌ speŶd and 
improve market penetration in London and the South-East.  Currently, international visitors account 
for only 7% of visitor nights in the County while half of staying visitors are from the north of England.  
They suggest the desigŶ of paĐkages of ͞eǆpeƌieŶĐes͟ ǁhiĐh ǁill appeal to oǀeƌseas touƌists.  There 
are also ideas being discussed to promote new quality food and drink, events and festivals, adventure 
sports and the development of heritage trails.  It is suggested that the County could attract new and 
encourage repeat visitors by developing enhanced digital mapping and information to enable people 
to navigate the Lake District and encourage the use of electric cars and electronic parking information.  
Cumbria LEP believes that the County is well placed to attract people from the creative industries and 
also to ďeĐoŵe the ͞‘oĐkies of the UK͟ – that is a place where people come to live and work.  The 
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CouŶtǇ, it is aƌgued, Đould attƌaĐt ͞lifestǇle͟ ďusiŶesses aŶd those who wish to work remotely from 
home avoiding the commute and experiencing a healthier and more contented pace of life.    Other ideas regarding tourism development in the rural North have been proposed in relation to the 
Borderlands development.  A paper prepared by Rory Stewart, for instance, suggested that much 
ŵoƌe Đould ďe ŵade of the ĐoŶĐept of ͞ǁildeƌŶess͟ thƌough a ϭϬϬ ŵile ƌoute liŶkiŶg Haǁes iŶ Noƌth 
Yoƌkshiƌe passiŶg thƌough the ͞foƌgotteŶ laŶds͟ iŶto the “Đottish Boƌdeƌs ǀia NeǁĐastletoŶ to 
Eskmdalemuir.  The arbitrary nature of the Anglo-Scottish Border in relation to tourism is also 
highlighted by the suggestion that tourism in the rural North could benefit from a coordinated 
investment plan for visitor attractions associated with the Borders towns of Hawick, Galashiels and 
Melrose.  The paper also points to existing Department for Transport proposals of dualling of the A69 
which would facilitate visits from local population centres to the new or enhanced visitor attractions 
along the Wilderness route.45 
Challenges 
The sector reports identify a number of challenges for the UK tourism industry: 
 If the UK͛s futuƌe ƌelatioŶship ǁith the EU is outside the “iŶgle Maƌket, theƌe ǁill ďe a depƌessiǀe 
effect on investment in the tourism industry especially in the hotel sector.  Currently, there is close cooperation between the airports of the UK and the EU such as through the 
European Aviation Safety Agency, Single European Sky and in security arrangements.  It is not yet 
known whether this will continue and ǁhat ŵight ďe the ĐoŶseƋueŶĐes if it doesŶ͛t.  The Tourism Alliance (2017) fears that if the government does not urgently work with the industry to 
develop and implement a plan for filling staff shortages in the sector, there will be increased 
employment costs and hence, higher prices to consumers.  This will make the UK less competitive in 
the international market.46  In Cumbria, the additional fear is that with the expected West Coast 
development, it may suck labour from the rural economy.  Nigel Wilkinson, who leads on tourism 
issues foƌ the Cuŵďƌia LEP, told delegates at the Noƌth West HospitalitǇ “hoǁ ;ϮϬϭϴͿ that ͞pƌoďleŵs 
caused by lower unemployment are being exacerbated by an ageing population and Brexit which is 
already reducing the migrant workforce.͟47 
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 According to the Tourism Alliance (2017), the World Economic Forum ranks the UK as 140th out of 141 
countries in terms of price competitiveness, mainly due to visitors facing very high levels of taxation.  
It would therefore like to see government institute a new tax regime for the sector that stimulates 
growth eg. A reduction in VAT rates for accommodation, restaurant meals and attractions.48  The 
Alliance is also calling for the abolition of Air Passenger Duty for all domestic and international 
journeys departing UK airports so that the UK becomes more competitive as a place to do business or 
go on holiday and which will also lower the cost of travel for UK citizens.49 
 The Heritage Alliance (2017) says that it deplores the currently low priority given to the safeguarding 
of cultural and natural heritage in the rural economy, quoting that under the Countryside Stewardship 
Scheme, 95% of funding goes on habitats, species and water in order to meet EU objectives with only 
£5M per annum going to heritage.50  The Heritage Alliance argues that unless there is an improved 
ƌeplaĐeŵeŶt of CAP fuŶdiŶg, ŵuĐh of ouƌ ͞ƌuƌal heƌitage͟ ǁill ďe lost.  TheǇ Ƌuote that ϴϰ% of 
scheduled monuments are in agricultural land51 and that almost a third of these are impacted by 
agricultural practices (such as cultivation) or natural processes (such as animal burrowing, erosion and 
scrub growth).52 
 In Cumbria, it is argued that there needs to be investment in infrastructure to support tourism.  For 
example, parts of Cumbria were badly affected by floods in 2009 and 2015 which hit tourism in the 
county since some of the worst flooding was centred on Keswick, Cockermouth, Glenridding and 
Pooley Bridge in the Lake District and the main road alongside Thirlmere was closed for several 
months, making travel through the National Park very difficult.   At a national and global level, concerns over rising air pollution may lead to increased air taxes and 
therefore reduced air travel in future. 
 
5.4  Fishing  
Sector reviews emphasise the declining importance of the fishing industry in the British economy.  
BƌitaiŶ͛s fishiŶg iŶdustƌǇ used to ďe of gƌeat sigŶifiĐaŶĐe ďoth ŶatioŶallǇ aŶd ƌegioŶallǇ.  Hoǁeǀeƌ, 
declining fish stocks and membership of the EEC and EU have caused a long-term decline of the industry.  
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The Marine Management Association, for example, states that the UK fishing fleet has fallen by 29% since 
1996.53 
In 2016, there were 11,757 fishermen in the UK and of these, 5,306 were in England and 4,823 in Scotland.  
UK vessels landed 701,000 tonnes of seafish into the UK and abroad with a value of £936 M.54  The fishing 
industry is not, however, of great statistical importance to any of the 4 Borderlands counties, comprising 
only 0.1% of total employment in each (and less than 0.1% in Cumbria).  In absolute terms, it is of greatest 
importance in Northumberland where, in 2016, 150 people were employed in a total of 55 enterprises.55 
Trade access, however, is vital for the industry as Britain exports the bulk of what it catches and imports 
the majority of what it consumes – cod, salmon, tuna, haddock and prawns. 
Sector reviews stress the seĐtoƌ͛s current dependence on the EU: 
 The Independent cites the fact that ͞Euƌope iŵpoƌts aďout ϳϱ% of the Bƌitish ĐatĐh, a ĐoƌŶuĐopia of 
ϰϬ speĐies that is too eǆotiĐ foƌ ŵost doŵestiĐ ĐoŶsuŵeƌs.͟56 
 EƋuallǇ, aĐĐess to the UK͛s seas is ǀitallǇ iŵpoƌtaŶt foƌ ŵaŶǇ EuƌopeaŶ fisheƌŵeŶ.  For example, 60% 
of mackerel and 40% of Dublin Bay prawns which together make up 60% of the value of all Irish fish 
landed in Irish ports, comes from UK waters.  Also, it is said that Belgian fishermen get around half of 
their catch from UK waters.  SimilaƌlǇ, oŶe thiƌd of the output of FƌaŶĐe͛s ŶoƌtheƌŶ depaƌtŵeŶts of 
Normandy, Brittany and Hauts-de-France comes from UK waters.57 
 It is said that the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) quota system is and has been the greatest frustration 
for British fishermen, giving for example, 84% of cod in the English Channel to France and just 9% to 
Britain.58 
 IŶ ϮϬϭϰ/ϭϱ, FƌaŶĐe, “paiŶ aŶd IƌelaŶd aĐĐouŶted foƌ ϯϲ% of the UK͛s total toŶŶage eǆpoƌted to its top 
20 export markets.59 
 UŶdeƌ the CFP, the UK has ďeeŶ alloĐated €Ϯϰ3.1 M of funding to support fishing communities. 
Drivers  
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The future of the industry is almost entirely dependent on the Brexit deal reached since this will have 
impacts on: Fish quotas; Access to UK coastal waters; Fisheries management and enforcement; Trade 
access with the EU and; Public funding of fishing communities. 
Other drivers identified include: 
 Environmental sustainability 
 Protection of the marine environment 
 CoŶsuŵeƌs͛ deŵaŶds foƌ diffeƌeŶt tǇpes of fish 
 The UK͛s aďilitǇ to foƌge faǀouƌaďle Ŷeǁ trading relationships with non-EU countries. 
 
Opportunities 
Given the fact that EU fleets take four times as much fish out of UK waters as the UK takes out of EU 
waters60, it is not surprising that an online survey conducted by the University of Aberdeen in 2016, just 
before the UK Referendum on Brexit, of fishermen, shippers and boat owners across the UK, found that 
92% said that they would be voting to leave the EU.  This high statistic makes the sector radically different 
with regard to the general level of Eurosceptacism felt by the UK population as a whole.61  However, it 
does ŵiƌƌoƌ the appaƌeŶt seŶtiŵeŶt felt ďǇ those iŶ the iŶdustƌǇ that the UK͛s ŵeŵďeƌship of the EU has 
been disadvantageous.  Industry reviews therefore tend to regard leaving the EU as an opportunity to 
recover sovereignty rights for the British industry allowing UK fishermen to catch and land more fish. 
The NatioŶal FedeƌatioŶ of FisheƌŵeŶ͛s OƌgaŶisatioŶs ;NFFOͿ ;ϮϬϭϴb) would like to see the UK assume 
full power of its status as an independent coastal nation from March 2019 with no transitional deal being 
negotiated with the EU.  This would give the UK exclusive access to up to 200 miles from its coast – the 
norm under the UN convention on the Law of the Sea.  This, of course, would mean that there would be 
a lot ŵoƌe fish that UK fisheƌŵeŶ ǁould ďe alloǁed to ĐatĐh.  It is stated that the EU͛s fishiŶg zoŶe ǁould 
amount to less than 20% of the North Sea and around 50% of Western Waters.62  In the University of 
Aberdeen survey in 2016, it ǁas fouŶd that ͞aƌouŶd ϳϱ% ďelieǀe that leaǀiŶg the EU ǁould haǀe Ŷo 
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detrimental effect on the trade of fish.  Indeed, more believe it would improve trade than would hinder 
it.͟63  
The NFFO argues that as an independent coastal state, the UK would then take its seat in international 
fisheƌies ŶegotiatioŶs aloŶgside otheƌ Đoastal states suĐh as NoƌǁaǇ aŶd the EU.  The CFP͛s deĐisioŶ-
making process, they argue, should then be replaced with annual (bilateral or trilateral) international 
agreements with the countries with which the UK shares stocks. 
It is envisaged that the UK would then trade some of its access rights with other countries, including rights 
foƌ aĐĐess to the EU͛s seas oƌ the EU ŵaƌket foƌ fisheƌies pƌoduĐts.  The Independent (2017) states that 
restrictions to EU market access might otherwise take the form of tariffs which could be as high as 24% 
on seafood.   
Challenges 
The iŶdustƌǇ ƌeǀieǁs teŶd to ďe pessiŵistiĐ aďout the UK fishiŶg iŶdustƌǇ͛s futuƌe.  In January 2018, the 
European Commission stated that ͞it ǁill iŶsist oŶ the status Ƌuo foƌ Ƌuota shaƌes aŶd aĐĐess 
arrangements, at least during any transition or implementation period; and will also press for the UK to 
ďe tied uŵďiliĐallǇ to the CFP foƌ the foƌeseeaďle futuƌe.͟  The NFFO aƌgues that the UK would then 
become a rule-taker without actually having a seat on the decision-making body!  Instead, the NFFO 
argues that it should have a 12-ŵile eǆĐlusiǀe liŵit foƌ its Đoastal fisheƌies aŶd that the UK͛s Ƌuotas of 
shared stocks should broadlǇ ƌefleĐt the ƌesouƌĐes that aƌe loĐated ǁithiŶ UK ǁateƌs, ǁhiĐh theǇ doŶ͛t 
currently.  Indeed, in March 2018, the UK and the EU agreed the transition arrangements and the NFFO 
ƌepoƌted that ͞the UK ǁas giǀeŶ a ďiŶaƌǇ ĐhoiĐe: eitheƌ a Ϯϭ-month transition, laƌgelǇ oŶ the EU͛s teƌŵs, 
to sŵooth the UK͛s depaƌtuƌe fƌoŵ the EU; oƌ ĐƌashiŶg out of the EU, the siŶgle ŵaƌket aŶd the Đustoŵs 
union, unprepared, just over a year away.  Faced with this choice, the UK backed down and swallowed 
the package as a whole.  Decisions made with the UK outside the room will apply to the UK, in their 
eŶtiƌetǇ, foƌ the peƌiod of the tƌaŶsitioŶ.͟64  From now until October, the two sides will be considering the 
UK͛s futuƌe eĐoŶoŵiĐ ƌelatioŶship ǁith the EU aŶd the NFFO saǇs that ͞the concern in the fishing ports 
has to be that come the end-game in October, the UK will be faced with the same binary choice, and with 
the saŵe outĐoŵe foƌ fishiŶg, as the pƌiĐe that the EU ǁill seek to eǆtƌaĐt foƌ a pƌefeƌeŶtial tƌade deal.͟65 
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Once outside the EU, the UK ǁill Ŷeed to fiŶd a Ŷeǁ ŵeĐhaŶisŵ to ƌeplaĐe the CFP͛s ĐuƌƌeŶt role in 
deciding on fish quotas, marketing standards, competition rules, import tariffs and provision of market 
intelligence. 
The ability of the UK to forge favourable new relationships with non-EU countries has been questioned by 
soŵe as the UK ǁill lose ͞the ĐolleĐtiǀe ďaƌgaiŶiŶg poǁeƌ of the EU͟ iŶ ŶegotiatioŶs ǁith NoƌǁaǇ, IĐelaŶd, 
Russia, the Faroes Islands and Greenland, for example.66  Also, if restrictions are imposed on trade with 
the EU, this might mean tariffs as high as 24% on seafood. 
The UK will still have to comply with EU market obligations in order to export fish to the EU. 
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5.5  Digital Sector  
Sector reviews emphasise the substantive progress achieved in the digital sector over recent years with 
regards to coverage and usage of broadband and mobile phones.  However, there is a distinct rural divide.  
This is supported by evidence as follows: 
Broadband coverage 
 Ofcom (2017) in December 2017 reported that across the UK, 230,000 small businesses (7% of the 
total) cannot receive a basic broadband service (defined as a download speed of at least 10 M/bit/sec) 
whilst 500,000 small businesses (16% of total) do not have access to superfast broadband.67  The 
problem is less pronounced in England than it is in the other four nations.  Ofcom (2017) quote 
ƌeseaƌĐh that shoǁs that doǁŶload speeds ďeloǁ ϭϬ M ďits/seĐ ĐoŶstƌaiŶ people͛s usage ŶotaďlǇ.  
Hence, this is still acting as a constraint on rural businesses in the region.68 
 Theƌe has ďeeŶ good pƌogƌess ŶatioŶallǇ oŶ geogƌaphiĐal Đoǀeƌage of ͞deĐeŶt͟ ďƌoadďaŶd seƌǀiĐe 
with only 3% of all premises in England being unable to get decent broadband compared to 5% in 
2016.  Also, with more people upgrading to superfast services, the amount of data carried by UK fixed 
access networks per month increased by 52% over the year 2016-17.69 
 Ofcom also notes that coverage is lower for small businesses on trading estates and in business parks 
where only 74% of small businesses can access superfast services compared to 84% for the overall 
populatioŶ of sŵall ďusiŶesses aŶd ϵϭ% foƌ the populatioŶ of the UK͛s pƌopeƌties as a ǁhole.70 
The rural digital divide 
However, the urban/rural divide is highly significant with 17% of premises in rural areas of the UK being 
unable to access decent broadband but only 2% of urban properties unable to do so.  This also differs 
markedly in Scotland with 2% of urban properties unable to get decent broadband but 27% of rural 
properties unable to do so.71 
Mobile phones and the rural divide 
Ofcom (2017) reports that: 
 Within their home or office, indoor telephone call coverage is now available in 90% of UK 
premises.72  However, this falls to 57% in rural areas.  
 Good progress has been made on mobile phone coverage whilst away from home with 70% of 
the geographic area of the UK having call coverage up from 63% in 2016 and 63% of total area 
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having mobile data coverage up from 52% in 2016.  However, only in 40% of the geographic area 
of Scotland can people make outdoor telephone calls using their mobile phones.73 
 Just 18% of rural premises in the UK can receive an indoor 4G service from all operators compared 
to 64% in urban areas.74 
However, improving coverage in rural areas is challenging, especially in mountainous or extremely remote 
locations.  In addition to practical difficulties of installing and maintaining network equipment in these 
locations, the commercial business case for operators to provide coverage in areas of low population 
deŶsitǇ ĐaŶ ďe ĐhalleŶgiŶg͟75 and this therefore remains a competitive disadvantage for rural SMEs in 
particular but also for the living standards of anyone living in such areas. 
The comparative position of the UK with respect to other EU countries 
In 2017, the European Commission (EC) reported that the UK is high iŶ the EU ƌaŶkiŶgs of ĐouŶtƌies͛ 
connectivity.  It ranks 5th in terms of the percentage of households covered by fixed broadband (99.97% 
in 2016) and 3rd in fixed broadband take-up (87% in 2016), well above the EU average of 74%.76  The EC 
Report (2017) commends the UK in being one of the few countries in the EU that has a comprehensive 
computing curriculum in compulsory education from the age of 5.77 
Digital skills and the use of digital tools 
 According to the EC (2017), in 2016, alŵost ϭ/ϯ of the UK͛s populatioŶ did Ŷot haǀe ďasiĐ digital skills. 
 Theƌe has ďeeŶ a fall iŶ the UK͛s ƌaŶkiŶg fƌoŵ ϭst in 2013 to 3rd iŶ ϮϬϭϰ, iŶ the EU foƌ the UK͛s 
percentage of STEM graduates in the population. 
 5% of employed individuals in the UK are IT specialists, ranking 3rd in the EU. 
 The UK ranked 12th in the EU in 2016 for the percentage of e-ĐoŵŵeƌĐe doŶe ďǇ “ME͛s ;ϵϰ% of theiƌ 
tuƌŶoǀeƌͿ although the Ŷuŵďeƌ of “ME͛s iŶǀolǀed iŶ selliŶg oŶ-line was higher than the EU average 
(19% compared to the EU average of 17%).  
The importance of digital technology to those living and working in rural communities 
Connectivity is important since a greater proportion of the rural labour force works from home (22%) than 
does the urban workforce (12%).78  In 2017, ‘uƌal EŶglaŶd aŶd “ĐotlaŶd͛s ‘uƌal College ;‘E“‘CͿ ĐoŶduĐted 
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a survey of more than 800 rural businesses on their use of digital tools and services.  Their findings suggest 
that:  The most important device for rural businesses is a smartphone (82%) followed by a laptop (79%).79 
 Almost 80% believe that the use of digital tools and services is important to their future growth 
potential with cloud computing being seen as the biggest driver (62%), 5G mobile networks (54%), the 
Internet of Things (47%) and Machine Learning/Artificial Intelligence (26%).  Of those who export, 80% 
say that the use of e-commerce is important in their trade of goods and services abroad.  The top two 
sectors using e-commerce are retail (80%) and the accommodation & food sector (71%) and the top 
export destinations for rural businesses are the EU (84%) followed by the USA (45%).80 
 62% of the businesses surveyed said that they use cloud computing for their rural business.  For 
eǆaŵple, the fiƌŵ IĐe ‘oďotiĐs has haƌŶessed ͞Đloud ĐoŵputiŶg aŶd sensor technologies to monitor 
the fertility and health of cows used in dairy farming, enabling farmers to see alerts and visualisations 
of hoǁ theiƌ liǀestoĐk aƌe ŵoǀiŶg so theǇ ĐaŶ ŵaŶage theiƌ heƌds ŵoƌe pƌoduĐtiǀelǇ.͟81 
 The benefits of digital technology use were said to be: 
1. Assisting remote working (30% of rural businesses) 
2. Improving access to customers/suppliers (29% of rural businesses) 
3. Improving business efficiency (28% of rural businesses) 
4. Improving data storage and security(25% of rural businesses) and 
5. Enabling more business flexibility (25% of rural businesses). 
Some also identified benefits in business costs (16%) and profitability (19%).82  However, 52% of respondents said that they faced issues with internet reliability and speed, 30% said 
that they had difficulty finding external or outsourced digital connectivity support, 14% said that they 
had difficulty accessing appropriate external digital training for their existing workforce and 20% said 
that their existing workforce lacked sufficient digital skills and struggled to recruit people who had 
them.83  The relative importance of different constraints was found to vary with business size as the 
ŵaiŶ ĐoŶstƌaiŶt foƌ ŵediuŵ aŶd laƌge ďusiŶesses ǁas ͞ƌeĐƌuitiŶg people ǁith the ƌeƋuiƌed digital 
skills.͟84  ͞Issues ƌaised ďǇ ďusiŶesses oŶ aĐĐouŶt of haǀiŶg sloǁ oƌ uŶƌeliaďle ĐoŶŶeĐtioŶs iŶĐlude ƌeputatioŶal 
harm to their business, lost time or added stress experienced, an inability to work flexibly or on the 
move (because of poor mobile signals) and, in soŵe Đases, lost ĐoŶsuŵeƌ sales.͟85  Large and medium-sized businesses are more positive about digital benefits than small enterprises. 
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Regional Policies 
iNorthumberland aŶd CoŶŶeĐtiŶg Cuŵďƌia haǀe ďeeŶ ǁoƌkiŶg ǁith BT to ĐoŶŶeĐt ŵoƌe of theiƌ ĐouŶtǇ͛s 
communities and businesses to broadband, superfast broadband and ultrafast broadband.  In 2015, 
Northumberland County Council stated that the aim of iNorthumberland was to deliver 100% mobile 
coverage for voice by December 2016 and via an investment programme of almost £20M in partnership 
ǁith BT, to ĐoŶŶeĐt ϵϬ% of the ĐouŶtǇ͛s hoŵes aŶd ďusiŶesses to supeƌfast ďƌoadďaŶd ďǇ ϮϬϭϱ.86  They 
would ensure that all new developments were provided with superfast broadband services as an integral 
part of the provision of core utilities.  By 2017, the intention was to increase fibre broadband coverage in 
the County to 95% of premises and wherever superfast broadband is not possible, to guarantee a 
ŵiŶiŵuŵ seƌǀiĐe deliǀeƌǇ of ϱ ŵďps to eǀeƌǇ pƌopeƌtǇ iŶ the CouŶtǇ.͟87 
Northumberland County Council has maximised digital transactions and agile working in council work.  In 
the NCC (2015) report, they envisaged that by 2018, around 80% of interactions with the Council would 
be handled digitally.88 
In the NCC (2015) report, the Council said that they wished to ensure that low cost connectivity was part 
of tenancy contracts for social housing providers and private landlords.  They were also to explore the 
feasibility of creating a digital academy in Northumberland to help grow and retain digital skills and talent 
in the County.89 
Cuŵďƌia LEP ;ϮϬϭϳͿ ƌepoƌts that ͞The CoŶŶeĐtiŶg Cuŵďƌia pƌogƌaŵŵe led ďǇ Cuŵďƌia CouŶtǇ CouŶĐil iŶ 
partnership with BT and part funding from ERDF has made good progress it says, in introducing superfast 
ďƌoadďaŶd to ŵaŶǇ of Cuŵďƌia͛s sŵalleƌ ǀillages ďut has soŵe ǁaǇ to go iŶ seƌǀiŶg ŵoƌe isolated ƌuƌal 
aƌeas.͟90  It states that farmers are expected to complete payment returns on-line.  Access to broadband 
in accommodation is also important for the visitor economy. 
Policy Drivers  
1. In March 2017, the UK Government confirmed that it will invest £1bn in full fibre deployment and 5G 
by 2020-21.91 
                                                          
86  NCC (2015), p. 7. 
87 NCC (2015), p. 7. 
87 NCC (2015), p. 15. 
88 NCC (2015), p. 13. 
89 NCC (2015), p. 9. 
90  Cumbria LEP (2017), p. 16. 
91  ͞UK Digital “tƌategǇ,͟ DCM“, MaƌĐh ϮϬϭϳ. 
  
2. The Digital Economy Bill (2017) is the GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s atteŵpt to eŶsuƌe that BƌitaiŶ ƌeŵaiŶs at the 
forefront of the 21st century economy, encouraging greater use of digital technology across the public 
sector. 
3. The EU͛s oďjeĐtiǀe is to eŶsuƌe that eǀeƌǇ ĐoŵpaŶǇ aŶd household has ďƌoadďaŶd aĐĐess at a speed 
of at least 30MBs by 202092. 
4. Ofcom is considering new coverage obligations on network suppliers and will also be working with 
industry and government to identify options for improvement to the dependence of mobile networks 
on mains power given that 70% of all calls to the emergency services are now done on mobile 
networks.93 
5. Northumberland aims to be the most connected rural county in Britain.  Since 1st April 2015, 
Northumberland has operated the Superconnected Cities voucher scheme which gives grants of up 
to £3,000 to SMEs to enable them to secure speeds of at least 30mbps.94 
6. NoƌthuŵďeƌlaŶd͛s iŶteŶtioŶ is to eŵďƌaĐe digital teĐhŶologǇ aŶd haƌŶess its ĐapaĐitǇ to iŶĐƌease the 
participation and wellbeing of people with long-term conditions, disabilities and the elderly. 
Opportunities 
The opportunities foreseen by industry reviews do not appear to be dependent on the EU deal on Brexit. 
They identify many opportunities for the sector and outline the benefits that they will bring to businesses 
and communities: 
 Increased health and wellbeing of communities and families as digital participation increases, and 
products that enable independent living and expansion of tele-health are supported.  Independent 
living will thereby be enabled/extended for the elderly and there will be a reduction in social isolation 
of older people by providing them with internet access and digital skills. 
 The authors of the SRUC report (2017) recommend  i) Better signposting to digital support by creating 
local directories of those who offer such services and ensure that support for connectivity, training 
and e-commerce is available on a single portal;  ii) The creation of more digital enterprise hubs in rural 
towns which businesses can use or visit for better connectivity, start-up workspace, hot desk space 
and digital training and  iii) UK businesses could do more to take advantage of digital technologies e.g. 
use of electronic information sharing. 
 Wilson et al. (2018) estimate that if digital constraints were overcome, the increase in annual business 
turnover in those areas would grow by at least £15bn.  Doing so, would increase GVA in rural areas by 
at least £12bn p.a.95 
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 Encourage more small businesses to export by promoting the opportunities afforded by e-commerce.  
EŶsuƌe that theƌe is sŵaƌteƌ digital tƌaiŶiŶg aŶd skills deǀelopŵeŶt foƌ “ME͛s aŶd theiƌ eŵploǇees. 
 The European Agricultural Machinery Industry Association (EEMA) has stated that ͞adeƋuate 
broadband infrastructure across the entire EU is an essential precondition to achieving a successful 
aŶd iŶĐlusiǀe digital tƌaŶsfoƌŵatioŶ iŶ agƌiĐultuƌe.͟  EURACTV (2017) sees farmer organisations 
playing a greater role in encouraging the take-up of technology that supports their members.96  It also 
suggests the introduction of an agricultural sustainable productivity bonus in the CAP to support green 
technology investments like smart farming.  They argue that precision farming allows higher 
productivity, less pesticide use and less waste in agriculture.  For example, the French fertiliser 
company Yara, claims that 85,000 tonnes of additional wheat production were produced in France 
because the farmers, with an N-tester tool were able to adjust to the nitrogen needs of the crop with 
a direct effect on yield, fertilisation cost and the environment.  This also contributed to lower 
greenhouse emissions by 71,000 tonnes of CO2.97  
 EURACTIV (2017) also argues that consumers will benefit from smart agriculture as the quality of food 
will be improved.98  A report by the Scientific and Technological Options Assessment (STOA) 
committee of the European Parliament emphasised the environmental benefits of smart farming.  The 
use of high-tech tools such as GPS systems, devices controlling sprayers and fertiliser distribution, and 
ĐeŶsoƌs ǁill ĐoŶtƌiďute to a ŵoƌe sustaiŶaďle aŶd ŵeasuƌaďle iŵpaĐt oŶ the eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt,͟99 allowing 
the pƌoduĐtioŶ of ͞ŵoƌe ǁith less.͟ 
 There will be a reduced brain-drain from rural areas as homes and businesses achieve greater 
connectivity. 
 The Cumbria Rural and Visitor Economy Growth Plan 2017 ƌeĐogŶises ͞aŶ oppoƌtuŶitǇ foƌ Cuŵďƌia to 
be a test bed for the application of new technologies in rural areas and sees it as a priority to build 
the County as a location for 21st ĐeŶtuƌǇ ďusiŶesses.͟100 
 Cumbria LEP (2017) sees an opportunity for the County to capitalise on the roll-out of superfast 
ďƌoadďaŶd aŶd its lifestǇle offeƌ to deǀelop the ͞‘oĐkies pheŶoŵeŶoŶ͟ espeĐiallǇ iŶ the south of the 
county.101 i.e. attract digital and creative firms to locate to Cumbria. 
 Northumberland County Council intends to increase the number of public access points to broadband 
(currently 300 in Northumberland in 2014) and to ensure that low cost connectivity is part of tenancy 
contracts for social housing providers and private landlords.  They will explore the feasibility of 
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creating a digital academy in Northumberland to help grow and retain digital skills and talent in the 
County.102 
 Wilson et al (2018) suggest that there be more rural targeting of existing digital policies and strategies 
e.g. design the National Productivity Investment Fund so that it targets rural areas; have a dedicated 
ƌuƌal stƌaŶd ǁithiŶ the GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s pƌoposed “haƌed PƌospeƌitǇ FuŶd, Đapaďle of supporting digital 
skills and growth.103 
Challenges 
The sector reviews foresee a number of challenges for the sector: 
1. The Cumbria LEP (2017) recognises the technological driver as being a challenge to the tourism sector 
in Cumbria since the County needs to remain competitive vis-a-vis other tourist destinations in terms 
of demand for connectivity and speeds obtained by staying visitors. 
2. The ability of rural businesses in accessing digital training. 
3. There is a lack of digital skills in the current work force and a struggle to recruit those who have them 
(Cumbria). 
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5.6  The Environmental and Renewable Energy Sector 
Sector reviews emphasise the importance of the Natural Environment and Renewable Energy in the 
national economy: 
 The Climate Change Act, passed in 2008, committed the UK to reducing greenhouse emissions by at 
least 80% by 2050 when compared to 1990 levels and since 1990, the UK has cut emissions by 42% 
while the economy has grown by two thirds.104  Five-year caps on greenhouse gas emissions termed 
͞CaƌďoŶ Budgets͟ aƌe set aŶd so faƌ, the UK has outpeƌfoƌŵed these.  Notaďle sigŶs of pƌogƌess haǀe 
been as follows: 
i. IŶ ϮϬϭϲ, ϰϳ% of the UK͛s eleĐtƌiĐitǇ Đaŵe fƌoŵ loǁ ĐaƌďoŶ sources around double the level in 
2010. 
ii. The UK has the largest offshore wind capacity in the world. 
iii. Average household energy consumption has fallen by 17% since 1990. 
iv. England recycles almost four times as much as it did in the year 2000 in local authority collected 
waste.105 
 ThaŶks to the UK͛s ǁoƌld-leading expertise in technologies such as offshore wind, power electronics 
for low carbon vehicles and electric motors and global leadership in green finance, the UK is 
successfully exporting goods and services around the world.  For example, one in five electric vehicles 
driven in Europe has come from the UK.  Hence, there are more than 430,000 jobs in low carbon 
businesses and their supply chains in the UK.106  The UK also leads on green finance. 
 However, it is argued that the environmental effects of the Common Agricultural Policy have been 
detrimental to the UK natural environment with, for example, there being a loss of hedgerows, bees, 
birds and biodiversity. 
The Importance of the Renewable Energy Sector to the region is also highlighted in the local strategy 
papers: 
 The Northumberland Economic Strategy (2015) records the highest growth in numbers employed to 
ďe iŶ the seĐtoƌ ͞MiŶiŶg, ƋuaƌƌǇiŶg aŶd utilities,͟ up ϲϳ% iŶ the peƌiod ϮϬϬϵ-13 although the sector 
still accounts for only 2% of total employment.107  There was even greater growth (77.5%) in the sector 
in the Scottish Borders but decline in the numbers employed in the sector in Cumbria (11% fall).108 
 In 2011, there were 26 small hydro schemes in Cumbria and 23 in Dumfries & Galloway.  In 2012, the 
largest off-shore windfarm in the world, with 102 turbines, was opened off the coast of Cumbria at 
Walney Windpark with the ability to generate enough sustainable electricity to power over 400,000 
                                                          
104  HM Government (2017), p. 5. 
105  HM Government (2017), p. 6. 
106  HM Government (2017), p. 7. 
107  Northumberland County Council (2015), pp. 17-18. 
108  Northumberland County Council (2015), p. 20. 
  
homes.  It was announced on 24th April 2018 by Danish developer Ørsted that the last of 87 new 
windmills have been installed at the Walney Extension and that these are expected to be operational 
later this year.109 
 The North East Enterprise Zone, centred on Blyth, focuses on energy sectors and Blyth hosts the 
National Offshore Renewable Energy Catapult Centre.110 
 West Cumbria hosts the National Nuclear Laboratory and the Dalton Nuclear Institute at Westlakes 
Science Park.  The Dalton Cumbrian Facility is the state-of-the-art research base of The University of 
Manchester's Dalton Nuclear Institute, part of the National Nuclear User Facility which provides 
academia and industry with the opportunity to carry out high-end research in radiation science and 
nuclear engineering decommissioning. 
Importance of the Natural Environment to the Region 
All four of the Border counties stress the importance of the natural environment in their economic 
strategies as this plays a fundamental part in the attraction of tourists to the region.  
The Northern Upland Chain Local Nature Partnership, established in 2012, includes over 50 organisations 
and covers four nationally-designated landscapes: Northumberland National Park, North Pennines AONB, 
Yorkshire Dales National Park, Nidderdale AONB and Forest of Bowland AONB.  The Partnership is calling 
on the Government, LEPs, environmental agencies and the farming community to work together to 
suppoƌt High Natuƌe Value FaƌŵiŶg as it feels that the latteƌ is the ďest ǁaǇ of ŵaiŶtaiŶiŶg the ƌegioŶ͛s 
valuable landscapes, wildlife, flora and fauna. 
Policy Drivers 
 In October 2017, the UK Government published The Clean Growth Strategy in which the Prime 
MiŶisteƌ stated that ͞eĐoŶoŵiĐ gƌoǁth has to go haŶd-in-hand with greater protection for our forests 
and beaches, ĐleaŶ aiƌ aŶd plaĐes of outstaŶdiŶg Ŷatuƌal ďeautǇ.͟111  It ǁas also stated that ͞aĐhieǀiŶg 
clean growth, while ensuring an affordable energy supply for businesses and consumers is at the heart 
of the UK͛s IŶdustƌial “tƌategǇ.͟112  Hence, Government intends to put emissions reductions and land 
stewardship at the heart of the post-EU agricultural support policy.  In his speech on 17th February 
2018, the Secretary of State for the Environment, Michael Gove (2018) stated that he wanted ͞the 
new system to deliver benefits such as improved air and soil quality; increased biodiversity; climate 
change mitigation and adaptation; and cultural benefits that improve our mental and physical 
ǁellďeiŶg ǁhile pƌoteĐtiŶg ouƌ histoƌiĐ eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt.͟113  He believes that the new post-Brexit 
eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal laŶd ŵaŶageŵeŶt sǇsteŵ that ǁill ďe adopted ͞ǁill help us to deliǀeƌ ouƌ ŵaŶifesto 
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commitment to be the first generation to leave the environment in a better state than we inherited 
it.͟114  The GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt has stated that ͞ LeaǀiŶg the EU ǁill Ŷot affeĐt ouƌ statutoƌǇ ĐoŵŵitŵeŶts uŶdeƌ ouƌ 
own domestic Climate Change Act and indeed our domestic binding emissions targets are more 
aŵďitious thaŶ those set ďǇ EU legislatioŶ.͟115  As stated above, The Climate Change Act (2008) 
commits the UK to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at least 80% by 2050 compared to 1990 
levels. 
 The Government states that the UK low carbon economy could grow by an estimated 11% p.a. 
between 2015 and 2030, four times faster than the rest of the economy and could deliver between 
£60bn and £170bn of export sales and services by 2030.116  The Clean Growth Strategy will see 
Government invest over £2.5bn in support of low carbon innovation from 2015 to 2021.  The National 
Productivity Investment Fund will provide an additional £4.7bn and an extra £2bn p.a. by 2020-21 on 
UK sĐieŶĐe, ƌeseaƌĐh aŶd iŶŶoǀatioŶ.  This stƌategǇ ǁill also ͞eŶhaŶĐe the UK͛s eŶeƌgǇ seĐuƌitǇ ďǇ 
deliǀeƌiŶg a ŵoƌe diǀeƌse aŶd ƌeliaďle eŶeƌgǇ ŵiǆ.͟117 
 The Energy sector is identified in all 4 Border authorities as a sector priority. 
Opportunities 
In the sector review and policy documents, the UK͛s leaǀiŶg the CAP is seeŶ as aŶ oppoƌtuŶitǇ to ƌeŵedǇ 
some of the environmental damage to which the CAP has been argued to giǀe ƌise.  It is the GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s 
vision to implement a new environmental land management system.  As direct payments to farmers are 
phased out during the Brexit two-year agricultural transition period from March 2019, it is proposed that 
they will ďe ƌeplaĐed ǁith a Ŷeǁ sǇsteŵ ǁheƌeiŶ faƌŵeƌs ǁill ďe paid ͞puďliĐ ŵoŶeǇ foƌ puďliĐ goods͟ 
which will deliver better environmental outcomes.118  In the meantime, DEFRA intends to simplify 
applications for farmers wishing to enter existing schemes that provide environmental benefits such as 
Countryside Stewardship. 
The following opportunities are also foreseen: 
 There is potential for growth in wind power – the Scottish Borders has an abundance of suitable sites.  
Also, offshore wind, oil and gas activity are a key part of the Northumberland offer.  There is also 
growth potential in hydro power.   The Cumbria LEP has considered the Solway Firth as a source of estuarine tidal power. 
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 The Government intends to improve the energy efficiency of homes and offer all households the 
opportunity to have a smart meter by 2020.  As part of the Clean Growth Strategy (2017), it intends 
to support £3.6bn of investment to upgrade around one million homes.  It will strengthen energy 
performance standards for new and existing homes under Building Regulations and also consult on 
how social housing can meet similar standards.  It intends to improve standards on the 1.2 million 
new boilers that are installed every year in England.  The Government will spend £4.5bn to support innovative low carbon heat technologies in homes and 
ďusiŶesses ďetǁeeŶ ϮϬϭϲ aŶd ϮϬϮϭ aŶd duƌiŶg the ϮϬϮϬ͛s, it ǁill phase out the iŶstallatioŶ of high 
carbon forms of fossil fuel heating.  It states intentions to: phase out the use of unabated coal to 
produce electricity by 2025: improve the route to market for renewable technologies; generate 
competition between suppliers of electricity; and deliver new nuclear power.119  The Government is to introduce a voluntary public sector target of a 30% reduction in carbon 
emissions by 2020-21 and will report annually on UK performance in delivering GDP growth and 
ƌeduĐed eŵissioŶs thƌough aŶ ͞EŵissioŶs IŶteŶsitǇ ƌatio.͟  The Government wishes to explore new and innovative ways to manage emissions from landfill.  Nuclear new build in Cumbria could provide construction jobs for the County.  The £15 million Walney Extension Community Fund, launched in 2016, gives approximately £600,000 
per annum to community and environmental projects located in coastal communities near to the 
Walney Extension offshore wind farm and will do so each year for the expected 25-year lifetime of 
the wind farm.120  Establish a new network of forests in England and increase the amount of UK timber used in 
construction. 
Over the Medium and Long Term, it is stated iŶ the GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s CleaŶ Gƌoǁth “tƌategǇ ;ϮϬϭϳͿ that it 
wishes to accelerate the shift to low carbon clean investment transport via a number of measures: 
i. End the sale of new petrol and diesel cars and vans by 2040; 
ii. Spend £1bn supporting the take-up of ultra-low emission vehicles (ULEV); 
iii. Develop one of the best electric vehicle charging networks in the world; 
iv. Position the UK at the forefront of Connected and Autonomous vehicle technologies and ensure that 
the UK leads the world in design, development and manufacture of electric batteries; 
v. Accelerate the uptake of low emission taxis and buses.  An example of sustainable transport is being 
trialled in the Lake District National Park on 27-28th April 2018 when the public will be given the 
oppoƌtuŶitǇ to tƌǇ out a dƌiǀeƌless ͞pod.͟  These aƌe eleĐtƌiĐ self-driving vehicles which could possibly 
be used in the Lake District in the future to transport people along specific routes in the National Park 
in an environmentally friendly way.121 
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vi. Work with industry as they develop an Automotive Sector Deal to accelerate the transition to zero 
emission vehicles; 
vii. Invest £1.2bn in making cycling and walking the natural choice for shorter journeys; 
viii. Work on shifting more freight from road to rail. 
It is also stated iŶ the GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s CleaŶ Gƌoǁth “tƌategǇ ;ϮϬϭϳͿ that it ǁishes the UK to deǀelop 
world- leading Green Finance capabilities.  To enable this, it suggests: 
i. Setting up a Green Finance Taskforce; 
ii. Developing voluntary green sustainable finance management standards; 
iii. Providing up to £20 million for a clean technology early stage investment fund; and 
iv. Developing green mortgage products. 
The Government wishes to improve business and industry efficiency so that their energy productivity is 
increased by at least 20% by 2030.  It recommends: 
i. the formation of an Industrial Energy Efficiency Scheme to help large companies to install 
measures to cut their energy use and bills; 
ii. that the energy efficiency of new and existing commercial buildings be improved; 
iii. that SMEs be given improved energy information and advice; 
iv. that requirements for businesses to report energy use should be simplified and;  
v. support for the recycling of heat to reduce business energy bills; 
vi. the publishing of joint industrial decarbonisation and energy efficiency action plans with 7 of the 
most energy intensive industrial sectors. 
The Government would like to see all fuel-poor homes upgraded to EPC Band C by 2030. 
The Government would like the UK to work towards zero avoidable waste associated with the extraction, 
use and disposal of our resources by 2050. 
There could be a large expansion of jobs in Cumbria based on new build in nuclear on the West coast with 
consequent growth in the accommodation sector, housing construction, service sectors and retail. 
Challenges 
Sector reviews and strategy documents envisage a number of challenges for the renewable energy sector: 
1. It remains to be seen how successful the Government will be in implementing a new post-Brexit 
scheme that bases payments to farmers on their delivery of environmental as opposed to agricultural 
goods, given the potential for conflict with WTO rules. 
2. There is a fear that there will be a lack of supply of skilled workers needed for the expansion of the 
economy in West Cumbria. 
3. Local opposition is a challenge to more windfarms in the Scottish Borders and Dumfries and Galloway. 
  
5.7  Manufacturing  
As noted earlier in this document, it is often overlooked that the rural North hosts a significant amount of 
manufacturing activity that is dispersed across free-standing towns within predominantly rural areas. This 
can be illustrated using official data for employment (BRES data accessed via NOMIS) which indicates that, 
despite recent decline, manufacturing is a major employer in Northumberland and Cumbria.  It is 
significant to note that this is also the case for Dumfries and Galloway and Scottish Borders.  In 2017: 
 39,000 or 16.9% of employees worked in the manufacturing sector in Cumbria;  11,000 or 10.9% of employees worked in the manufacturing sector in Northumberland;  6,000 or 10.5% of employees worked in the manufacturing sector in D&G;  5,000 or 12.5% of employees worked in the manufacturing sector in the Scottish Borders;  This is compared to just 8.1% of employees in GB as a whole.122 
The IPPR Noƌth͛s 2017 report oŶ ͚FoƌgotteŶ OppoƌtuŶities͛ aƌgues that Advanced Manufacturing tends to 
aĐĐouŶt foƌ a siŵilaƌ pƌopoƌtioŶ of GVA iŶ ďoth ƌuƌal aŶd uƌďaŶ aƌeas.  ͞A ƌaŶge of faĐtoƌs, iŶĐludiŶg laŶd 
availability, proximity to transport links, and the opportunity to attract skilled workers, make the 
ĐouŶtƌǇside a good plaĐe foƌ ŵaŶufaĐtuƌiŶg ďusiŶesses.͟123  
Furthermore, manufacturing accounts for 45% of UK exports and ϱϳ.ϱ% of the UK͛s ŵaŶufaĐtuƌiŶg eǆpoƌts 
currently go to the EU.124 
Drivers  
Recently, the fall in the value of sterling has seen a surge in competitiveness for both EU and non-EU trade, 
benefitting manufacturers.  However, the downside of the weaker pound is an increase in unit costs and 
a concern that this will need to be passed on to consumers.125 
Sector reports emphasise that the nature of the deal that is determined with the EU will have a profound 
effect on trade, investment and incomes and thereby have both direct and indirect effects on 
manufacturing.  The CBI (2016) undertook a consultation with companies of all sizes and sectors and with 
representatives of dozens of trade associations in order to gauge how businesses felt about their post-
Brexit future and in what ways they were preparing for the consequences.  Its intention was to report on 
a sector-by-sector basis and to use this information to guide government and industry to get the best deal 
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for the UK on leaving the EU. It believes that there are six pƌiŶĐiples ǁhiĐh should guide the UK͛s 
negotiations with the EU: 
1. A barrier-free relationship with our largest, closest and most important trading partner; 
2. A clear plan for regulation that gives certainty in the short-term, and in the long-term balances 
influence, access and opportunity; 
3. A migration system which allows businesses to access the skills and labour they need to deliver 
growth; 
4. A renewed focus on global economic relationships, with the business community at their heart; 
5. An approach that protects the social and economic benefits of EU funding; 
6. A sŵooth eǆit fƌoŵ the EU, aǀoidiŶg a ͞Đliff-edge͟ that Đauses disƌuptioŶ. 
Its findings with regards to the Manufacturing Sector were that: 
1. Low barriers and long-term regulatory cooperation between the UK and the EU was important to 
firms. 
2. Companies have concerns about continued access to workers at all levels of skills and about flexible 
movement. 
3. Partnership between international education institutions and UK manufacturers was important in 
enhancing innovation in the sector. 
Clearly, a Brexit deal that jeopardised any of these industry drivers would affect both the demand and 
supply sides of the sector in the UK.  If a preferential trade arrangement were not agreed between the UK 
and EU, the EU would be legally obliged to apply the same tariff rate to UK goods as it does to those from 
any other third country.126  These tariffs differ by product with, for example, a 12% tariff on clothing, a 
tariff of over 3% on electrical machinery and chemicals and an average EU tariff of 22.3% on food 
and drink products.  This would put UK suppliers at a competitive disadvantage when trying to 
sell to the EU.  In addition, if UK imports from the EU attracted tariffs, this would push up the cost 
of imports such as energy, vehicles and machinery and lead to supply chain costs increasing for 
the sector.  
If non-tariff barriers to trade such as rules of origin declarations, quotas, labelling and packaging 
requirements were to increase, this would create cost and delay and might also upset just-in-time 
deliveries.127  In this regard, it is envisaged that SMEs might turn to large companies to facilitate EU trade 
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given the expertise that may be needed and this would disadvantage rural areas more given their lack of 
large companies. 
The CBI is calling for the UK government to engage in wide consultation with the entire UK economy when 
considering its approach to current EU regulations, directives and standards as these affect not just 
immediate sectors, for example, chemicals and plastics but those which they also supply. 
The chemicals, plastic and technology industries are also requesting assurances that the Great Repeal Bill 
ǁill ďe suĐĐessful iŶ its aiŵ of ĐoŵpƌeheŶsiǀelǇ ͞ĐaƌƌǇiŶg oǀeƌ͟ legislatioŶ oŶ ƌegulatioŶs that steŵ fƌoŵ 
EU or cross-European bodies.  If this were not to be the outcome, then again, smaller firms could be 
disadvantaged by the need to understand and incorporate new legislation.128 
Challenges 
The CBI (2016) has identified a number of challenges to the Manufacturing sector, as follows: 
 The CBI (2016) reports that ͞ǁith the UK͛s eŵploǇŵeŶt leǀels at a ƌeĐoƌd high at ϳϰ.ϱ% oǀeƌ a thiƌd 
of businesses are not confident about filling their high-skilled joďs iŶ futuƌe.͟129  However, nearly 2/3 
of ŵaŶufaĐtuƌiŶg fiƌŵs iŶ the CBI suƌǀeǇ saǁ ͞ĐhalleŶges iŶ ƌeĐƌuitiŶg the skills they need in the years 
ahead.͟130  Given that industry already tends to face recruitment problems in the rural North, this 
would only be exacerbated if labour were in further short supply and attracted to the higher-paying 
factories in urban areas.  In particular, for rural areas, the biggest threat might be the shortage of 
workers with the right skills.  
 Also, difficulties in recruiting EU labour may affect the transport and logistics sector which would have 
a negative effect on manufacturing industry that required goods to be moved from one location to 
another. 
 An easy system for visitor travel and freedom to move employees to work in other EU countries and 
vice versa may be valued by some manufacturing companies who rely on inter-company transfers in 
theiƌ ŵaiŶteŶaŶĐe of theiƌ gloďal Ŷetǁoƌks.  The CBI ;ϮϬϭϲͿ ƌepoƌts that ͞ if UK eŶgiŶeeƌs ĐaŶŶot ŵoǀe 
quickly from the UK to the EU, talent pools will be developed there and the UK capability may be 
affeĐted.͟131 
Opportunities 
Sector reviews identify the following potential opportunities for the manufacturing sector: 
 MaŶufaĐtuƌiŶg ƌelies oŶ good digital aŶd phǇsiĐal ĐoŶŶeĐtiǀitǇ.  The IPP‘ ƌeĐoŵŵeŶds ͞ƌuƌalised͟ 
plans be drawn up as part of rural devolution deals for the contribution of rural areas to national 
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sectors such as advanced manufacturing, digital and tourism.132  It ďelieǀes that ͞the poteŶtial of ƌuƌal 
areas as centres of excellence in advanced manufacturing and high-tech fields (for example, energy) 
should be part of a place-ďased iŶdustƌial stƌategǇ.͟133 
 Growth and Proximity to energy generation (renewable energy) may be an additional draw for 
manufacturing firms to rural areas.  
 In Cumbria, the Cumbria Manufacturing Service aims to help manufacturing SMEs to streamline their 
processes, drive up production capacity, innovate, improve business systems and access new markets.  
The Manufacturing Adviser helps businesses to apply for grants available under the ERDF.134  The 
question is, will these grants be replaced by the UK Government when no longer available from the 
EU? 
 New international trade agreements with countries outside the EU are seen as a long-term ambition 
since i) until the UK has formally exited the EU on 29th March 2019 it cannot launch formal trade 
negotiations with any third country and ii) all future trading relationships will depend on formal 
acceptaŶĐe of the UK͛s sĐhedules at the WTO.  The process of submitting new UK and EU schedules 
to the rest of the WTO for approval has not yet begun. 
 At present, EU funding streams are targeted at areas of economic and social deprivation and need.  
Some sectors also receive significant amounts, particularly in the fields of innovation, infrastructure 
and the rural economy.  Unless these funds are replaced by UK government funds going to the same 
causes and regions, the  rural North may suffer in terms of new infrastructure, investment in 
innovation and skills.  A decline in these components themselves would have repercussions for 
ŵaŶufaĐtuƌiŶg.  The CBI ;ϮϬϭϲͿ is ĐalliŶg foƌ a ͞fuŶdiŶg ƌoadŵap͟ foƌ aƌeas ĐuƌƌeŶtlǇ Đoǀeƌed ďǇ EU 
funds and grants to be drawn and also for government to set a target for joint public and private R&D 
expenditure to reach 3% by 2025.135 
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5.8  Sectors in the rural North– Optimistic and Pessimistic Outcomes 
Table 3 draws together the views expressed in the policy documents reviewed above regarding possible 
outcomes for these sectors following BREXIT.  Continued uncertainty surrounding the characteristics of 
Brexit mean that speculation about outcomes involves a wide range of opinion.  While most sector reviews 
address the pessimistic outcomes there are some expressions of optimism, though based on specific 
conditions and outcomes from negotiations.   
In the farm sector, there appears to be recognition that aspects of CAP do not benefit the sector in the 
North of England in terms of promoting and supporting innovation in farming practice.  There is 
recognition that, with the right incentives and policy environment, some farms may benefit from BREXIT 
by becoming test-beds for new models of farming based on investment in ICT and a new phase of 
mechanisation.  Others might benefit through adoption of de-intensification models and, under 
appropriate policy steer, maintain viable business through production based on environmental goods and 
further phases of diversification. These policy commentaries, however, also recognise high risk for the 
farm sector following a hard Brexit that closes off EU markets for farm produce and allows imports of 
cheaper foodstuffs from non-EU countries.  In these circumstances, there is less confidence from 
commentators that a new UK farm policy could create conditions within which the farm-based economy 
could thrive in the rural North.   
Industry reports, strategy and policy documents reveal little impact of Brexit on the digital sector.  The 
main concern is that there still exists a rural-urban divide in terms of broadband and mobile connectivity.  
This hinders business growth in the rural economy and puts, for example, the accommodation sector in 
the NatioŶal Paƌks at a distiŶĐt disadǀaŶtage iŶ this ͞ĐoŶŶeĐted age.͟  Hoǁeǀeƌ, the NoƌthuŵďeƌlaŶd 
County Council (2015) and Cumbria LEP (2017) strategy documents look forward to the many benefits 
that digital take-up could have for the populations of these counties such as tele-health, reduction of 
social isolation and extension of independent living for the elderly.  The counties should benefit 
economically from creative businesses taking advantage of digital roll-out and the stemming of brain drain 
of people leaving the rural areas. 
The Government is placing great emphasis on the growth of the renewable energy and environment 
sector in its pursuance of an environmentally-friendly agenda aimed at helping the UK ͞to ďe the fiƌst 
geŶeƌatioŶ to leaǀe the eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt iŶ a ďetteƌ state thaŶ ǁheŶ ǁe iŶheƌited it.͟136  Brexit is not foreseen 
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by any commentators to give rise to negative consequences in the sector.  Rather, it is seen as an 
opportunity for the UK to adopt a more environmentally-friendly farming industry and to spur farmers to 
adopt smart technology thereby reducing the cost of food and input costs. 
IŶ the fishiŶg iŶdustƌǇ, theƌe is a hope that the UK͛s depaƌtuƌe fƌoŵ the EU ǁill ďƌiŶg soǀeƌeigŶtǇ oǀeƌ UK 
wateƌs up to ϮϬϬŵiles offshoƌe aŶd that this ǁill ƌeǀeƌse the seŶse of ͞uŶfaiƌŶess͟ felt ďǇ UK fisheƌŵeŶ 
of the current situation where EU fleets take four times as much out of UK coastal waters as the UK takes 
out of EU waters.  However, industry reports and statistics obtained from NOMIS indicate that the fishing 
iŶdustƌǇ is of ƌelatiǀelǇ little sigŶifiĐaŶĐe to the Noƌth͛s eĐoŶoŵies iŶ teƌŵs of eŵploǇŵeŶt pƌoǀided.  The 
possibility of post-Brexit tariffs on UK fish exports and the loss of EU collective bargaining power that the 
UK would have in negotiations with other countries may outweigh the advantages of the regaining of 
sovereignty over UK waters. 
Industry reports recognise that the forestry sector is heavily dependent on changes that might occur as a 
result of Brexit.  At present, UK forests are subject to EU regulations covering environmental impacts, 
biosecurity and pest control.  If UK regulations are put in force to replace these, it is thought that they 
may be more relaxed with regard both to the felling and replanting of trees.  This is because at present 
about 82% of wood consumption in the UK is imported and Brexit might lead to tariffs on these imports 
which makes domestic production more viable.  Such an impact would be favourable to the economies of 
rural areas.  However, monies for woodland management currently emanate from the European 
Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and these would also be required to be replaced by the UK 
government. 
Despite the Border counties being predominantly rural in nature, the Manufacturing sector is still seen to 
be very important, employing between 10.5% and 16.9% of workers in these counties.  Brexit is likely to 
have a profound impact on trade, investment and incomes and therefore will have both direct and indirect 
effects on manufacturing.  The two biggest threats to the sector recognised in the literature are i) a 
shortage of skilled workers and ii) the possibility of tariffs being imposed on British exports and imports 
of products and raw materials.  Both of these factors would raise costs and thereby ƌeduĐe the UK͛s 
international competitiveness.  The reduction in the value of sterling has benefitted manufacturers 
recently when exporting their goods.  If there is a degree of import-substitution by manufacturers 
following Brexit, this could potentially be good for rural areas. 
  
In the tourism sector, continued growth is expected given the rise in incomes, demand for leisure and the 
fall in sterling.  However, there is real concern that the shortage of labour already being experienced in 
the hospitalitǇ seĐtoƌ ŵaǇ ďe eǆaĐeƌďated ďoth ďǇ the Bƌeǆit ŶegotiatioŶs aŶd the ͞fiŶal deal.͟  The seĐtoƌ 
is quite heavily dependent on labour from the EU, especially in the Lake District and uncertainty over EU 
ǁoƌkeƌs͛ aďilitǇ to staǇ iŶ the UK afteƌ Bƌeǆit, is haǀiŶg a detƌiŵeŶtal effeĐt.  This faĐtoƌ aŶd the ƌise iŶ 
costs of imported food and hospitality products could lead to some hotel closures.  Industry strategic 
bodies are poised to foster tourism in the Border counties taking advantage of the beautiful natural 
landscapes; rich heritage; food and drink specialisms and outdoor sports opportunities that exist. 
 
Table 3: Optimistic and Pessimistic Sectoral Outcomes from Brexit  
Sector Optimistic outcome for rural areas Pessimistic outcome for rural areas 
Agriculture CAP has stifled innovation due to effect of 
support payments.  Coming out of CAP may 
stimulate innovation and prompt many 
farms to change practices and invest in 
technology – precision farming.  Farm 
productivity may be enhanced significantly.   
Rural areas of the North could become 
͞test ďeds͟ foƌ Ŷeǁ ŵodels of faƌŵiŶg 
based on environmental goods and/or 
smart technologies.    
Policy innovation to preserve and improve 
͞Ŷatuƌal Đapital͟ is ŵade possiďle ďǇ 
withdrawing from CAP.  Upland farming 
may have opportunity to de-intensify and 
diversify successfully.   
Farms with low productivity might 
experience barriers to investment and 
many farms could fail.   
Hard Brexit would reduce export of 
lamb to Europe.  Imports of lamb (NZ) 
and beef (Brazil, USA) could increase 
and prices fall in the UK.  Puts added 
pressure on UK farmers, especially in 
marginal upland areas.   
New farm policy for the UK might fail 
to foster innovation and 
diversification.  
UK government could experience 
difficulty in negotiating new farm 
policy with WTO 
Digital Rural areas could capitalise on the 
successful roll-out of superfast broadband.   
Addressing the digital divide might become 
a priority for policy and developers to 
facilitate smart farming and technological 
advances in farming, rural areas receive 
further investment in broadband 
infrastructure.   
Further investment in broadband and 
mobile connectivity could stimulate 
business start-up and small business 
growth in rural areas (e.g. tourism, digital, 
creative sectors).   
Demand for digital services from 
smart farming in rural areas might not 
materialise due to policy and market 
uncertainties 
Businesses in rural areas could be held 
back due to lack of digital skills base 
and local education and training 
capacity 
Due to policy uncertainties and 
commercial priorities of infrastructure 
providers, new investment in 
broadband infrastructure in rural 
areas might fail to keep pace with 
  
Rural area of the north could become test 
bed for new technologies applied to 
health-care diagnosis and delivery. 
To overcome negative effects of BREXIT, 
government might prioritise investment in 
digital enterprise hubs in rural areas 
through Borderlands Growth Deal, 
Productivity Investment Fund and Shared 
Prosperity Fund. 
urban areas and a digital divide could 
be reproduced at a higher level. 
Productivity Investment Fund and 
Shared Prosperity Fund might not be 
subject to rural targeting of digital 
infrastructure investment.   
 
Environmental 
and 
Renewable 
Energy 
 
New government policy has capacity to 
deliver better environmental outcomes 
from farming while also sustaining viable 
businesses in the sector.   
Rural areas of the North could capitalise on 
natural advantages for the generation of 
wind and hydro-power.   
Government green growth strategy might 
lead to investment in sustainable sources 
of domestic timber to supply the UK 
construction industry. 
The post-Brexit farm policy may not 
succeed in providing a viable basis for 
sustainable farming.  There may be 
unintended negative consequences 
for rural areas and upland 
environments.  
Communities may respond negatively 
to plans to expand windfarms in rural 
areas.  
 
Fishing 
 
Following the current agreed transition 
arrangements (21 months from March 
2019), the UK plans to withdraw from 
Common Fisheries Policy and assume 
exclusive access to waters up to 200 miles.   
The UK would then be in a position to enter 
negotiations with other countries to trade 
access rights to different waters.   
Agreement could be reached with the EU 
over conditions for fish exports.   
The EU might insist on status quo 
extended beyond the current 
transition agreement.   
The UK might not be able to enter 
negotiations with third countries due 
to EU restrictions necessary to sustain 
export trade to Europe.   
Forestry  The Brexit negotiations could lead to 
restrictions on imports of wood and wood 
products from the EU.  This could stimulate 
domestic production and opportunity for 
innovation in wood products for the 
construction industry.   
Withdrawal from the CAP and the 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural 
Development could create an opportunity 
for UK policy innovation in relation to 
providing support for small-scale forestry 
businesses in rural areas.   
Withdrawal from the CAP will mean 
loss of funding opportunity for SMEs 
in the forestry sector currently 
obtained from LEADER and EAFRD. It 
is not clear how this support will be 
replaced or replicated.    
Increased demand for domestic 
timber may exacerbate an existing 
problem with low rates of forest 
planting.   
Public funding for woodland 
management may decline under the 
new farm policy for the UK.   
  
Manufacturing In the short term, manufacturing in rural 
areas could benefit from exports both to 
the EU and non-EU countries due to the fall 
in the value of sterling.  Longer term, there 
could be benefits if the UK succeeds in 
negotiating a beneficial trade deal.   
The UK government seems committed to 
supporting manufacturing growth in 
general and in rural areas.  Government 
could prioritise the skills and labour needs 
of industry dispersed across rural areas 
through immigration policy.   
New international trade agreements with 
non-EU countries might be agreed. 
Growth and proximity to energy generation 
(renewable energy) attracts manufacturing 
firms to rural areas. 
A preferential trade agreement might 
not be agreed with the EU and EU 
applies the same tariff to UK goods as 
it does on those from any other third 
country.   
Manufacturing in rural areas shares 
the same difficulties as those in cities 
with regard to recruiting labour and 
cost and delays at borders.  UK 
transport & logistics sector could 
experience increased cost which feed 
into supply chains across 
manufacturing.   
Current EU funding ceases and is not 
replaced by sufficient funds from the 
UK government so that innovation and 
infrastructure in the rural economy is 
not maintained.  Government 
continues to prioritise North Cities for 
larger scale projects.  
Investment in communications 
infrastructure in rural areas may fail to 
keep pace, making rural 
manufacturing less competitive.   
Tourism Travel to and from the EU is not impaired 
and the UK tourism industry continues to 
grow.  Both inbound and domestic tourism 
continue to flourish partly due to the 
relatively low value of sterling. 
Investment in improved marketing for the 
rural North and national parks in particular 
could compensate for any negative Brexit 
effects.   
The opening of Carlisle Airport to 
passenger traffic in 2019 and possibility of 
abolition of Air Passenger Duty could bring 
more tourists to the area. 
The GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s plaŶs foƌ a ŵoƌe 
environmentally-friendly farming structure 
may provide new opportunities for 
diversification into tourism.  
New Immigration restrictions could 
give rise to a shortage of skilled 
workers to fill vacancies in the 
hospitality sector.  
A shortage of labour, increased wages 
and increased cost of imports may 
cause some hotels and B&Bs to close.  
ESIF and ERDF moneys which currently 
supports much coastal and rural 
tourism development may not be 
replaced to the same degree by the 
UK government. 
The lack of full digital connectivity in 
rural areas may reduce the 
attractiveness for tourists of staying in 
rural accommodation. 
“ouƌĐe: Authoƌs͛ aŶalǇsis of “eĐtoƌ ‘eǀieǁs aŶd PoliĐǇ DoĐuŵeŶts 
  
This analysis has considered the views of specialists and policymakers on the possible effects of Brexit on 
economic sectors that form the backbone of the economy of the rural North.  It is evident in this analysis 
that while the threats are very real, the opportunities are highly dependent on negotiations and 
circumstances surrounding the withdrawal from the EU.  The analysis also reveals that the outcomes for 
one sector will impinge on others and cannot in reality be considered separately.  The impacts, for 
instance, on land-based activities such as farming, forestry, accommodation and food are, to a 
considerable degree, interdependent.  This issue will be considered again in constructing the scenarios 
that emerge from the Delphi survey process.   
 
  
  
6. The results of the Delphi Panel 
As outlined in the previous section, the Delphi Panel consisted of 150 expert stakeholders drawn from 
across the region and from various sectors of the economy and society.  26 people completed (a response 
rate of 18%) the first round of the survey which gave the detailed description of what they thought were 
the key drivers for the future.  16 people completed the second round of the survey (a response rate of 
11%) and indicated which drivers they thought were most important and how the drivers related to each 
other.  These response rates are not atypical in a Delphi Method survey that is quite demanding on the 
time of participants and the structure of response has been examined to check for bias in response.  Figure 
5 shows the profile of the expert panel in terms of its gender and age.  The panel was skewed in favour of 
male members with only 26% of the respondents being female.  The age profile of the expert panel was 
skewed to the slightly older end of the spectrum which perhaps reflects the seniority and experience of 
the panel members.   
 
Figure 5: Expert Panel characteristics for Round 1 
 
 
Lastly, the panel was slightly over-represented by people from the public sector, accounting for just over 
half of the respondents.  Around a third of respondents were from the private sector and one 5th from the 
not-for-profit & community sector.  A number of respondents did highlight the fact that they could be said 
to be representing more than one sector as they held a number of roles in different organisations.  The 
characteristics of this response need to be taken into account when interpreting the findings.   
Results of Round 1 
In round one, members of the expert panel were asked to outline what they felt would be the key drivers 
for change in the next 20 years.  The drivers were related to three broad themes: the economy; society 
and the environment and the environment.  There were also questions relating to 10 sectors of importance 
to the rural north of England and what the expert panel felt were the key drivers for change in each of 
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these sectors.  The results of the survey were then collected and themes identified. A full list of the drivers 
for each theme and sector is included in Appendix 2 of this report.  By conducting a thematic analysis of 
the responses it was possible to link similar drivers into broader themes for change.  
From this analysis, a long list of 19 drivers for change was identified: 
1. The financial pressures on rural services: Schools, health and elderly care etc. 
2. Demographic change and the ageing rural population  
3. Rural labour markets and access to a workforce with suitable skills 
4. Availability and affordability of rural housing 
5. Transport infrastructure in rural areas and between rural and urban areas 
6. Energy markets and the cost and availability of energy in all forms. 
7. The deǀelopŵeŶt of digital aŶd iŶfoƌŵatioŶ aŶd ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ teĐhŶologǇ. The ͚ϰth Industrial 
ƌeǀolutioŶ͛.  
8. The development of a new rural policy and support framework following the UK͛s withdrawal 
from the Common Agricultural Policy. 
9. Changes to grant and support mechanisms, LEADER ERDF etc.  
10. Changes to international trade and its effects on the goods and services produced in the rural 
economy.   
11. Changes to national supply chains and markets for both inputs (raw materials etc) and outputs 
from the rural economy. 
12. Moves to become more Sustainable and avoid or mitigate environmental pressures. 
13. The UK policy and governance structure following Brexit, i.e. devolution, localism and popular 
political concerns (eg. rewilding or the ban on plastics).  
14. Changes to land values and the mechanisms by which land is valued.  The value of public goods 
or ecosystem services for example.  The impact that this has on land ownership.  
15. Education and training in rural areas for the rural economy 
16. Availability of suitable rural commercial premises 
17. Rural connectivity.  The availability of high speed broadband and 4G or 5G mobile phone 
connectivity. 
18. An uncertain relationship between England and Scotland creating uncertainty in both physical 
and political/economic/social links between the NE and Scotland 
19. An uncertain relationship between the regions within the North of England creating uncertainty 
in both physical and political/economic/social aspects of the rural North. 
There was some indication from round one of the survey as to which drivers the expert panel felt were 
most important in the frequency with which they were suggested.  However, a more robust way of 
understanding the relative importance of the drivers was used in Round 2 of the Delphi Survey.  
Sector Drivers for change:  
As well as the overarching drivers for change, the expert panel were asked to highlight specific drivers for 
change in key sectors important to the future of the rural north of England.  These sectors were: Farming 
and Primary Production; Tourism; Manufacturing and Digital and Creative industry.  
 
  
Farming and Primary Production 
The most important driver for change highlighted by the expert panel was the access to markets following 
Brexit.  This was closely followed by concerns about the replacement for the Common Agricultural Policy 
and any new regime of subsidies and supports.  The drivers relating to access to markets related to both 
loĐal ŵaƌkets: ͚ŵaƌt pƌiĐes͛ aŶd ǁideƌ iŶteƌŶatioŶal ŵaƌkets. IŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ, access to EU markets and the 
opening up of UK markets to other low-cost producers such as the United States, Australia and New 
Zealand.  The knock-on effect of this uncertainty on the food supply chain was also highlighted. In 
particular, one respondent highlighted the need to convert local supply chains to national ones to perhaps 
take advantage of the opportunities offered by Brexit. One consequence of any disruption to these supply 
chains could be an increase in the cost of food in super markets.  This could have a negative reputational 
impact on the agricultural sector as this could be perceived to be profiteering at a time of national 
disruption even though it may not be a deliberate consequence of Brexit.  This could further increase 
tension between the agricultural community and the rest of the country at a time when the agricultural 
community will be very vulnerable to external shocks.  
Two further drivers which were identified were the impact of automation and technological developments 
and climate change and the environment.  These were mentioned half as many times as the first two 
drivers.  The main reason given for the importance of technology was its impact on employment.  Most 
experts who highlighted this did so in relation to its impact on the employment structure of the 
agricultural sector.  This can have both positive impacts, i.e. as a replacement for the loss of access to the 
EU labour market but also in its consequential impact on rural communities.  The responses which cited 
the environment and climate change as an important driver did so in relation to a variety of impacts.  One 
impact was the move to decarbonise agriculture.  So far agriculture has not been the focus of attempts to 
decarbonise the economy but as more of the low hanging fruit is tackled, attention will turn to agriculture.  
This will likely have an impact on cultivation and stock rearing methods as well as things such as direct 
inputs.  OŶe eǆpeƌt highlighted the Ŷeed foƌ a ŵoǀe to ͚sustaiŶaďle iŶteŶsifiĐatioŶ͛ iŶ agƌiĐultuƌal 
production.  This would be the ideal ambition for agriculture but would involve a significant investment 
in technology and research to achieve.  
Other drivers - which were only highlighted by a limited number of experts were: the problems of retaining 
a skilled workforce in the sector; the large number of tenant farmers in the rural north of England; the 
expansion of forestry at the expense of farming; energy costs and finally the attitude of the wider public 
to the sector.  
  
Tourism 
Many of the expert panel highlighted a number of problems but also lots of opportunities for the region͛s 
tourism industry.  The probability that it will become harder and less practical to travel to continental 
Europe for holidays and that holidaying at home may increase was highlighted as one potential benefit 
from Brexit.  This was balanced on the other hand by fears that a reduction in farm subsidy may spur more 
farms to diversify into tourism related activities, particularly the provision of accommodation.  This may 
then result in a saturation of the market.  
The general uncertainty around Brexit and the effect that this may have on investment to develop the 
tourism offer was also highlighted as being an important driver.  One area of investment that was 
mentioned a number of times was digital connectivity.  Visitors are increasingly expecting a higher level 
of connectivity, be it 4G mobile coverage or superfast broadband when they are on holiday.  
At a more regional level, concern was expressed at a lack of a coordinated approach to place-based 
marketing for the rural parts of the region.  A lack of a coherent place-based marketing campaign, 
particularly when our neighbours and competitors do have very good campaigns and profiles, may put 
the region at risk of missing out.  This place-based campaign would also include food production and other 
aspects of the local rural economy.  One respondent highlighted how the potential disruption to longer 
supply chains could stimulate local supply chains.  This could be translated into a much stronger overall 
regional offer to visitors.  Another aspect of the marketing of tourism around increasing the value added 
of visitors was highlighted.  In particular encouraging longer stays in the region which in turn increases 
spend per visitor.  
The final common driver for change suggested by the expert panel, was the impact of Brexit on the labour 
market.  Many of the workers in the region͛s tourism industry are from the EU.  The loss of this pool of 
workers may have a significant impact on the tourism industry.  
Manufacturing 
The two top drivers of change for manufacturing post Brexit are access to markets and the impact on the 
labour market.  These closely mirror the drivers highlighted in relation to farming and primary production 
and the two sectors will face similar problems in these two areas.  In the case of access to markets, the 
concerns for manufacturing seem to be based more towards the impact on exports than on competition 
from new sources of imports. The North East is the only region in the UK to have a positive balance of 
trade and this means it is particularly vulnerable to trade shocks of this type.  
  
The next most important drivers for change cited by the expert panel were the impact on inputs, both of 
raw materials and energy.  This is in relation to both the costs and availability of these inputs.  One of the 
possiďle ĐoŶseƋueŶĐes of a failuƌe to agƌee the teƌŵs of tƌade foƌ the UK͛s depaƌtuƌe fƌoŵ the EU ǁill ďe 
interruptions to supply chains. 
Finally, the lack of investment in infrastructure and the possibility of Brexit making a bad situation worse 
was the next most cited driver for change.  Both transport and ICT infrastructure is poor in the rural parts 
of the north of England.  This acts as both a barrier to innovation and entrepreneurship as well as reducing 
productivity in the region. 
The Digital and Creative industries 
Understandably, the biggest driver for the digital and creative sector is the lack of connectivity.  This 
mirrors the concern expressed in relation to the manufacturing sector that Brexit will disrupt and delay 
the deployment of superfast broadband and other ICT infrastructure.  This driver was mentioned by nearly 
every respondent in relation to this sector. 
The next driver for change is the ability of the sector to form a coherent voice in the region, particularly 
as the proposed devolutions start to have an influence.  At the moment, the digital and creative businesses 
make up an important but hidden segment of the economy in the rural north of England.  A number of 
the respondents commented that this sector needs to be better connected and networked both within 
the rural economy but also to similar clusters in the urban core.  The North East has one of the fastest 
growing digital and creative sectors outside Greater London.  It is critical to the development of the rural 
economy that this sector is supported and nurtured.  
Results of Round 2 
Overview 
In round 2 of the Delphi Survey, the expert panel were asked to indicate how important they felt each 
driver to be on a scale of 1 – 5, with ϭ ďeiŶg ͚Ŷot at all iŵpoƌtaŶt͛ aŶd ϱ ďeiŶg ͚ĐƌitiĐallǇ iŵpoƌtaŶt͛.  Figure 
6 shows the overall results with the drivers being considered most important lying at the top of the chart 
and those considered least important at the bottom.  
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 6: Results of Round 2 
 
 
The most important driver for change in the rural north of England was felt to be, ͚The deǀelopŵeŶt of a 
new rural policy and support framework following the UKs withdrawal from the Common Agricultural 
PoliĐǇ͛.  The survey was carried out just as the GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt staƌted its ͚Health aŶd HaƌŵoŶǇ͛ (2018) 
consultation on the future of rural agricultural policy so this may have been uppermost in the expert 
panel͛s minds at the time of the survey.  However, from the detailed comments on this topic in the Round 
1 responses and from attending the recent ͞Health and Harmony consultation͟ event in Hexham, it is 
clear that the development of a new suite of rural policies following Brexit is fundamental to the future 
of all parts of the rural economy, not just agriculture.  
Linked to this driver were seĐoŶdaƌǇ dƌiǀeƌs suĐh as ͚The UK poliĐǇ aŶd goǀeƌŶaŶĐe stƌuĐtuƌe folloǁiŶg 
Bƌeǆit, i.e. deǀolutioŶ, loĐalisŵ aŶd populaƌ politiĐal ĐoŶĐeƌŶs ;i.e. ƌeǁildiŶg oƌ the ďaŶ oŶ plastiĐsͿ͛ ǁhiĐh 
was the 4th most important driveƌ aŶd ͚ChaŶges to iŶteƌŶatioŶal tƌade aŶd its effeĐts oŶ the goods aŶd 
seƌǀiĐes pƌoduĐed iŶ the ƌuƌal eĐoŶoŵǇ͛ ǁhiĐh ǁas the ϴth most important driver for change.  These three 
  
drivers highlight both the internal and external issues facing rural areas. To some extent, rural areas are 
mostly controlled and influenced by forces, be it political or market forces, from beyond the immediate 
area but there is a challenge with the post-Brexit policy and political structures to perhaps rebalance the 
power back towards a national or regional level.  The ongoing devolution debate is inextricably linked 
therefore to these issues of governance and control. 
What is perhaps interesting given this potential importance of devolution and the development of new 
rural policies and programmes is that the external relationships between the north of England and its 
neighbours were not seen as being important drivers for change.  These drivers came second and third 
from bottom in order of importance. This may reflect the current uncertainty and unfamiliarity with the 
new devolution processes.  The two main devolution deals, the Combined Authority and the Borderlands 
Growth Deal, are yet to reach the wider public͛s consciousness and indeed have yet to develop concrete 
proposals for their programmes and policies.  
The results of round 1 also show the complexity inherent in considering the future after Brexit.  Many of 
the drivers for change identified in round 1 relate to each other.  Taking just one example, the drivers 
focusing on connectivity (transport and ICT) have an impact on people͛s residential location choices and 
thus on the availability of skilled labour and the pressure on services.  To make sense of these linkages 
between drivers we use them to build scenarios as outlined in the next section.   
 
  
  
7. The Post-Brexit rural north of England: Future Scenarios 
This section draws upon material from both the policy reviews and the Delphi approach to create two 
scenarios. As already outlined above, the scenarios are not intended to be predictions of the future.  This 
would be an impossible task.  Rather they are provocations which set out possible futures as a way of 
stimulating debate about desirable and undesirable futures.  From these extreme future scenarios, it is 
possible to Đƌeate a shaƌed ǀisioŶ of the futuƌe aŶd to ͚ďaĐkĐast͛ to the pƌeseŶt daǇ aŶd deǀelop a set of 
policy principals that avoid the undesirable effects and achieve the desirable outcomes.  The scenarios 
presented in this section imagine the rural north of England in the year 2030.  
  
  
Scenario 1: Growing the rural green economy 
Context 
The UK has left the European Union with a limited trade agreement but not a customs union or free trade 
agreement.  There is a short-term impact, mainly caused by increased friction in trade that recovers over 
time but not to pre-Brexit levels.  The North of England has been able to do better than most out of the 
trade deals which were concentrated on advanced manufacturing including car production, agricultural 
and food products.  The North of England remains one of the most affordable places to live in the UK and 
has retained a stable population in contrast to other regions which have suffered population falls as a 
result of changes to EU migration patterns.  The quality of life remains a key draw for many people and as 
such, key sectors of the economy, particularly in critical areas such as primary production, manufacturing, 
health and education, are able to maintain a stable workforce.  
Politics and governance 
The North of Tyne Combined Authority is now onto its 3rd strategic plan with the results of the first two 
now being achieved.  The focus on a rural green economy is starting to pay dividends.  Following the 
success of the first two strategic plans, greater devolved powers have been granted to the Combined 
Authority.  This has stƌeŶgtheŶed the ƌegioŶ͛s positioŶ ǁheŶ ŶegotiatiŶg ǁith the deǀolǀed adŵiŶistƌatioŶ 
in Scotland.  This has been further strengthened by the success of the first Borderlands Growth deal which 
has embedded a strong partnership working ethos on both sides of the border and has begun to shape 
and resource shared priorities.   
Economy 
The focus on the key sectors of agri-forestry and food 
chains; green energy and the digital and creative sectors 
has created a vibrant and resilient economy in the rural 
North.  The impact of Brexit and the introduction of a 
domestic agricultural policy focused on the provision of 
public goods and a healthy natural environment has 
enabled the rural economy to adapt quickly to the loss of 
international markets.  Upland farms have been able to 
remain viable thanks to a move to less intensive farming systems, greater value added through the local 
food production system and increased agri-environment payments for the provision of public goods.  
  
A coordinated approach by the Combined Authority, Local 
Councils, Academic Institutions and businesses has enabled 
strategic investment in skills and physical infrastructure to 
suppoƌt the ƌegioŶ͛s eĐoŶoŵǇ.  Academic training at all levels, is 
geared to allow businesses to retain a skilled workforce in the 
rural economy.  This includes a higher graduate retention rate for 
the region͛s universities and greater vocational provision of life 
long training in all the regions HE and FE institutions.  The region 
now focuses on the export of high value-added products and 
services both from the agricultural and forestry sectors but also 
the digital and creative sectors in areas such as film-making and 
gaming.  
The changes to agriculture and its impact on the environment have also given the tourism sector a massive 
boost.  Already one of the most tranquil and unspoilt areas of the country, the focus on agi-enviroment 
schemes has further improved this.  The funding available for farm diversification and adaption has also 
helped create more tourism opportunities in the region. 
The impact of new technologies is now starting to 
make a real impact on the economy of the rural 
North.  All rural households and businesses now have 
superfast broadband and 5G mobile access is 
available in 50% of the region.  The impact of better 
connectivity is evidenced in the growing number of 
teleworkers and rural digital businesses in the rural 
North.  These are supported by an expanded network 
of Rural Enterprise Hubs which provide shared 
workspace, conference facilities and business 
support.  These enterprise hubs are also well connected to urban business networks providing a powerful 
knowledge network linking businesses across the region to international markets, finance and innovation 
networks within the region͛s universities.  
  
Infrastructure 
Major investment in critical aspects of the ƌegioŶ͛s iŶfƌastƌuĐtuƌe has Ŷoǁ ďeeŶ Đoŵpleted.  The 
improvements to the main east-west and north-south arterial roads have iŵpƌoǀed the ƌegioŶ͛s 
accessibility both for people and goods coming into the region and leaving it.  Improvements to the rail 
network both with extension of the Tyne & Wear Metro into south east Northumberland and the 
completion of the Waverly Line through to Carlisle have given a boost for the rural parts of the region.  
Food research and production hubs have been developed along the Waverly route as they now have 
greater access to a larger workforce.  The expansion of 
electricity production in the region and the creation of 
a locally-owned power company has also encouraged 
manufacturers to set up in the region to take advantage 
of the lower overheads.  
Electric autonomous vehicles are also starting to 
alleviate some of the mobility issues faced by all 
sections of the population.  They are also providing 
another opportunity for farm diversification around the 
urban core as AV service stations.  As digital 
connectivity improves, it enables rural areas to be at the forefront of the 4th Industrial Revolution with 
many services being delivered remotely.  
Leisure, Recreation, Culture and Well Being 
With the need to obtain tourist visas to travel to continental Europe, domestic tourism is booming.  Since 
the region started to coordinate its place-marketing, the rural North has been a significant beneficiary of 
this boom.  Travel numbers and spend-per-visitor have increased.  Better accessibility has also improved 
the ability of people living in the urban centres of the region to access the rural areas.     
  
Table 4 
 Social Technological Economic Environmental Political Values (Culture) 
New Rural Policy  Changes to farming 
practice have had an 
impact on certain 
communities in the 
region with the move 
away from outputs 
challenging a way of life 
for some 
For lowland and arable 
farms, technology plays 
a bigger role with 
robotics, Internet of 
Things and smart 
farming having an 
impact.  
Upland farming is now 
concentrated on public 
goods and 
environmental 
enhancement 
Bio-diversity is 
improving as the 
changes to farming 
practice take effect. 
Better flood protection 
in the uplands improves 
flood resilience down-
stream  
The post-CAP rural 
support programme 
is now well 
established with a 
high level of 
devolution.  
The nature of certain 
aspects of farming is 
changing leading to a 
revaluation of the culture 
of the countryside. The 
impact of farming on the 
landscape is of much 
greater importance.  
Rural Services An ageing population is 
placing an ever greater 
strain on the provision of 
health and adult care 
services.   
Certain aspects of the 
delivery of services is 
being improved by 
better technology. 
Housing technology is 
one area that helps 
elderly people lead 
independent lives.  
A shift to co-operative 
and social interest 
company provision of 
services creates new 
opportunities to deliver 
services  
New initiatives linking 
public health and 
environmental goods is 
helping to create a 
healthier population 
and alleviate some of 
the pressure on social 
ad health care systems 
 Models of social innovation 
and community delivery of 
services as tested and 
developed as part of the 
CoŵďiŶed Authoƌities͛ 
devolved powers.   
Rural Connectivity Better connectivity 
results in much higher 
welfare for people living 
and working in the rural 
North.  
Every business 
premises has super-fast 
broadband. Smart 
distributed energy 
systems are being 
developed in the rural 
areas.  
The connectivity and 
availability of reliable 
and cheap power is 
attracting new 
businesses in a variety 
of sectors to the rural 
parts of the region 
Economic growth has 
been decoupled from 
environmental 
emissions and damage. 
A circular economy 
ensures better resource 
use and value-added.  
The rural north of 
England is viewed as a 
green economy 
exemplar. It helps 
attract high-value, 
high-skilled jobs and 
delivers significant 
productivity gains.  
Rural is seen as an integral 
part pf the 4th industrial 
revolution and a test-bed 
for many of the new 
generation of technology.  
Rural innovations are being 
exported to many 
developing countries with 
significant rural populations  
Devolution Strong devolution helps 
develop a strong identity 
and pride in rural areas.  
Devolution deals have 
included a number of 
new sectors in the 4th 
Industrial Revolution. 
The region in a world 
leader in rural IoT and 
CAVs  
 A greater emphasis on 
the green economy 
through devolution 
leads to a locally 
designed set of agri-
environment schemes.  
The Combined 
Authority gains 
greater powers over 
transport and health 
as its capacity to 
deliver develops. 
Stronger ties with the 
 
  
Scottish Government 
also develop.  
Housing A focus on improving the 
aƌea͛s housiŶg stoĐk has 
delivered sustainable 
lifetime homes.  The 
region remains the most 
affordable in England.  
Social housing is focused 
on particular regional 
issues, farming succession 
and rural family homes. 
The ƌegioŶ͛s 
Universities have 
helped develop smarter 
technological homes 
which are able to adapt 
to changing ways of life.  
They integrate with 
other aspects of the 
region such as a 
regional smart grid.  
The forestry supply 
chain developed in the 
past 10 years now 
delivers high quality 
building materials 
produced in the region.  
This has led to the start 
of a prefabricated 
construction sector.   
The green economy 
focus has reduced the 
environmental impact 
of housing significantly.    
 The region is known as one 
of the best places to live 
and work with affordable 
housing being one of the 
key elements of this  
Labour Market The rural North is viewed 
as an attractive place to 
live and work.  A 
concerted effort is made 
to attract people to live 
and work in the region, 
building on the natural 
resources of the rural 
parts of the region 
The investment in skills 
training, through 
vocational and 
academic pathways, is 
starting to pay 
dividends with new and 
existing businesses now 
reporting no skills 
shortage in the region. 
More affordable 
housing is an attraction 
to the workforce 
Improved transport has 
allowed for greater 
travel-to-work 
distances and hence 
access to a larger work 
force for rural and 
urban employers. 
Digital access has 
enabled more home-
working. 
  
Education & Training Clearer pathways through 
education and parity of 
esteem between 
vocational and academic 
courses help develop a 
skilled local workforce 
A system of Newton 
Rooms develop an 
integrated education 
system across all parts 
of the rural north of 
England. These digital 
classrooms link all 
aspects of the HE 
system and deliver it to 
the remotest parts of 
the region. 
The developing green 
economy is now 
supported by specialist 
vocational training and 
through research 
conducted in the 
ƌegioŶ͛s eduĐatioŶal 
institutions. Links 
between applied 
research and local 
industry have grown 
stronger due to 
coordinated action 
through the Combined 
Authority. 
  Vocational and academic 
pathways are seen as being 
equal with high skill, high 
wage jobs available to all at 
the end of each educational 
path.  
The network of Newton 
Rooms and the 
development of a suite of 
regionally specific MOOCs 
ensures that all parts of the 
rural north of England have 
access to high quality 
education. 
  
International Trade   By increasing the 
amount of value added 
that occurs in the 
region, rural areas are 
now able to export high 
value products to new 
markets in the Far East.  
 Through links to 
Scotland and other 
northern regions, the 
rural economy can 
take advantage of 
new markets and 
place-based 
marketing campaigns 
highlighting the green 
credentials of the 
region. 
 
Demographic Change An ageing rural 
population will have an 
impact on rural society. 
This is starting to be 
countered by a 
strengthening counter-
urbanisation trend with 
more jobs being made 
available in rural areas.  
The ageing rural 
population is supported 
through technological 
developments in 
personalised 
healthcare, smart 
homes and transport.  
Changes to transport 
and technology allow 
more families to settle 
in the rural areas and 
bring economic benefits 
to villages and towns. 
 Steps are taken to 
ensure all generations 
are able to live and 
work in the rural 
north of England.  
Rural communities are 
more vibrant and are 
attracting a diverse 
population.   
Sustainability and 
Environment 
Sustainability and circular 
economy are delivering 
stronger rural 
communities.  
The benefits of 
technological 
development are 
making rural 
communities ever more 
sustainable. 
Autonomous electric 
vehicles for example 
mean young, old and 
infirm rural residents 
have full mobility.   
The move to a circular, 
high value, high skill 
economy means a 
boost to the rural 
economy.  More 
businesses are being 
attracted to rural areas, 
not only because of the 
high amenity value but 
a vibrant 
entrepreneurial 
ecosystem.   
The environmental 
impact of all activity in 
the region is 
understood and 
incorporated into all 
future plans.  
 The region builds on its 
reputation as one of the 
most tranquil and 
environmentally diverse 
areas of the UK. 
Improvements in the 
ecosystem management in 
the uplands is seen as an 
exemplar for other 
international areas.  
Transport Greater connectivity both 
by road and rail improves 
the wellbeing of rural 
communities.  
The development of a 
comprehensive 
[A2]Mobility as a service 
offer for the region, 
including rural and 
urban areas has 
Better public transport 
in the Borders expands 
the functional labour 
markets in those areas 
and steps are underway 
to facilitate similar 
The strategy to 
decarbonise the 
transport system 
through the switch to 
public transport and 
electric vehicles means 
 The strength of the rural 
economy ensures rural 
areas do not become 
subservient to the urban 
core and participate as 
  
removed many of the 
mobility barriers for 
rural communities.  
connectivity using 
autonomous vehicles in 
other areas.  
transport is on its way 
to being carbon neutral.  
equals as a result of better 
connectivity. 
Land Value and Public 
Goods 
  Work by the region͛s 
universities helps 
develop new business 
models to support the 
provision of public 
goods particularly in 
the area of flood risk 
management  
  The rural north of England 
becomes an exemplar in 
the provision of public 
goods. 
Businesses Premises A network of rural 
enterprise hubs provides 
business and social 
support for 
microbusinesses  and 
homeworkers.  
The enterprise hubs are 
able to be nodes in a 
knowledge network 
that helps businesses to 
adopt the latest 
technology and 
innovate.  
 Support for enterprise 
and other business 
hubs includes steps to 
improve building 
efficiency and 
sustainability.  
  
Energy Markets       
 
  
Scenario 2: Aftermath of a hard Brexit 
Context 
The UK has left the European Union without any agreement on trade or any other substantive issues such 
as migration or regulatory standards.  5 years ago, a limited trade agreement was reached which has 
elevated some of the issues caused by the hard Brexit.  Following the successful second independence 
referendum, Scotland has left the Union and is in the process of re-joining the European Union.  It has also 
negotiated a limited trade deal with the EU in relation to its critical sectors, sea food, whisky and other 
food products and oil & gas.  The north of England has suffered more than most from the impact of Brexit.  
It is only now starting to emerge from a serious recession.  High unemployment has resulted in a significant 
out-migration of working age people.  
Economy 
The impact on the rural economy has been significant.  
There have been large scale failures in the farming sector 
with a consequential crash in land values.  In the uplands, 
large portions of the land have been acquired by 
conservation charities such as the National Trust, Wildlife 
Trusts and RSPB.  Due to the uneconomic nature of upland 
farming, significant tracts of land have been given over to 
rewilding projects.  This has caused tension in rural 
communities and a reduction in economic activity in these 
marginal upland areas as the land no longer requires a significant workforce.  In some areas this has been 
balanced by a growth in eco-tourism particularly to see the newly introduced species such as the beaver, 
lynx and wolf. 
The independence vote in Scotland caused the Borderlands 
Growth Deal to finish 2 years earlier than planned with many 
of the projects only half finished.  The fresh uncertainty 
around the new hard border between the north of England 
and Scotland has further depressed economic activity in the 
region.  
  
Due to the recession and further squeeze on tax revenue at all levels of government, austerity has been 
continued far longer than originally planned.  Service cuts and withdrawal of certain supports have made 
it difficult for certain groups to live and work in more remote rural areas.  
Politics and governance 
The disruption to supply chains including most importantly the food supply chain has the effect of pushing 
up prices and therefore inflation.  This is presented by sections of the media and political commentariat 
as profiteering at the expense of ordinary folk.  Political parties compete to suggest tougher sanctions on 
those perceived as taking advantage of the situation.  Price controls for many staple goods are developed 
to cap price rises.  This has a negative effect on investment in the sector both at the farm level but also 
within the food production sector more generally.  
Infrastructure 
The continuing austerity has resulted in much of the 
planning infrastructure spending being cut or scaled 
back.  The rural north of England now has one of the 
lowest average broadband speeds.  This has resulted 
in these areas missing the benefits of the next 
generation of technology developments such as the 
deployment of the internet of things and autonomous 
vehicles.  
Other traditional infrastructure projects have also been scaled back or put on hold.  East/west and 
north/south connectivity has not been improved with the result that the Tyne & Wear economic area lags 
behind the rest of the country with the consequent impact on the adjacent rural areas.  The decline in 
manufacturing in the key sectors of automotive and 
advanced manufacturing has affected supply chains 
and employment markets across the region.  This has 
affected infrastructure such as the Port of Tyne and 
the region͛s airports.  Both have suffered from a lack 
of investment and are facing significant decline in 
volume as the neighbouring Scottish airports and 
ports are able to undercut them. 
  
 
Leisure, Recreation, Culture and Well Being 
The hard Brexit has caused significant issues for many businesses in the leisure and recreation sectors.  
The loss of free movement to and from the UK has reduced both visitor and migrant worker numbers.  
This has been partially off-set by greater demand from UK tourism, but the recession has also affected 
this market as well.  
The severe recession has further reduced funding for cultural activity with no local or central government 
funding now being available.  The only available funding is through the lottery schemes which have not 
been able to fill the gap.  Rural cultural activities and institutions have been particularly hard hit with many 
not-for-profit organisations ceasing to exist.  CeƌtaiŶ ƌuƌal aƌeas ƌisk ďeĐoŵiŶg Đultuƌal ͚ďlaĐk holes͛ ǁith 
little or no provision.  
 
 
  
Table 5 
 Social Technological Economic Environmental Political Values (Culture) 
New Rural Policy  The loss of support for 
certain areas of farming 
means some areas have 
felt significant decline 
with consequential social 
issues.  Intensive areas 
are growing with stronger 
society though not always 
concentrated on 
farming[A3].  
In areas where 
intensification takes 
place, technology is 
playing an ever-increasing 
role.  Robotics and 
Internet of Things now 
support precision farming 
and have displaced 
humans in significant 
areas of farming and 
primary production.  
Farm incomes and land 
prices continue to come 
under pressure.  
Consolidation and 
bifurcation of the farming 
sector result in fewer jobs 
but higher productivity.  
Continued austerity has 
resulted in cuts to some 
of the support 
payments for public 
goods.  This has led to a 
re-intensification of 
farming with significant 
environmental impacts.  
Wider rural policy has 
disappeared from 
political policy and rural 
policy is entirely 
focussed on farming 
and primary 
production.  
Certain rural areas feel 
abandoned by the rest 
of the country.  
Rural Services Austerity has resulted in 
many rural services being 
cut back or removed 
altogether.  
The gulf between urban 
and rural grows further as 
investment in rural 
technology stalls.  
The hard Brexit means 
further austerity 
measures having a 
disproportionately 
greater effect on rural 
areas  
 Politcal geography 
becomes ever more 
polarised between the 
left leaning urban core 
and a more traditional 
conservative political 
bias in rural areas. 
‘uƌal͛s iŵage of ďeiŶg a 
backwater intensifies as 
political, human and 
financial capital is 
concentrated on the 
urban core. 
Rural Connectivity Rural areas remain ͞the 
left behind͟ places.  This 
starts to impact the 
ability of all age groups to 
participate in an 
increasingly digital 
society. 
Progress has slowed 
considerably, and the 
new generation of 
technology is not being 
rolled out in rural areas. 
The poor connectivity 
impacts all aspects of the 
rural economy.  
Businesses cannot start 
or grow as easily as their 
urban counterparts.  
Sectors such as tourism 
and farming start to 
suffer a loss of 
productivity.  
The environment starts 
to benefit from poor 
rural connectivity.  Less 
economic land use and 
less intensive 
agricultural production, 
particularly in remote 
rural areas leads to 
increased bio-diversity 
in these areas. 
The decline in rural 
areas, in both 
population and 
businesses, means that 
the rural agenda falls 
even further down the 
list of political priorities.   
Rural is again seen as 
being beyond 
technology.  The lack of 
connectivity places 
rural in contrast to the 
innovative urban. 
Devolution The independence of 
Scotland has created a 
number of difficulties for 
communities in and 
around the Border.  
Access to certain services 
is reduced. 
The technological 
developments to deliver a 
virtual border have not 
materialised and are still 
being developed. A lack 
of investment in the 
region due to the failure 
of devolution means 
missing out on the 4th 
Industrial revolution. 
The creation of a hard 
border between 
Northumberland, 
Cumbria and Scotland has 
caused significant 
economic hardship in key 
sectors of the rural north 
of England  
 The regional devolution 
debate is seen as being 
a distraction to the 
problems facing the 
national economy.  
Central government is 
continuing its 
programme of 
centralising power.  
A debate is splitting the 
region about whether 
to join Scotland or 
remain part of the 
diminished UK.  This 
takes up significant 
political debates and 
energy with other day-
to-day issues being 
neglected. 
  
Housing With house prices falling, 
housing is becoming 
more affordable.  
However, people are 
trapped in rural areas 
unable to move to more 
expensive urban 
locations.  
 The recession deflates 
house prices which 
means affordability rates 
increase.  There is an 
over-supply of certain 
types of housing caused 
by a reduction in working 
age families and an ever 
growing elderly 
population. 
Falling house prices 
result in a failure to 
invest in the required 
environmental 
improvements required 
iŶ the ƌegioŶ͛s ďuildiŶg 
stock.  
Housing is no longer a 
political priority.  The 
depopulation of the 
region, particularly the 
remote rural areas has 
created an over-supply 
of housing.  
 
Labour Market The loss of job 
opportunities in rural 
areas means greater out-
migration of younger 
people and a shrinking 
labour market.  
The lack of digital 
connectivity restricts 
technology-based 
businesses from setting 
up in rural areas.  
Some more basic digital 
businesses and routine 
work is still available in 
rural areas but not the 
high value- added 
businesses. 
  The reduction of job 
opportunities and the 
lack of migrant workers 
leads to greater 
automation in that 
industry which does 
operate in rural areas.  
Rural areas are not 
seen as dynamic 
economies.  
Education & Training Pressure on schools and 
HE colleges leads to 
further closures of rural 
educational institutions.  
Students must migrate to 
urban areas to continue 
their education post-16.  
The lack of digital 
connectivity means 
students in rural areas 
are at a disadvantage and 
lack access to new 
technology. 
The economic downturn 
results in an outflow of 
skilled workers.  Local HE 
and FE institutions try to 
make up the skills gap.  
 The region͛s FE & HE 
institutions are 
suffering from falling 
numbers and lack of 
research funding.  With 
one failure already, 
other institutions are in 
difficulty with 
consolidation seen as 
the only option for a 
number of FE 
institutions.  
The rural north of 
England is on the way 
to being a low-skilled 
low wage economy 
with little value added 
in the region.  
International Trade The recession results in 
falling living standards for 
the region and an outflow 
of skilled workers.  
The loss of some of the 
high-tech international 
companies has reduced 
the region͛s ability to 
keep up with 
developments in 
technology. 
A hard Brexit means 
much higher trade 
barriers for agricultural 
and other manufactured 
goods hitting the region 
hard.  This triggers a 
severe recession.  
 The north east of 
England is again seen as 
a low political priority 
with all effort being 
concentrated on the 
South East and North 
West.  
As international trade 
declines, attempts are 
made to establish local 
supply chains, but these 
are unable to fully 
replace lost markets.  
Demographic Change After many decades of 
counter-urbanisation, 
most rural areas are again 
As real wages continue to 
fall, many instances 
where technology could 
The loss of working adults 
leads to economic decline 
in the service sector 
 The biggest political 
problem is supporting 
the growing older 
There is a risk of a 
downward spiral of low 
wage, low skill 
  
suffering population 
decline. This is mainly 
from working-age adults 
exacerbating problems of 
ageing.   
be used is being replaced 
with a low wage 
workforce.  The region is 
being left behind by the 
4th industrial revolution. 
without sufficient 
markets.  In another area, 
lower land values and 
increased automation 
increases productivity but 
this value is captured 
beyond the rural 
economy. 
population in the region 
as working-age people 
flow out.   
economy with a 
shrinking and ageing 
population.  Managing 
this decline, both 
physically and mentally 
is a difficult task.   
Sustainability and 
Environment 
The issue of depopulation 
of remoter rural areas 
sets up a debate about 
rural communities and re-
wilding.  Those remaining 
in remote rural 
communities feel under 
threat.  
The environment and in 
particular ecosystem 
services are able to 
harness new technology 
to monitor natural 
systems.  Issues such as 
flood risk management 
and biodiversity use a 
number of new 
technologies.  
The economic recession 
did lead to a reduction in 
carbon emissions but as 
the country starts to 
emerge from the 
recession the benefits are 
being lost.  
 Sustainability and the 
environment are seen 
as a luxury.  The 
growing impact of 
climate change does 
however start a debate 
about radical proposals 
such as a personal 
carbon allowance and a 
ban on flights within 
the country.  
Sustainability and the 
environment are seen 
as luxuries and priority 
is given to social issues, 
particularly adult social 
care and health 
provision. 
Transport The lack of rural public 
transport creates a bigger 
gap between  those able 
to afford private 
transport and those that 
cannot.  This affects 
remoter rural 
communities to a greater 
extent. 
Rural areas fail to take 
advantage of the 
technological 
developments in 
transport.  Mobility as a  
Service applications only 
reach peri-urban areas  
HS2 never reaches the 
North East and sucks up 
most rail investment.  
Other transport 
investments in the region 
are delayed or 
abandoned further 
marginalising the rural 
North.  
 Parts of the rural north 
of England are seen as 
politically beyond reach 
and are to all intents 
and purposes 
abandoned.  
The rural north of 
England is seen as being 
peripheral and it is 
suggested this should 
be seen as one of its 
strengths.  
Land Value and Public 
Goods 
Communities in the areas 
where de-intensification 
is greatest suffer from 
out-migration and a lack 
of social capital.  The few 
remaining cultural assets, 
the pub, village hall and 
school are lost.  
 The crash in land values 
and lack of public 
financial support for 
pubic goods creates two 
extremes of land use.  
Highly intensive on the 
one hand and low 
input/low intensive on 
the other with many 
areas taken out of 
production altogether. 
  De-intensification of 
land use, particularly in 
the uplands leads to a 
loss of traditional 
culture reference points 
as farming and food 
production cease to be 
important in those 
areas. 
Businesses Premises The lack of investment in 
rural infrastructure has 
seen a decline in rural 
Much of the new 
business premises is seen 
  Rural areas are seen as 
being areas of 
traditional business 
 
  
businesses.  The 
dominant discourse is 
aƌouŶd ͚tƌaditioŶal͛ aƌts 
and crafts industries in 
rural areas.  
as catering for non-
technological businesses.  
activity or else mainly 
for hobby or lifestyle 
businesses.   
Energy Markets       
 
  
Scenario 3 – A vision for the rural north of England 
 
Almost one year to the day from the first workshop that kick started this project, a second workshop was 
held at the Sill Landscape Discovery Centre in Northumberland to discuss the two Brexit scenarios created 
by the project team.  It was also an opportunity to create a third, optimal scenario that could act as a 
roadmap for the future.  The workshop was attended by 50 individuals representing local and national 
government, the local business community, the community and voluntary sector and academia.  During a 
series of activities, the two existing scenarios were presented to the workshop along with a summary of 
the policy and sectoral analyses highlighted in chapters 3 and 5 of this report.  The workshop participants 
were then asked to create their own scenario which avoided the worst outcomes highlighted in Scenario 
2 and achieved the outcomes they thought were appropriate from scenario 1.  The final activity of the day 
was to start to consider a roadmap that delivered the outcomes identified in the third scenario.  This was 
divided into things that the region could do on its own and things that required external input in the form 
of resources, legislation or support.   
Scenario 3, shown in table 6 below was created using the same framework as has been used for scenarios 
1 and 2 and building on the information contained in those scenarios, groups worked to generate ideas 
across a range of policy areas.  As you will see, not every cell in the table was completed, but there is a 
strong overall narrative provided by the scenario.  
  
  
 Social Technological Economic Environmental Political Values (Culture) 
New Rural Policy  Sustainable rural 
communities are at the 
heart of the new rural 
policy for the region.  
Support for sectors builds 
from the bottom-up with 
the primary aim of adding 
more value in the region. 
A good example of this is 
the two new abattoirs 
have helped develop a 
thriving local red meat 
supply chain.  
Policy recognises all 
economic activity in rural 
areas is inter-linked. 
Support for SMEs and start-
ups is designed specifically 
for rural areas rather than 
urban. 
The link between 
environmental 
sustainability and 
improvement is now 
integrated into economic 
policy. New business 
opportunities have been 
created as the region 
exports its knowledge in 
this sector.  
Bottom-up and co-
production is now second 
nature in the region͛s 
policy-making. There is now 
a strong cohort of policy 
makers and politicians 
committed to this inclusive 
way of working.  
The rural north of 
England is seen as a 
pioneer of social and
economic change th
other rural areas have 
now started to emb
upon.  
Shift to payment for 
outcomes has chang
the mind set of the 
sector. 
Rural Services The loĐal ͚LEADE‘͛ soĐial 
innovation programme 
has delivered its 100th 
project. Communities are 
able to share best 
practice and replicate 
what works locally and 
from other areas.  
The region is a test bed 
for technology to 
improve rural services 
such as transport, health 
and education. Smart 
business now makes 
remote communities 
accessible.  
Better provision of services 
in all rural areas has 
allowed SMEs and larger 
businesses to thrive in rural 
areas.  A ready and skilled 
workforce along with new 
business opportunities to 
deliver services see the 
rural economy thrive. 
Green therapy has been 
included in adult and 
ĐhildƌeŶ͛s soĐial Đaƌe 
models.  
Integrated budgets and 
programme delivery is now 
delivering joined-up 
support to all rural areas.  
The NoTCA [A4]is about to 
start consultation on its 
2030-2035 integrated plan.   
Social and technolog
innovation is embraced
in the delivery of rural
services.  
Rural Connectivity Business in the region has 
embraced flexible and 
remote working as a way 
both to support rural 
business and increase 
sustainability.  
Digital by default with 
100% coverage in rural 
North.  
The high levels of digital 
connectivity ensure that 
businesses in the rural 
north are fully integrated 
into the regional economy. 
Rural areas are also seen as 
a place to start and build 
new businesses.  
 Rural areas are now seen as 
fully part of next generation 
technology in the same way 
that cities are.  The 
opportunities afforded by 
the 4th Industrial Revolution 
for rural areas is embedded 
in political strategy.  
Rural and urban are
are part of the same
debate around 
connectivity.   
Devolution Since Brexit, efforts have 
been made to develop 
the governance capacity 
in the region.  
 Success is not just about 
GVA, productivity and jobs. 
Longer timescales included 
on devolution deals. Not 
just annual settlements.  
 The rural agenda is fully 
integrated into all regional 
strategies. Local priority 
setting with shared 
outcome measures.  
The rural parts of th
region speak with on
ǀoiĐe. ͚thiŶk, plaŶ aŶd 
speak like a ĐitǇ!͛ 
Housing Rural areas have now 
completed the last 
neigbourhood plan for 
the region. This has 
created an integrated 
spatial plan structure that 
builds from the bottom-
up.  
 The updated code for 
sustainable homes has 
been reintroduced and now 
includes existing homes. 
The development of a 
regional supply chain for 
sustainable building 
products has helped in the 
 Priority is now given to 
owner occupiers in all parts 
of the rural region. 
The devolution of funding 
for social housing has led to 
a resurgence of council 
house building. Working 
with the local construction 
Housing is seen as 
being integral to 
creating vibrant rural
communities with a m
of housing types and
tenures across the ru
region.  
  
process of improving new 
aŶd eǆistiŶg hoŵes͛ 
sustainability.  
supply chain, low cost, 
sustainable housing is being 
delivered.   
Labour Market A range of high skill high 
wage jobs in a range of 
sectors are now available 
in the rural North. This 
includes provision in 
social enterprise.  
The investment in 
education and training 
has created a workforce 
able to exploit 
technology.  Technology 
has also expanded 
opportunity to live and 
work in rural areas.   
Smaller businesses, through 
the provision of support to 
access markets and to find 
suitable property are able 
to recruit more well-trained 
people from the region.  
 The region is well on the 
way to developing a circular 
economy which allows 
more of the value created 
in the region to remain in 
the region. 
 
Education & Training Rural schools are 
connected, both digitally 
and socially to other 
schools both in the rural 
area and urban areas.  
They are also now 
community hubs 
delivering life-long 
learning.  
Universities have been 
able to connect digitally 
to the rural areas of the 
region through rural 
schools but also directly 
through MOOCs designed 
for the region. 
The significant investment 
in schools and colleges is 
paying dividends. 
Curriculums have been 
designed to support the 
ƌegioŶ͛s keǇ stƌeŶgths aŶd 
the changing economy.   
   
International Trade  Technology has been 
developed that has 
allowed the region to 
develop its ports and 
allow goods to bypass the 
congested South East.  
To support this increase in 
international trade, 
business support has 
focused on SMEs 
particularly in the rural 
areas: i.e. advanced 
pharmaceuticals and high 
value food products.  
 North East better 
connected internationally 
with new sea routes and 
direct international rail  
from region 
 
Demographic Change Other changes to 
housing, connectivity, 
jobs and training has 
attracted more young 
people to live and work in 
rural areas. Many of the 
issues of an ageing 
population are being 
addressed by joined-up 
policy and service 
delivery as well as by 
social innovation.  
Technology and digital 
connectivity has allowed 
all age groups to thrive in 
rural areas.  
The shift in farming in parts 
of the region away from 
focus on production to a 
more multi-functional 
farming as the impact of 
the 2019 Agriculture Act 
has seen average age of 
famers and rural population 
fall  significantly.  
   
Sustainability and 
Environment 
Efforts to manage and 
create greater access to 
Rural mobility as a service 
and distributed energy 
The green economy is now 
starting to pay dividends. 
The investment in natural 
capital is paying dividends 
The value of ecosystems is 
now valued beyond their 
There is now a stron
ethos of collaborative
  
countryside help engage 
the wider public in 
sustainability. More 
community ownership of 
rural land starts new 
commoning tradition.  
systems have massively 
increased rural 
sustainability.  
Green energy compliments 
sustainable tourism and 
industry with farming now 
comfortable with balance 
between production and 
public goods.  
for the region in reducing 
the impact of adverse 
weather and climate 
change.  
monetary value and at a 
more intrinsic level.  
working between th
farming and 
environmental 
community which 
allows new ways of 
working to be 
developed and teste
Transport  Improved E/W links are 
integrated into wider 
northern transport 
network. Travel times to 
other regions halved.  
    
Land Value and Public 
Goods 
    Natural capital and its value 
is fully reflected in both 
regional and national rural 
policy. 
 
Businesses Premises   A vibrant mix of rural 
business spaces is provided 
by a variety of sources 
across the region. 
   
Energy Markets   The region is leading the 
way with a distributed 
community-owned model 
of energy production and 
supply.  
   
Future of Forestry There has been an 
increase in the area of 
native woodland planting, 
iŶĐludiŶg ͞futuƌe Ŷatiǀes͟ 
in upland areas, largely 
driven by ELMS and some 
of it in the pilot re-wilding 
areas. 
There has also been a 
significant increase in 
urban and peri-urban 
woodland creation in a 
new wave of community 
forests including three in 
NE England.   
New technology and 
better use of GIS has also 
enabled those interested 
in creating new 
woodlands to make a 
rapid and reliable desk-
based assessment of 
features of a site and so 
ascertain the sites͛ 
suitability for 
afforestation.  For sites 
deemed by the system as 
suitable, a simple file 
transfer and electronic 
application to the 
Forestry Commission 
completes the grant 
Whilst domestic timber 
supply remains an issue and 
͞Peak Wood͟ appƌoaĐhes, 
there has been a sustained 
increase in multi-purpose 
productive woodland 
creation at an average rate 
of around 1,000ha per year.  
Much of this new woodland 
has been planted on poorer 
arable and dairy land and 
on upland areas of 
relatively low sensitivity. 
Our departure from the EU 
in 2019 triggered a lengthy 
period of a relatively weak 
pound.  This helped to 
Our larger forests have 
become more diverse and 
natural over the last 30 
years.  As part of this, 
lynx and European beaver 
have been successfully 
reintroduced and golden 
eagle has returned to 
northern England and the 
Scottish borders.  Pine 
marten, once almost 
extinct, are now relatively 
common in the forests of 
northern England and 
have proved a valuable 
aspect in grey squirrel 
control.  Red squirrels are 
The environmental 
protections and safeguards 
rooted in EU directives and 
laws were largely adopted 
in UK legislation after 
Brexit, providing a similar 
level of environmental 
protection as before.   
The new regulations
requiring a pro-rata 
area of green space to
be created for every 
hectare of land 
developed (partly in
response to the obe
and mental health c
and the need to 
encourage higher le
of outdoor activity) h
led to a substantial 
increase in green 
infrastructure. 
  
application process.  As 
sites that are deemed 
suitable have already 
been given the green 
light by consultees, the 
application process takes 
around a month from 
start to finish.   This rapid 
and simple process has, 
together with the strong 
market for timber, 
supportive grants (ELMS) 
and reduction in land 
values in some places, 
encouraged an increase 
in the rate of woodland 
creation. 
sustain domestic timber 
prices at high levels and 
confidence among forestry 
businesses was sustained, 
as was the value of 
woodlands and forests.  
Indeed the natural capital 
accounting approach first 
trialled in around 2017, is 
now common place and 
there is a well-developed 
market for trade in carbon 
credits, both of which have 
been a boon for forestry.   
now largely restricted to 
the largest forests in 
northern England and the 
Highlands of Scotland but 
the fertility control work 
that began in about 2016 
eventually proved to be 
an effective control agent 
and together with the 
pine marten 
preferentially predating 
grey squirrels, the need 
for grey squirrel control 
has been substantially 
reduced. 
4th Industrial Revolution       
  
8. Conclusions & Recommendations  The sheer size of this report speaks to the complexity of the challenges facing the rural north of 
England.  To tackle such a complex and uncertain future requires a coordinated approach.  This 
project engaged a wide range of stakeholders in its development. This needs to be continued 
and expanded.  
Recommendation 1 - A rural development stakeholder network needs to be developed and 
resourced to maintain the collaboration and knowledge exchange started by this project.  
 This project has started the process of creating a vision for the future and a roadmap to take 
concrete steps on the path to that future.  However many of the ideas and objectives are still 
very abstract. The stakeholders need to be more specific about what is required and from 
whom.  This is something cities are very good at and rural areas need to be much better at. 
Recommendation 2 - Using the new devolution deals as the impetus, the rural North needs to 
deǀelop a specific aŶd costed ͚ǁish list͛ of projects aŶd prograŵŵes that ǁill deliver the 
outputs contained in the vision.   The third scenario highlights a number of opportunities for the rural north of England to 
improve and diversify the economy. However these are often built on tangible (ICT Connectivity 
and transport) and intangible (skills and knowledge) infrastructure that are currently absent or 
deficient. A good example given by a participant at the final workshop was local quality food 
production.  Farms wanting to shorten supply chains and diversify into supplying meat produced 
on their farm are hampered by the lack of an abattoir north of the river Wear. This adds costs to 
already tight margins.   
Recommendation 3 – Any sectoral development programmes must start with a review of the 
underpinning infrastructure to ensure it is in place to enable the sectoral developments.   
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Appendix 1: Sector Summary Tables  
AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 
Current situation Drivers Short term opportunities/ challenges Medium term / 
Long term outlook 
Agriculture an important sector but 
in relative decline. 
Nationally in 2016 i) farmers 
managed 71% of UK land area, a 
decline from 75% in 1984;  ii) the 
British food and drink industry = 
£109bn and employs 3.8 million 
people137.  However, the real value 
of both total crop output and total 
livestock output fell considerably 
1984-ϮϬϭϲ aŶd agƌiĐultuƌe͛s shaƌe 
of total employment has also fallen 
iŶ eaĐh of the UK͛s ĐouŶtƌies.138  iii) 
the majority of the funding 
received by the UK from the EU 
each year, £6bn, is for agriculture - 
£3bn on direct payments and 
£0.5bn as support for rural 
development.139  The direct 
payments support, it is claimed, 
1. The outcome of the Brexit 
negotiation with the EU.  
Scenarios depicted by the CRE 
(2017) are: 
a) Brexit Lite where UK 
negotiates a free trade 
agreement with the EU.  This 
would mean marginal changes 
in production and value of 
output. 
b) Brexit Comp The UK has 
free trade with the EU and 
also the rest of the world.  
This is the trade liberalisation 
option desired by the Institute 
of Economic Affairs.  This 
would mean reduced prices 
and UK output values across 
all commodities.  Marked 
downward effect on beef and 
sheep sectors. 
Opportunities 
Recognised by all bodies – DEFRA, the NFU, the CLA and 
Cumbria LEP that leaving the CAP will create the opportunity for 
a Ŷeǁ aŶd ͞ďetteƌ͟ DoŵestiĐ AgƌiĐultural Policy (DAP) to be put 
iŶ plaĐe.  GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt ǁaŶts ͞the Ŷeǁ sǇsteŵ to deliǀeƌ 
benefits such as improved air, water and soil quality; increased 
biodiversity; climate change mitigation and adaptation; and 
cultural benefits that improve our mental and physical 
ǁellďeiŶg ǁhile pƌoteĐtiŶg ouƌ histoƌiĐ eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt.͟145  
DEFRA and NFU foresee the period post-Brexit as consisting of 3 
phases. 
Phase 1: March 2019-Feb. 2021 
Period of relative stability and continuity for the sector as 
Government is committed to maintaining cash funding to the 
sector to the end of the current Parliament.  Launch of pilot 
schemes of new funding initiatives and emphasis on the 
environment.  Government will simplify applications for farmers 
wishing to enter existing schemes providing environmental 
benefits such as Countryside Stewardship.  Direct payments will 
be phased out. 
Phase 2: March 2021-2023 
All bodies - DEFRA, 
NFU, CLA, Cumbria 
LEP & SSA wish to 
see increased 
agricultural 
productivity.  
DEF‘A ǁish ͞to see 
the UK producing 
more, selling more 
and exporting 
more of our Great 
Bƌitish food.͟148 
Government 
foresees: 1) 
Increased 
investment in 
automation with 
drilling, harvesting, 
picking and 
packaging all being 
automated. 
                                                          
137 NFU (2017), p. 2 
138 House of Lords (2017), pp. 2, 4, 6 
139 Scottish Rural Policy Centre (2017), p. 16 
145 Gove (2018b), p. 8 
148 Cumbria LEP (2017), p. 25 
  
makes up around 50-60% of farm 
incomes in the UK.  
Regionally, i) of the 39 English LEP 
areas, Cumbria has the second 
highest proportion of adults 
working in agriculture (nearly 
ϭϮ,ϬϬϬͿ  iiͿ ϭϬ% of the UK͛s daiƌǇ 
herd, 8% of beef cattle and 13% of 
all sheep and lamb stock are in 
Cumbria.140  iii) the agriculture, 
forestry and fishing (AFF) sector 
accounts for 25% of economic 
activity in Southern Scotland, 
almost 3 times the Scotland 
average.  iv) in Northumberland, in 
2013, AFF accounted for 5% of 
total jobs in the county but had the 
highest location quotient of any 
sector in the county (2.25).141 
In 2016, the UK had a trade deficit 
of £23bn in food, feed and drink 
(FFD) products – a deficit both with 
the EU and non-EU countries.142  
Since the Brexit referendum, UK 
farm incomes have been boosted 
due to fall in the value of sterling 
leading to increased UK agricultural 
competitiveness and increased 
value of CAP payments (in euros). 
c)  Brexit-WTO  where no 
trade agreement was reached 
with the EU and WTO rules 
would apply.  This would lead 
to significant adjustments in 
trade between the UK and EU.  
EU tariffs and NTBs would 
affect UK exports. 
2.  The impact of technology 
oŶ ͞“ŵaƌt FaƌŵiŶg͟ – 
precision farming, genetic 
biotech. 
3.  National and global 
population growth increasing 
the demand for food. 
4.  Labour shortages especially 
in Cumbria due to: migration; 
ageing economy and 
succession issues; labour 
availability due to other 
developments in the County; 
affordability of rural housing. 
5.  Shift in funding to attention 
oŶ ͞Ŷatuƌal Đapital͟ iŶ 
government policy. 
6.  Impact of climate change – 
warmer climate and greater 
probability of flooding events. 
Review and assessment of pilot schemes.  Impact assessment of 
post-Brexit trading environment. 
Phase 3: 2023 onwards  
The new DAP is fully implemented.  However, the date for its 
full implementation may be postponed depending on whether 
the Brexit settlement has had a great adverse effect on the 
sector.  
In addition, Cumbria LEP, for example, sees a number of 
opportunities for the County: 
1.  Cumbria could be offered to the country as a test bed/ 
exemplar for new locally designed and delivered rural/ 
agricultural development programmes that ensure economic, 
environmental, social and cultural benefits.  They suggest the 
partners in this to be the LEP, farmer groups, Natural England, 
the local authorities, the National Park, the National Trust and 
existing LEADER groups.  
Ϯ.  Add ǀalue to the CouŶtǇ͛s ŵilk pƌoduĐts ďǇ iŶĐƌeasiŶg the 
amount of processing that is done in the County. 
3.  Develop and expand expertise in environmental land 
management.  Encourage Cumbria and Lancaster Universities to 
provide research institutes in this field. 
4.  Develop the cluster of agricultural supply, technology and 
advice businesses.   
5.  Re-invigorate the Cumbria/Lake District brand in order to sell 
the ďest of the CouŶtǇ͛s pƌoduĐe. ie. ͞Taste the Vieǁ͟ aŶd ͞Feel 
the Vieǁ͟ ŵaƌketiŶg. 
Challenges/Fears 
2) Investment in 
precision mapping, 
enabling precise 
targeting of pests 
and weeds.  Lowers 
their use. 
3) Investment in 
sensor technology 
so as one can tell 
where, when and 
how livestock 
should be fed, 
housed and bred to 
maximise yield and 
animal health & 
welfare. 
4) Better 
integration of 
research with 
ongoing training of 
those working on 
the land. 
5) Rural areas to 
have unbroken 
mobile phone and 
internet coverage 
& superfast 
broadband. 
6) Creation of a 
new gold standard 
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UK agricultural sector heavily 
dependant on EU.  In 2016: - the 
EU aĐĐouŶted foƌ ϲϬ% of UK͛s FFD 
products and 70% of imports. 
- ϳ of the UK͛s top ϭϬ eǆpoƌt 
markets were EU member states. 
- 9 of the top 10 countries from 
which the UK imported its FFD 
products were EU members.143  
Most important sectors from point 
of ǀieǁ of UK͛s eǆpoƌts to the EU 
are wheat, barley and sheep.144 
7. Government has created a 
Food & Drink Sector Council to 
boost productivity and to help 
industry to take advantage of 
emerging opportunities. 
1.  SRUC believe agri-environment schemes are problematic.  
Why would WTO members support faƌŵeƌs͛ iŶĐoŵes foƌ Ŷot 
farming or not harming the environment?146  
2.  Concern for the food industry is the potential for customs 
delays once UK is outside the customs union. 
3.  Fear that at the UK level, concessions for economically 
smaller sector ie. agriculture, could be exchanged for benefits 
to larger sectors eg. Financial services.  Also, Scottish agriculture 
more exposed to trade restrictions than England post-Brexit.147 
4.  Not known yet whether there will be devolved power for 
Scotland to control and deliver spending on agriculture. 
metric for food and 
farming quality. 
In addition, NFU 
would like to see 
financial support 
for structural 
change to aid those 
wishing to cease 
farming and to help 
new entrants.  
 
 
TOURISM 
Current situation Drivers Short term opportunities/ challenges Medium term Long term 
target 
Touƌisŵ is UK͛s ϯrd largest 
employer accounting for 3.1m jobs 
and contributing £127bn to the UK 
economy.149 
Growing national and local tourism 
industry. 
In 2013, in Northumberland, 
tourism accounted for 13,200 
jobs150 or 13% of total employment 
1.  It is believed that 
national and global 
population growth and 
income growth will 
continue to boost 
demand for travel and 
tourism. 
2.  Borderlands Growth 
Deal 
Opportunities 
Ending of CAP seen as an opportunity to reassess 
incentive structures so that linkages between 
farming, tourism and environment are taken into 
account. 
Emphasise the inter-connectedness of urban and 
rural areas. 
Capture more international tourists due to the 
lower exchange rate. 
Rory Stewart (2018) 
has suggested the 
cƌeatioŶ of the ͞ϭϬϬ 
ŵiles of WildeƌŶess͟ 
brand to keep our 
rural communities 
vibrant and self-
sustaining.  His paper 
also suggests that 
the dueling of the 
A re-alignment 
of the balance 
between 
agriculture & 
rural heritage 
will create 
more job 
opportunities 
in tourism, 
construction 
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and had experienced growth in the 
past 5 years of 18%.  Compared to 
the England average in 2013, the 
County had a location quotient in 
tourism of 1.33. 
A significant new investment has 
been made to the visitor economy 
in Northumberland during 2017 
with the opening of the Sill 
National Landscape Discovery 
Centre. 
In 2016, Cumbria received > 45 
million visitors and provided 
36,240 FTE posts.151  The Lake 
District is the most visited national 
park and generates the largest 
tourism spend of any in England 
and Wales. 
Of the UK͛s top ϭϬ souƌĐe ŵaƌkets 
for inbound tourism, 8 are other 
EU countries. 
11% of all tourism industry 
employees in the UK are EU 
nationals.152 
Current structure & focus on 
business support is heavily 
3.  The deal that we get 
with the EU: 
- whether part of 
customs union; 
- whether ease of travel 
changes 
- whether airports 
continue close 
cooperation between 
UK and EU 
- whether EU nationals 
are allowed to stay 
- whether EU nationals 
can be sourced easily 
for supply of labour  
- will employment rights 
for UK outbound travel 
sector remain in force? 
4.  Ending of ESIF 
funding for tourism 
development. 
5.  Development of new 
technologies in 
transport and travel. 
6.  Challenge of climate 
change and need to 
adapt to flooding. 
Introduce a Universal Service Obligation on 
broadband. 
Introduce Costal Enterprise Zones. 
Enhance Coastal Community Fund. 
Reduce VAT on accommodation, meals and 
attractions153. 
Abolish Air Passenger Duty on domestic flights to 
boost domestic air travel and therefore tourism 
outside London.  
Ideas from the Cumbria LEP include:. 
Cumbria to use World Heritage status to market 
itself;  DesigŶ paĐkages of ͞eǆpeƌieŶĐes͟ to 
appeal to overseas tourists;  Further develop the 
iŶitiatiǀes of ͞Made iŶ Cuŵďƌia͟ aŶd ͞Taste 
Cuŵďƌia͟; Offeƌ Cuŵďƌia up as a test ďed foƌ Ŷeǁ 
ideas and technologies; Sell Cumbria to the 
creative industries in order to attract inward 
investment in this field; Connections between 
Food aŶd DƌiŶk aŶd the ͞Đultuƌal͟ eǆpeƌieŶĐe 
could be emphasised; Passenger flights from 
London and Dublin to Carlisle Airport  
 
Challenges 
If our future relationship with the EU is outside 
the Single Market, there will be a depressive 
effect on investment in the tourism industry 
especially in the hotel sector. 
A69 would facilitate 
visits from local 
population centres 
to the new or 
enhanced visitor 
attractions along the 
Wilderness route.156 
Improve the public 
realm and facilities 
for visitors. 
Encourage 
community-led and 
low-cost innovation 
projects 
(Borderlands Growth 
Deal). 
Creation of a 
͞BoƌdeƌlaŶds ‘uƌal 
EŶeƌgǇ CeŶtƌe͟ at 
Chapelcross Energy 
Park. 
Develop adrenaline 
attractions. 
Enhance the cycling 
offer. 
and local 
economies 
and have 
benefits for 
well-being and 
the 
environment. 
The Lake 
District to 
become a 
major supplier 
of adventure 
capital 
services. 
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influenced by availability of EU 
funding. 
High rate of entrepreneurial 
activity in rural areas. 
Long distances involved in travel to 
learn in rural areas. 
 
7.  Strong links between 
the tourism sector and 
other rural sectors esp. 
food and drink 
manufacture. 
8  Increase funding for 
Visit Britain. 
9.  Introduce tourism-
related travel products. 
 
 
At a national and global level, concerns over 
rising air pollution may lead to increased air taxes 
and therefore reduced air travel in future. 
Serious squeeze on skills at all levels and lack of 
affordable housing will affect the sector. 
Extend Tier 5 Youth Mobility Scheme to include 
EU nationals.154 
Allow overseas students to work in the industry. 
Increase provision of career information on the 
sector.155 
Increase apprenticeship training so as to employ 
the unemployed and economically inactive.  
Small/micro businesses often suffer from their 
oǁŶ ŵaŶageƌ͛s laĐk of stƌategiĐ skills. 
Offer opportunities for flexart-time work across 
the visitor economy to take advantage of 
professional and business expertise of older 
people coming into Cumbria to live. 
Develop food and 
drink linked 
attractions. 
Develop events and 
festivals to attract 
visitors at otherwise 
less busy periods of 
the year. 
In Cumbria, growth 
of the West Coast 
economy over the 
next 5-15 years may 
suck labour from 
rural businesses.  
Activity in the West 
of Cumbria will 
provide workforce 
and accommodation 
requirements, 
opportunities for 
business tourism and 
the food & drink 
sector. 
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FORESTRY SECTOR 
Current situation Drivers Short term opportunities/ challenges Medium term / 
Long term outlook 
The forestry sector consists of woodland 
creation and management, timber production, 
primary wood processing (sawmilling, panels, 
pulp and paper) as well as secondary wood 
processing businesses.  It is estimated that in 
2016 there are over 4,500 forestry businesses in 
the UK including 550 sawmills157.   
The area of woodland in the UK at 31 March 
2017 is estimated to be 3.17 million hectares.  
This represents 13% of the total land area in the 
UK, 10% in England, 15% in Wales, 18% in 
Scotland and 8% in Northern Ireland.  
Of the total UK woodland area, 0.86 million 
hectares (27%) is owned or managed by the 
Forestry Commission (in England and Scotland), 
Natural Resources Wales (in Wales) or the 
Forest Service (in Northern Ireland).  
The total certified woodland area in the UK at 
31 March 2017 is 1.39 million hectares, 
including all Forestry Commission/Natural 
Resources Wales/Forest Service woodland.  
Overall, 44% of the UK woodland area is 
certified.  The Scottish Borders and northern 
England together represent the most important 
area for wood production and processing in the 
On the demand side, the key 
pull factor is demand from UK 
construction industry, but 
also manufacturing industry 
(pulp and paper) and 
distribution (pallets)160.   
Domestic demand outstrips 
supply.  UK is therefore a 
major importer of wood and 
wood products.  Imports 
accounted for 82% of wood 
consumption in the UK in 
2016161. 
On the supply side, both new 
forest developments and 
felling are subject to 
regulations covering 
environmental impact and 
biosecurity (Pest control).  
Most of these regulatory 
frameworks are European-
wide agreements.  UK 
Government is also 
committed to sustainability 
principles (certified woodland 
A report by Confor (published 14.04.2016) 
suggests a number of impacts:  
Non-sector specific effects – impacts of 
changes in employment legislation, 
restrictions on free movement of labour and 
consequences for skills and training, level of 
business support available including support 
for R&D. 
Sector-specific impacts – impacts on the 
market for timber in the UK, threats to public 
funding for woodland planting, changes to 
environmental legislation, controls on plant 
health.   
Documents produced by both Confor and the 
Scottish Parliament identify a range of 
potential impacts of Brexit:  
Impacts on trade – UK is a major importer of 
wood from the EU.  Trade barriers are likely to 
reduce the level of trade in timber and timber 
products.  It is suggested this will increase 
demand for domestically produced timber164.   
Public funding for woodland management 
could be under threat due to withdrawal from 
Possible long term 
effects on the rate 
of planting and 
harvesting of UK 
forestry.   
Higher cost of 
imported wood 
products supplied 
to the UK 
construction 
industry. 
Public funding for 
woodland and 
forest 
management is 
devolved, so in 
future, devolved 
administrations 
could take different 
positions regarding 
priority given to 
forestry issues.  
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UK, accounting for one third of total UK 
production.  Either side of the Border are major 
wood processing plants such as BSW at Carlisle, 
James Jones at Lockerbie and Eggers at 
Hexham. 
Seven thousand hectares of new woodland 
were created in the UK in 2016-17, with 
conifers accounting for over one half (54%) of 
this area.  Kielder Forest Park is one of the 
largest man-made forests in Europe covering an 
area of 60,000 hectares mainly across 
Northumberland between the Scottish Border 
aŶd HadƌiaŶ͛s Wall.  
A total of 196 sites were served with a Statutory 
Plant Health Notice in 2016-17, requiring a total 
of 700 hectares of woodland to be felled.  (This 
excludes areas felled within the Phytophthora 
ramorum management zone in SW. Scotland, 
where a statutory Plant Health Notice is not 
required).158 
New planting across the whole of the UK has 
declined considerably since the mid-1970͛s.  
While there was an increase in new planting in 
England in the early 1990͛s that has also 
declined, and 2016 saw the fewest new trees 
planted on record159.   
meets criteria for Woodland 
management including 
replanting). 162163 
Supply is also influenced by a 
fairly stable ownership – 27% 
state owned and 73% private.  
European Agricultural Fund for Rural 
Development (EAFRD).   
Possible threat to current environmental 
protections provided to large scale forested 
areas which are covered at present by EU 
Directives to provide detailed Environmental 
Impact Assessments.   
Possible opportunity for UK producers of wood 
products to innovate in order to supply UK 
construction industry.   
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FISHING 
Current situation Drivers Short term opportunities/ challenges Medium and long term 
UK fishing industry in decline since 
joining EEC in 1973. 
UK fishing fleet fallen by 29% since 
1996.165 
In 2016: the UK had 11,757 fishermen 
of whom 5,306 in England; 4,823 in 
Scotland.  UK vessels landed 701,000 
tonnes of seafish into the UK and 
abroad – value £936M.166 
The fishing industry, however, is not 
of great statistical significance in any 
of the Border counties – accounting 
for only 0.1% of total employment 
(and < 0.1% in Cumbria).  In absolute 
terms, of greatest importance in 
Northumberland – in 2016, 150 
people were employed in 55 
enterprises.167 
The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) 
quota system greatest source of 
frustration for British fishermen, 
giving for example, 84% of cod in the 
English Channel to France and just 9% 
to Britain.  EU fleets take 4X as much 
 Future of 
industry almost 
entirely 
dependent on 
the Brexit deal 
which will have 
impacts on:  Fish quotas.  Exclusive access 
of UK coastal 
waters.  Fisheries 
management 
and enforcement 
system.  Trade access 
with the EU.  Public funding of 
fishing 
communities.  Environmental 
sustainability. 
Opportunities  The NatioŶal FedeƌatioŶ of FisheƌŵeŶ͛s 
Organisations (NFFO) is arguing for UK to 
assume full power of its status as an 
independent coastal nation from March 2019 
with no transitional deal with the EU.  This 
would give UK exclusive access to up to 200 
miles from its coast – the norm under UN 
convention on the Law of the Sea.  UK would trade some of these access rights with 
other countries, including rights for access to the 
EU͛s seas oƌ the EU ŵaƌket foƌ fisheƌies 
products.  UK fishermen hopeful of greatly improved 
prospects for UK fishing industry as they would 
be able to catch and land more fish.  EU however is arguing for status quo to be 
maintained as this is beneficial to them.  In 
March 2018, the UK Government backed down 
on its wishes for the fishing industry during the 
transition period and now the status quo will be 
maintained for a period of 21 months.  NFFO hopes that CFP͛s deĐisioŶ-making process 
will be replaced with annual (bilateral or 
trilateral) international agreements with 
countries with which the UK shares stocks. 
Nothing explicit mentioned in the 
literature. 
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fish out of UK waters as the UK takes 
out of EU waters.168 
Pre-referendum (University of 
Aberdeen) online survey showed that 
92% of UK fishermen would be voting 
for Brexit.169 
Europe imports about 75% of the 
British catch with France, Spain and 
Ireland accounting for 36% of total 
toŶŶage eǆpoƌted to the UK͛s top ϮϬ 
export markets in 2014/15.170 
Trade access vital for the industry as 
Britain exports the bulk of what it 
catches and imports the majority of 
what it consumes. 
UK ǁas alloĐated ЄϮϰϯ.ϭ M iŶ fisheƌies 
funding from 2014-20 under the CFP 
to support fishing communities. 
 Protection of the 
marine 
environment.  CoŶsuŵeƌs͛ 
demands for 
different types of 
fish.  UK͛s aďilitǇ to 
forge favourable 
new trading 
relationships 
with non-EU 
countries. 
 
Challenges  The concern of fishing ports is that the EU will 
extract the same preferential deal on fishing 
access and rights from the UK Government in 
the final deal.171  Restrictions on market access might mean tariffs 
as high as 24% on seafood.  UK would still have to comply with EU market 
obligations in order to export fish to the EU.  Ability of UK to forge favourable new 
relationships with non-EU countries questioned 
by some as the UK would lose bargaining power 
of the EU. 
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DIGITAL 
Current situation Drivers Short term and Medium term opportunities/ challenges Long term target 
Good progress nationally on 
geogƌaphiĐal Đoǀeƌage of ͞deĐeŶt͟ 
broadband service (97% of premises in 
England, 2017).  However, urban/rural 
divide (17% of premises in rural areas 
in UK lack this and 27% in Scotland).172 
Good progress on mobile phone 
coverage (indoor tel. coverage to 90% 
of UK premises) but this falls to 57% in 
rural areas.173 
Just 18% of rural premises in UK can 
receive indoor 4G service from all 
operators compared to 64% in urban 
areas.174 
UK relatively high in EU rankings: - 3rd 
in fixed broadband take-up (87% of 
households in 2016).175 
EC Report (2017) commends UK in 
being one of the few countries in the 
EU that has a comprehensive 
 UK Government to 
invest £1bn in full fibre 
deployment and 5G by 
2020-21.179viii  Digital Economy Bill 
(2017) is the 
GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s atteŵpt 
to ensure that Britain 
remains at forefront of 
21st century economy, 
encouraging greater 
use of digital 
technology across the 
public sector.  The EU͛s oďjeĐtiǀe is to 
ensure that every 
company and 
household has 
broadband access at a 
speed of at least 
30MBs by 2020180ix. 
 Increased health and wellbeing of communities and 
families as digital participation increases, and products 
that enable independent living and expansion of tele-
health are supported.  Wilson et al. (2018) estimate that if digital constraints 
were overcome, the increase in annual business 
turnover in those areas would grow by at least £15bn 
and increase GVA in rural areas by at least £12bn 
p.a.183xii  EURACTV (2017) sees farmer organisations playing a 
greater role in encouraging take-up of technology that 
supports their members.184xiii  It suggests the 
introduction of an agricultural sustainable productivity 
bonus in the CAP to support green technology 
investments like smart farming.  They argue that 
precision farming allows higher productivity, less 
pesticide use and less waste in agriculture.    EURACTIV (2017) argues consumers will benefit from 
smart agriculture as the quality of food will be 
improved.185xiv  Use of high-tech tools such as GPS 
Independent living will 
be enabled/extended 
for the elderly in rural 
areas. 
There will be a 
reduction in social 
isolation of older people 
by providing them with 
internet access and 
digital skills. 
Better signposting to 
digital support & 
support for 
connectivity, training & 
e-commerce to be 
available on a single 
portal. 
Creation of more digital 
enterprise hubs in rural 
towns which businesses 
can use or visit for 
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computing curriculum in compulsory 
education from the age of 5.176 
However, almost 1/3 of population did 
not have basic digital skills in 2016. 
5% of employed individuals in the UK 
are IT specialists, ranking 3rd in the EU. 
In a study by Rural England and 
“ĐotlaŶd͛s ‘uƌal College 
(RESRC)(2017), almost 80% of rural 
businesses thought that the use of 
digital tools and services was 
important for their future growth 
potential.177vi 
However, 52% of RESRC survey 
respondents said that they faced 
issues with internet reliability and 
speed.  20% said that their workforce 
lacked sufficient digital skills and they 
had difficulty recruiting people who 
had them.178vii 
The number of SMEs involved in 
selling on-line is higher than the EU 
average (19% compared to EU average 
17%). 
 Ofcom is considering 
new coverage 
obligations on network 
suppliers and will also 
be working with 
industry and 
government to identify 
options for 
improvement to the 
dependence of mobile 
networks on mains 
power given that 70% 
of all calls to the 
emergency services are 
now made on mobile 
networks.181x  Northumberland aims 
to be the most 
connected rural county 
in Britain.  Since 1st 
April 2015, 
Northumberland has 
operated the 
Superconnected Cities 
voucher scheme which 
gives grants of up to 
systems, devices controlling sprayers and fertiliser 
distribution, and censors will contribute to a more 
sustainable & measurable impact on the 
eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt,͟186xv allowing pƌoduĐtioŶ of ͞ŵoƌe ǁith 
less.͟  Reduced brain-drain from rural areas as homes and 
businesses achieve greater connectivity.  Northumberland CC intends to increase number of 
public access points to broadband (currently 300 in 
2014) and ensure that low cost connectivity is part of 
tenancy contracts for social housing providers and 
private landlords.  They will explore the feasibility of 
creating a digital academy in Northumberland to help 
grow and retain digital skills and talent in the 
County.187xvi  The Cumbria Rural and Visitor Economy Growth Plan 
2017 recognises an opportunity for Cumbria to be a test 
bed for application of new technologies in rural areas 
and sees it as a priority to build the County as a location 
for 21st ĐeŶtuƌǇ ďusiŶesses.͟188xvii  Cumbria LEP (2017) sees an opportunity for the County 
to capitalise on roll-out of superfast broadband and its 
lifestyle offer to develop the ͞‘oĐkies pheŶoŵeŶoŶ͟ 
better connectivity, 
start-up workspace, hot 
desk space and digital 
training. 
Champion super-fast 
broadband take-up by 
rural businesses. 
More rural targeting of 
existing digital policies 
and strategies. 
A dedicated rural strand 
within the 
GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s pƌoposed 
Shared Prosperity Fund, 
capable of supporting 
digital skills and 
growth.190xix 
More small businesses 
will be exporting using 
e-commerce. 
Smarter digital training 
and skills development 
foƌ “ME͛s aŶd theiƌ 
employees. 
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Large and medium-sized businesses 
are more positive about digital 
benefits than small businesses. 
iNorthumberland and Connecting 
Cumbria have been working with BT to 
connect more of their couŶtǇ͛s 
communities and businesses to 
broadband, superfast broadband and 
ultrafast broadband. 
NCC has maximised digital 
transactions and agile working in 
council work. 
£3,000 to SME͛s to 
enable them to secure 
speeds of at least 
30mbps.182xi  Northumberland 
intends to embrace 
digital technology and 
harness its capacity to 
increase the 
participation and 
wellbeing of people 
with long-term 
conditions, disabilities 
and the elderly. 
especially in the south of the county.189xviii i.e. attract 
digital and creative firms to locate to Cumbria. 
Sector Challenges  Ability of rural businesses in accessing digital training.  Lack of digital skills in current work force & struggle to 
recruit those who have them (Cumbria).  Cumbria LEP (2017) recognises the technological driver 
as being a potential challenge to the tourism sector in 
Cumbria as the county will need to compete for 
connectivity and speeds obtained by staying visitors. 
 
Precision farming will 
allow higher 
productivity, less 
pesticide use and less 
waste in agriculture.  
Precision farming is also 
good for the 
environment. 
The quality of food will 
be improved through 
smart agriculture. 
 
  
                                                          
182 NCC (2015), p. 15. 
189 Cumbria LEP (2017), pp. 31-32 
  
ENVIRONMENT & RENEWABLE ENERGY SECTOR 
Current situation Drivers Short term opportunities/ challenges Medium term Long term target 
National 
Since the passing of the Climate 
Change Act, UK has out-performed 
its carbon budgets.  Since 1990, the 
UK has cut emissions by 42% while 
the economy has grown by approx. 
65%.191 
In 2016, 47% of electricity 
consumption was from low carbon 
sources, double the level in 2010. 
The UK has the largest offshore 
wind capacity in the world. 
Av. Household energy consumption 
has fallen by 17% since 1990. 
England recycles 4x what it did in 
2000 in local authority waste.192 
>430,000 jobs in low carbon 
businesses and their supply chains 
in the UK.  1 in 5 electric vehicles in 
use on the Continent are made in 
the UK.193 
Government intends 
to put emissions 
reductions and land 
stewardship at heart 
of post-EU 
agricultural policy. 
Climate Change Act 
(2008) commits UK 
to reducing 
greenhouse gas 
emissions by at least 
80% by 2050 
compared to 1990 
levels. 
Government. 
published Clean 
Growth Strategy, 
Oct. 2017 with 8 
strands.  PM states 
that ͞eĐoŶoŵiĐ 
growth has to go 
hand-in-hand with 
greater protection 
for our forests and 
Government will simplify applications for 
farmers wishing to enter existing schemes 
providing environmental benefits such as 
Countryside Stewardship.  Direct payments 
under the CAP will be phased out over the two-
year transition period from when we leave the 
EU iŶ MaƌĐh ϮϬϭϵ.  The Ŷeǁ sǇsteŵ ǁill ͞paǇ 
faƌŵeƌs puďliĐ ŵoŶeǇ foƌ puďliĐ goods.͟198 
GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt ǁishes to ͞iŶĐeŶtiǀise ŵethods of 
farming that create new habitats for wildlife, 
increase biodiversity, reduce flood risk, better 
mitigate climate change and improve air quality 
ďǇ ƌeduĐiŶg agƌiĐultuƌal eŵissioŶs.͟ 
LeaǀiŶg the EU ǁill Ŷot affeĐt the UK͛s 
commitments under the Climate Change Act – 
UK has more ambitious targets than the EU. 
The National Productivity Investment Fund will 
provide an additional £4.7bn and an extra £2bn 
p.a. by 2020-21 in UK science, innovation and 
research. 
Phase out installation of high carbon forms of 
fossil fuel heating.  Government will spend 
£4.5bn to support innovative low carbon heat 
UK to develop one of the 
best electric vehicle 
charging networks in the 
world. 
UK to accelerate the 
transition to zero 
emission vehicles. 
Position the UK at 
forefront of Connected 
and Autonomous vehicle 
technologies and ensure 
UK leads the world in 
design, development and 
manufacture of electric 
batteries. 
Carbon capture usage 
and storage to be 
deployed on a large scale. 
UK to phase out use of 
unabated coal to produce 
electricity by 2025. 
Energy 
productivity in 
businesses and 
industry to be 
increased by at 
least 20% by 
2030. 
All fuel-poor 
homes to be 
upgraded to EPC 
Band C by 2030. 
End the sale of 
new petrol and 
diesel cars and 
vans by 2040. 
Work towards 
zero avoidable 
waste associated 
with the 
extraction, use 
and disposal of 
our resources by 
2050. 
                                                          
191 HM Government (2017), p. 5. 
192 Ditto, p. 6. 
193 Ditto, p. 7. 
198 This is the GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s iŶteŶtioŶ set out iŶ a ĐoŶsultatioŶ doĐuŵeŶt oŶ the futuƌe of EŶglish faƌŵiŶg aŶd the eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt launched by the Environment 
Secretary on 17th February 2018, see Gove (2018b).  
 
  
UK is leading the world in expertise 
on low carbon and green 
technologies.  Global leadership in 
green finance.  North East 
Enterprise Zone focus is on energy 
sector and Blyth hosts the National 
Offshore Renewable Catapult 
Centre.  West Cumbria has NNL 
and Dalton Institute at West Lakes 
Science Park leading on renewable 
technologies. 
It is argued that the environmental 
effects of the CAP have been 
detrimental – loss of hedgerows, 
biodiversity, bees, birds. 
Regional 
Natural environment very 
important for all border counties in 
attracting tourists. 
Northumberland Economic 
Strategy records highest growth in 
the seĐtoƌ ͞MiŶiŶg, ƋuaƌƌǇiŶg aŶd 
utilities͟, up ϲϳ% iŶ peƌiod ϮϬϬϵ-13 
but still accounts for only 2% of 
total employment.194 
In 2011, there were 26 small hydro 
schemes in Cumbria and 23 in 
D&G.  Walney Windpark and its 
beaches, clean air 
and places of 
outstanding natural 
ďeautǇ.͟195 
Government states 
that the UK low 
carbon economy 
could grow by an 
estimated 11% p.a 
between 2015 and 
2030, 4 x faster than 
the rest of the 
economy and could 
deliver between 
£60bn and £170bn 
of export sales and 
services by 2030.196 
The Clean Growth 
Strategy (2017) will 
see Government 
invest over £2.5bn in 
support of low 
carbon innovation 
from 2015-21.197 
Energy sector 
identified in all 4 
Border authorities as 
a sector priority. 
technologies in homes and businesses between 
2016 and 2021. 
Improve the energy efficiency of homes and 
offer all households the opportunity to have a 
smart meter by 2020. 
Report annually on UK performance in 
delivering GDP growth and reduced emissions 
thƌough aŶ ͞EŵissioŶs IŶteŶsitǇ ƌatio.͟ 
Government to introduce a voluntary public 
sector target of a 30% reduction in carbon 
emissions by 2020-21. 
Explore new and innovative ways to manage 
emissions from landfill. 
Offshore wind, oil and gas activity key part of 
Northumberland offer. 
Nuclear new build in Cumbria could provide 
construction jobs for the County.  However, 
there is fear of lack of supply of skilled workers 
needed by expansion of economy on West 
Coast. 
Potential for growth in wind power – Scottish 
Borders has an abundance of suitable sites.  
However, local opposition a challenge. 
Growth potential in hydro-power.  
Cumbria LEP has considered the Solway Firth as 
a source of estuarine tidal power. 
UK to shift more freight 
from road to rail. 
Establish a new network 
of forests in England and 
increase the amount of 
UK timber used in 
construction. 
UK to develop world 
leading Green Finance 
capabilities. 
Invest in making cycling 
and walking the natural 
choice for shorter 
journeys. 
Expansion of jobs in 
Cumbria based on new 
build in nuclear on W. 
coast with consequent 
growth in 
accommodation sector, 
housing construction, 
service sectors and retail. 
 
 
                                                          
194 Northumberland County Council (2015b), pp. 17-18. 
195 HM Government (2017), p. 2 
196 HM Government (2017), p. 8. 
197 HM Government (2017), p. 11. 
  
extension, off the coast of 
Cumbria, is the biggest offshore 
windfarm in the world. 
 
 
 
 
 
